THE FABRICATION of ISRAEL

About the Usurpation and Destruction of Palestine through Israeli Zionist Spatial Planning

A Unique Planning Issue

Author’s Edition
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Dedication

This book is dedicated to all the people who lost their homes for the Israel Project.
You will meet them all over the world and some of them we met here and there - listen to some of them.

'I am Omar, born in Irbid/Jordan, living in Germany, married to a German and working as a doctor. My family is from Jaffa. When Jaffa was threatened by the Zionist militia my grandmother fled by boat like many others in 1948. The boat was supposed to go to Egypt, but had to change direction and landed in Beirut. She and her five children, one of them my father, were put into one of the many refugee camps. My uncle, brother of my mother - her husband already died - had fled to Jordan and landed in Irbid. He searched for his sister and finally found her in Beirut. He brought the whole family to Irbid. I was born in Irbid, but I am Palestinian.'

'I am Khalid, born in Um El Fahem/Israel, living there with my family, working as an engineer. My family is originally from Hebron-Al Khalil, today part of the West Bank. In 1947 after UN Resolution 181 my grandfather sent his son, my father, who was only 18 years old, to the area of Um El Fahem, where the family had land. He wanted my father to look at it and to preserve the documents to the land. He went there, stayed for a while, and when he wanted to come back Israel had been founded and he could not return. He lost touch with the family and was eventually married in Um El Fahem. His land is now the location of a new colony. I was born in Israel and I am Palestinian.'

'I am Lina, born in Birzeit, living in the West Bank, working as university lecturer. My mother’s family is from the Netanya area. Every night my grandma, Um Michel, watches the blinking light at the coast remembering the time when she, 12 years old, had to flee with her mother from their village. They arrived in Birzeit where we live now. I am a refugee in my own country, Palestine.'

'I am Khalil, born in Nablus, living in Peking, a student at the sport university. My family left Nablus in the ‘67 war and fled to Saudi Arabia. They have residence there and Israel's occupation prevents them from coming back to Nablus. I did not get the residency right of my parents and cannot go to Nablus as well. I lost any identity and China is only giving me permission for a limited stay. I don't know what will happen. I have no passport, and I am a Palestinian.'

'I am Amina, living in Amman/Jordan, working as a researcher in an institute. My family is from Kufr Labad, Tulkarem, where I was born. In '67 my father lived under Jordanian occupation in Amman, where he found work. He was denied entry back to Palestine, therefore the whole family had to leave and join him in Amman. All my family can only visit our house as tourists. My mother has a big plot of olive trees. We don't know how long we can harvest on our land. I am Jordanian now, and a Palestinian.'

'I am Yasser, born in Spain, living in Anata/Jerusalem, working as an engineer at Birzeit University. My family is from Anata. My father left the West Bank after 1967 to find work and a future. He married a Spanish lady. I came back to Palestine with my Spanish passport to study in my country, to marry a Palestinian and to live in my family's house. I am 'illegal' here in my own country, Palestine.'

'I am Moussa, born in Beirut in a refugee camp, now living in New York and working in my own pet shop. My family is from Beit Umma, West Bank. During the first
Libanon war I was defending my people; after the PLO had to leave from Beirut I had to leave too and came to New York to study. But I had no support and I started to work as a businessman. I am a refugee, with an American passport. I am a Palestinian, but I may visit my country only as a tourist. If I visit Israel will put me in jail as a former fighter, so I cannot visit.'

'I am Mohammed, born in a refugee camp close to Amman. My family were bedouin from the Bir Saba area. They were thrown out in 1948 by the Zionist militia and fled over the Jordan river to the East Bank. I studied in Germany, but did not finish my studies. I had to go back to Jordan, married, and work now as a tour guide for German groups. I am still living in the camp. I am a Palestinian refugee, forced to live in Jordan.'

'I am Mariyam. I was born in Jifna, West Bank. After I finished my education at the Schmidt School in Jerusalem I went to Germany to study pharmacology. I finished and married a German. Therefore Israel refused the extension of my passport. Since then I am 'staatenlos', however I am a Palestinian.'

'I am Jihad, I was born in Jerusalem and my family is from Jerusalem originally. I married a Japanese lady and went to Japan for a while. I am a businessman, but what can I do in my poor country?. Every year I come back for some weeks to see my mother and the family to help me maintain my identity as a Palestinian. This time Israel refused to extend my identity card. For three months I've been at the American Colony Hotel, waiting for a court decision. I am a Palestinian and a Jerusalemite, born in Jerusalem, and cannot live without it'.

An endless story
Abstract

The fabrication of the Jewish State of Israel was done by political planners; planners who understood a lot about the power of space and imperial strategies in occupying foreign countries. Their plans were in good harmony with the interests of the main European imperial powers of the time in that specific region, well known for its wealth of resources. Together they were intent on taking all possible steps to realize the idea of a physical base for a Jewish state through policies related to religion, historical interpretation, geography, culture, and finally, space and land.

All this was justified with the persecution of Jews in Europe since the 19th century and even more with the Nazi policy of systematically killing and expelling most of the Jews from Germany and Europe from 1936 to 1945, known as the Holocaust.

Correspondingly, institutions, regulations, and funds were established since the first Zionist Congress was held in Basle in 1897. Since then these measures successfully assisted in seizing Palestinian land and colonising it with Jews from abroad. The main tool used in taking land from Palestinians was the exploitation of land and property laws as well as planning regulations declared by the Ottoman Empire and later by the British Mandate. Through that policy the Zionist institutions did not occupy more than 6-7% of the land of Palestine in the Mandate borders. When the British withdrew in 1948, the State of Israel was declared unilaterally and by force and around 60% of Palestine came under Zionist control, including the biggest part of the coast, the most fertile plains, and most water resources. An additional expulsion policy utilising the British emergency laws and a world-wide 'hunt for migrants' filled this occupied land with Jews from all over the world and emptied it of Palestinians in a very short time, reducing the Palestinian population inside Israel ‘borders’ to half of the former Palestinians living in this part of Palestine. The other half then became refugees in their own land (West Bank and Gaza Region), or went to reside outside their country. Observing that this, as granted by many Israeli writers, was done systematically we might call it the first phase of the Palestinian genocide.

After 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Region, and East Jerusalem - again by military force - the same procedure was followed. The same laws were exploited to expropriate and expel even more Palestinians in addition to killing many. This consequently was a second phase in executing the genocide of the Palestinians.

Of course this planned and systematic undertaking created conflicts. Palestinians fought this project as soon as it was clear that it would lead to their total expropriation and eventual elimination from the geographic map. In 1948 around three quarters of the nation was systematically expelled from its land by force. This does not include the thousands of Palestinians who left before 1948 because of limited expectations under the British Mandate and beginning conflicts with the Zionist militia. It is recorded by Israeli writers that special death forces wiped out the total male population of villages between 1947 and 1949 by purpose and program. In addition, more than 500 villages were destroyed and left in ruins or were totally erased. Until today more than half of the nation is living outside their mother country as 'recognised' refugees. Many thousands were killed by Israeli soldiers after 1967. Palestinians in Israel are being stripped of their properties until today, leaving approximately 6% of their original land in their hands in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem regions. Their property was confiscated for Israeli use leaving less
than 20% of the total Palestinian land. The destruction and plundering of archaeological sites and the destruction of the unique landscape by military and private activities deprived the Palestinians of their cultural, social and natural heritage. This is the result of systematic planning with very clear goals and correlating measures. As a national heritage is a constitutional part of a national identity, depriving a people from its history and identity must be considered a crucial crime; the fabrication of Israel in this manner is a crime. It can be considered as genocide of the 20th and 21st century, with lucid and perverse components. It might be called the geographic and cultural ‘holocaust of the Palestinians’ (Publisher Husni Ayesh in an interview with the editor 20.02.2007). According to Webster’s Encyclopaedia ‘holocaust’ stands for “a great or complete devastation or destruction”, a “systematic slaughter” and also for “any reckless destruction of life” – and this is what happened in Palestine against the Palestinians from the beginning of the Zionist project and what is still slowly continuing in a very cool and silent manner, based on ideology and clear aims.

The flow of this publication follows the flow of this systematic plan to fabricate a Jewish State at the expense of the Palestinians, their land, their culture and their properties. Beginning with the Congress of Basle in 1897, the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the UN division resolution 181 in 1947, the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem in 1967, until the recent construction of a gigantic wall and fences between Israeli colonies and Palestinian villages and cities, all of this was the work of reckless planners, geographers, architects, water managers and most of all the Zionist politicians and consequent Israeli governments, the accomplices. Planners in particular may understand the Israel project as a warning and a horrifying example showing the extent to which planning can be used not only to neglect, but to eliminate the powerless - against all proclaimed objectives of social, ecological, cultural or economical sustainability.

This publication portrays recent plans and programs for the next steps in splitting and reducing what is left of Palestine. This time these programs are proposed by international consultants and planning groups in co-operation with or alongside Israeli plans to divide the remainder of what was Palestine before the Jewish State was proclaimed, in addition to being another step in the Palestinian genocide. Finally, an outlook to a just solution will be given based on existing UN resolutions which are still considered valid and the basis for peace by the international community.
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Introductory Statement

This book intends to summarise findings about the special character of Zionist ‘planning’ in Palestine and Israel, translated into a planning policy over a period of more than a hundred years. For a long time the editors were following changes in land use and colonisation through ethnocratic planning and plans in the country of Palestine according to Mandate borders before 1947/1948. After the definite eradication of the so called ‘peace process’ by Sharon in 2000 it seems time again to find an explanation for the existing conflict over this land and to identify its genuine character beyond the daily news focussing on current conflict configurations. Today even Israeli scientists argue that different discriminatory mechanisms and policies are applied by the State of Israel on the indigenous Palestinian (Arab) people (Fenster 1996, Yiftachel 1999, Khamaisi 2002, Pappe 2006 and others). What was once called illegal expropriation or unjust expulsion has come to be referred to as ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ (Pappe 2006) and even ‘Genocide’ (Voelkermond) (Shamir 2005, Leibowitz1994) and ‘cultural and geographical Holocaust’ (Ayesh 2007, for definition see Lemkin 1944, ).

We believe in facts and history explaining both the present and future and therefore went back to the roots and the beginning of the project of establishing a Jewish State through the usurpation of Palestine, trying to find the mechanism that led to the present conflict from its beginning. The focus is also related to scientists who carried out studies dealing with majority/minority relationships in terms of urbanisation and power (Greed 2000, Yiftachel 1995, Forester 1989 and others).

Knowledge helps understanding. Therefore, identifying the character of the planning which led to the fabrication of the State of Israel and its consequences for the present situation is our issue. Modern planning is a western habitude of controlling land use and spatial development according to the interests of either a state and/or main economic stakeholders. Normally it is agreed on as ‘serving the interests of the whole nation’ (German planning law and others). In the context of relations between ‘imperial countries’ and ‘third world countries’ planning can deteriorate to a unique tool of unfair control over territory, property and people to the disadvantage of the powerless. Just and social accomplishment will then only appear after fight and struggle. This is what the editors understand as having happened and as continuing to happen in Israel/Palestine.

At the end of the 19th century the Zionist Movement decided to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, claiming Palestine as the initial national home for the Jews as a people. The Ottoman Empire at that time was losing its power. The European imperial powers, Britain and France, were preparing to inherit as much as possible from the empire: territory, natural resources, and people. The coincidence of Zionists’ national plans and European economic desires made this late colonial project possible. It was established by means of expulsion and land robbery. Warning voices like King/Crane of 1920 in their report to the League of Nations peace congress about the political and geographical aspirations of the people in that region were ignored.

50 years after proclaiming the State of Israel, there is no peace and no justice or equity. Not only had the editors identified the fabrication of Israel as a result of the
unfairness that sprang from the idea of the founding of the State. Mainly tactic and imperial thinking of the first Zionist Congress in 1897 led to the idea of establishing a Jewish state on Palestinian land. In addition, it was part of imperial desires of the European powers when Palestine and the whole area were divided into Mandate areas and came under the British Mandate, after Britain promised the land to both the Arabs in the Sykes Picot treaty in 1916 and the Zionist movement in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. It was a violation of Palestinian rights and an unjust decision when the United Nations, in 1947, declared the division of Palestine, giving around 60% of Ottoman Palestine to the Zionist Movement for a Jewish State (although the Jews owned not more than 6-7% of Palestinian land) and proposing an area of less than 40% to the Palestinian side. Furthermore, the State of Israel was founded on more than 70% of historical Palestine after military aggression against Palestinian people, villages and cities. All this was realised through the process of planning copied from Europe and supported by European forces, and eventually war. Under the Ottomans sovereign Jews, Christians and Muslims lived beside each other, as long as they paid their obligations, such as taxes and military service. Since the invasion of the Zionist Movement, from the end of the 19th century on, Palestine changed into an area of conflict, where religion was turned into politics and became an important segregation factor between Jewish Zionists and indigenous people, the Palestinians.

During the past centuries the world had already experienced colonial occupation, land usurpation and abuse of the lands of other peoples: the Incas, the Red Indians, the Maori, the Australian indigenous people, and so on.

The Prussian way of extending their sandy empire three hundred years ago was well known to the Zionist movement: building colonies like forts, networking them step by step through main roads and military posts, finally surrounding the local people (the Slavs) and giving them only one alternative: to live under Prussian control, or to leave and risk the destruction of what they lived on (Diner 1980). This strategy is copied and documented in an article by one of the ideologists of the Zionist model. Oppenheimer commented at the Zionist Congress in 1903:

"Our beginning must therefore be: co-operative villages of peasants; this is the lesson of history, of economic science and our sacred tradition. But how shall it come about? Now, my friends, we should stretch a net of peasant colonies over the land we wish to acquire. To stretch a net pegs must first be driven in between which the net is to appear. Then between these pegs are stretched strong ropes, between the ropes are thick strings, and so there is a coarse network in which as need arises an ever finer network can be woven by introducing finer string just so should we, I think, proceed. As far as the means at our disposal suffice we should acquire wide stretches of land in all parts of the country, and where possible only such as guarantee certain results from agricultural labour by the constitution of the soil and facilities for irrigation. At the same time from among the great numbers of Jewish agriculturists to be found in Galicia, Romania and Russia emigrants must be attracted and set on their way to the settlements." (Oppenheimer 1903)

This statement simply explains how land usurpation through planning became a main instrument in changing the country into a fabricated Jewish territory, and also shows that conflicts were imminent.

The main aim of this book is to give the reader a better understanding of the basis of the present and enduring conflict. It should not be discriminated against as ‘anti-Semitic’ propaganda; this is not at all what we want to do. We want to help the
realization of peace and justice for the people of this region. We do not address political issues such as the violation of human rights, abuse of the Geneva Convention or neglecting UN resolutions from the Israeli side since the state began functioning. Accordingly we do not speak about terrorism or other criminal actions to justify neither Israel’s military operations nor Palestinian reactions to that. We only report what happened and continues to happen, the continuation of wise and purposeful planning in order to reduce Palestinian living space and how this is possible. In fact, the basis of this process is the Zionist project to establish another nation on the land of an existing people, along with European and American support and interests in the region. As long as Israel insists on being a ‘Jewish State’, refusing civil and democratic equality for ‘non Jews’, the conflict will remain. Furthermore, there will be no just and lasting peace, not for the Israelis and not for the Palestinians, if this ethnocratic, or rather racist, ‘regime’ remains, Palestinians’ national rights continue to be refused, and Israeli planners still adhere to the colonisation concept, realising its plan against a Palestinian reality. To promote this conclusion is another intention of this book. Planners have to insist on democratic and just solutions to spatial conflicts about land resources and land use and should not serve imperial desires.

The fabrication process of Israel until today will be unfolded as follows.

Chapter one will give a short introduction into the geo-political and socio-economic situation of Palestine in Mandate borders.

Chapter two is meant to give a historic overview of the initial colonisation process, introducing Zionist ideology as characteristic for the practiced (later Israeli) planning policy until the end of the British Mandate and the unilateral declaration of the Jewish State in Palestine on May 15, 1948.

Chapter three will look into the Zionist systematic planning within Israel from 1948 on, first showing the ‘consolidation phase’ and then giving an overview of the main planning policy until today, from structure to results and later on presenting two case studies, typical for the ethnocratic character of Zionist planning. The first case study concerns the housing situation executed on the town of Tayibe; the second illustrates the situation of the ‘unrecognised’ localities and the Bedouin.

Chapter four comments on this policy in more detail and is focussing on the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Region after the 1967 occupation. We then examine the meaning of the colonies and the strategies behind the planning. Two examples illustrate the impact of planning and the strategy behind it: the water question and the problem of mobility – given the actual aggression of the recently erected wall.

Chapter five deals with two main cities in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Hebron, and Jaffa, in Israel, core subjects for the Israeli colonisation project. Jerusalem, which is deteriorating as a result of the multiculturalism and many religions which abide in it, is becoming an exclusive ethnic ghetto for Jewish majorities as a result of expropriation and expulsion of others.

Chapter six deals with future plans for Palestine within the region: again the Israeli national plan 2020, the Palestinian plan for 2015, the international proposal of the ‘Arch’ and the ‘Multinational Belts’ of international planning groups. Finally we will examine the Jordanian/Israeli ‘Jordan Valley Project’ and look at the future.

We will use the words ‘colony’ and ‘colonist’, not the innocuous terms ‘settlement’ or ‘settlers’, which could be confusing, considering that ‘human settlement’ is used
differently in a planner’s context. We use the term ‘Israelis’, not ‘Jews’, when we speak about citizens of Israel. ‘Jewish’ or ‘Jews’ is used only as far as concerns Israel, if it describes the situation before Israel existed, or when the context needs this differentiation. For Israeli citizens we differentiate between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Israelis. We use the word Zionism, because this is the leading ideology of the project of the state of Israel and is not to be confused with Judaism or Semitism. If we speak about Palestine we refer to a common understanding of ‘Palestine’ according to the map of the United Nations in 1947 based on the borders of the British Mandate from fall of the Ottoman Empire. We do not use the modified context of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Region or East Jerusalem. We differentiate between West- (Israeli) Jerusalem and East- (Palestinian) Jerusalem, according to the geopolitical situation after 1948, before East Jerusalem was usurped as the ‘unified capital of Israel’ in 1967. We use the term ‘Palestinian’ and not ‘Arab’, though Israel describes them officially as ‘Arabs’ or as ‘non-Jews’ not willing to accept the Palestinians as a people and a nation and to justify any national desire of Palestinians or a state of Palestine.

As we sum up facts of history our main tool is the use and interpretation of facts and documents in context. The understanding (theories) behind the evaluation of these facts goes back to theories of power relation (Foucault), cultural differences and minorities (Yiftachel) and Orientalism (Said) as well as planning theories related to just land use and territory (Harvey).

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I Brief Information on Country and Society and the Current Territorial, Political and Socio-economic Situation in Palestine

(According to British Mandate borders)

A brief portrait of the country of Palestine (pre-1947 borders) aims to give a current impression of the geography, population and income resources of the West Bank, Gaza Region and East Jerusalem. This is the area that was agreed upon in the peace process as a possible future Palestinian State and is rich in resources, diversity and potential. This might clarify some facts in contrast to the common proposal that Israel was ‘greening a desert’ and populating an unused field.

Palestine throughout its history has been an area of transition. Its strategic location between Africa, Asia and Europe invited empires and regional powers to plunder it, to occupy it or to use it as a land bridge between continents. Contrary to the Zionist argument that this country was empty, there are many documents on its cultural and social abundance and its economic prestige in the Middle East prior to the establishment of the State of Israel. If we look at the 19th century, the region of Palestine had many assets for a growing economy. Agricultural land, its main source of income, was well developed. Palestine had a strong practice of exporting agricultural products to Europe and was famous for its excellent olive oil. The country exported stone predominantly used for building, as well as handicrafts of many kinds. This prosperous atmosphere eventually came to a standstill with the imperialist impediments. (Schoelch, 1982)

Under British Mandate Palestine (officially 1923-1948) Zionist institutions were supported to the utmost, while Palestinian landowners and farmers were barred from investment. Before the British left in 1948, the United Nations decided (Resolution No. 181) in November 1947 to partition the country. This fact accomplished the Zionist aspiration to end the socio-economic, cultural, and geographical continuity of the Palestinians (see chapter II).

During the war between 1947 and 1949, Israel usurped: the coastal plane with its rich agricultural capital; the bulk of the coast and important harbours; the Negev with its minerals and the entrance to the Red Sea and Africa; the northern Galilee hills around Nazareth; the Hula region rich with water; lake Taberiya, with its significant water resources from the Lebanon and Syrian mountains, including a large part of the Jordan River Valley as a strategic position for water and borders. After Israel had taken complete control over the Palestinians and usurped most of their land, the occupation of the Gaza region and the West Bank followed in 1967, the latter important because of the two big water basins, the northern and the southern. These two aquifers feed the whole country and are still under Israeli control (see chapter III).

Moreover, control over the West Bank allows Israel to continue grabbing the fertile olive and grape fields, the quarries, many historical sites, and particularly the Old City of Jerusalem and the ‘Wailing Wall’ (see chapter IV and V).
Geography

The borders of the area which, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, became a separate country under the British Mandate made up the area of Palestine. Palestine is a small country of around 28,000sqkm, approximately 350 km long with a narrowest width of 60km.

Despite its small size, Palestine has various climates and landscapes, and features animal and plant species from Mediterranean coastal, mountainous, and desert regions (PACE, 1999:17 f; ARIJ, 2000; ARIJ, 1997, Richter 1969). In Palestine, we find the lowest point on earth, the Jordan valley, up to 400 m below sea level, and the smallest oasis in the world on the west side of the Jordan valley. The main cities, Hebron, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin and Nazareth (from south to north), situated on the western slopes of the Jordan rift, enjoy typical Mediterranean climates. Jerusalem, for example, is about 1,000 m above sea level, enjoys the hot Mediterranean summer as well as occasional snow during its winter.

Westward the slopes softly pass into the agriculturally productive coastal plain. The coast from north to south is the location of ancient cities like Akka, Haifa, Jaffa, Askalan, Majdal and Gaza; some of these have been inhabited for centuries. Tel Aviv, founded at the beginning of the 20th century as a 'pure Jewish' city, is the hectic coastal centre of Israel, like other new towns such as Netanya or Hadera, constructed after the foundation of the State of Israel, generally on the ruins of Palestinian villages or towns (see chapter III).

The southern part of the coast is semi-arid. Heavy rainfalls in winter are followed by a long, hot, dry summer period. The fertile sand dunes of the Gaza region, covering most of the area, are important for the ecosystem, collecting the heavy rains and
filtering them gradually to the groundwater. The Negev region, besides being a desert area, is rich in important minerals. (Pace 1999)

Map 2 Palestine geography

![Map of Palestine](image)


**Population and socio-economic situation**

Accurate data for the population composition of the entire area of Palestine is difficult to find and differ from various sources: pre-1948 Ottoman, or British, current Palestinian, Israeli, or international. Furthermore, Israeli statistics include the Palestinians and the settlers in East Jerusalem and the Israeli settlers in the West Bank, whilst the Palestinian statistics do not count them, which make it even more difficult to differentiate exactly between region and ethnicity or nationality.

**Today’s population in the borders of Mandate Palestine, characteristics and figures**

We can estimate today a population of 11 million people living in all of Palestine, approximately 5-5.5 million Jews/Israelis, and 5-5.5 million Palestinians, a relation of 50% to 50% (see (I)CBS, (Israeli) Central Bureau of Statistics, census 2007, PCBS, Palestinian Centre Bureau of Statistics, census 2007, 2009).

In **Israel**, within the borders of 1948, in 2009 ICBS recorded 7,411 inhabitants, 5,472 million Jews (including 187,000 living in West Bank colonies, 20,000 in Golan Heights and around 177,000 in East (Palestinian) Jerusalem) and 1,498 million Palestinians in Israel, forming 20.6% of Israeli society. Jews born in Israel have come to represent
nearly 70%, compared to 36% in 1848. With regard to origin, 37.5% of Jews come from Israel, 34.8% from Europe/USA, 15.5% from Africa and 12.2% from Asia; 37.5% of all of them have a father born in Israel (CBS 2009: 158). Israeli society is still largely a society made up of immigrants.

In the 1967 occupied **Palestinian territories**, in 2009 the PCBS recorded 3.9 million **Palestinians** (census 2007: 3,761,464), in the West Bank around 2.4 million (census 2007: 2,345,107), the Gaza Strip 1.5 million (census 2007: 1,416,539), including 362,000 in East Jerusalem (census 2007: 240,000). Between 40,000 and 100,000 of them were returnees, expelled in either 1948 or 1967, or those who lost their residency while living abroad for studies. Some of these entered the occupied territories during the peace process according to the Oslo agreements. The majority of these were ‘Tunisians’, cadres and militants of the PLO forming the new administration and government and the security forces and police; others were American-Palestinians who generally settled in the West Bank (MERIP 212, 2006).

For the year 2008, 187,000 **Israelis** in the West Bank, or ca. 8% of the total population, were registered as living in West Bank colonies and 177,000 in East Jerusalem (July 2008). The origins of one-third of those living in West Bank colonies are Israeli-born, with one or both parents born in Israel; one-third of them has an Asian/African background, one-third an American/European background. More than 50% consider themselves orthodox or ultra orthodox, 35% of them work in Israel, and a quarter of them own a home in Israel as well (CPRS Polls 1999).

**Different characteristics**

**Youth:** While in 2009 one quarter of the population in Israel is under 14 years of age (28.4%), the Palestinian society of the occupied territories is much younger, with children under 15 making up nearly half of the society (WB 40.4%, Gaza 44.9%) (CBS 2009, PCBS 2009).

**Growth rate, mortality, life expectancy:** The growth rate of the population in Israel is 1.8%, and in Palestine 3.9% in the 1967 occupied territories (o.t.) in 2009; the fertility rate is 4.1 births per women in the Palestinian 1967 o.t. and 2.96 in Israel (Jews 2.88, Muslims 3.84, Christians 2.11’) (CBS 2009, PCBS 2009); the infant mortality rate is 24.2 per 1000 births for Palestinians in the o.t. and 3.8 for Israelis (2.9 for Jews, 6.8 for Muslims, Jewish settlers in the WB 3.0); life expectancy is 72.5 for Palestinians in the o.t. and 83.0 for Israelis in 2008 (83.3 for Jews, 79.7 for Muslims) (CBS 2009, PCBS 2009).

**Household size:** In Palestinian communities in the occupied territories of 1967 the average family has 5.8 members, in the West Bank 5.5 in Gaza and in the refugee camps 6.5 persons (2007), in Israeli Palestinian communities the average is around 4.8 persons per household in 2007. The average Israeli household is made up of 3.3 persons in 2008 (Jews 3.1; Arabs 4.8) (CBS 2009, PCBS 2009).

**Religion:** The majority of Palestinians are Muslims; Christian Palestinians form about 2% of the West Bank population, living mainly in the district of Bethlehem, as well as in East Jerusalem in 2009. In Israel the majority is considered to be Jews, 75.6%; the majority of ‘non-Jews’ are Muslim (mostly Palestinians), 16.1%; there is a small minority of Christians, most of them found around Nazareth, making up about 2.1%, with Druse at 1.6%, and Bahai (CBS 2007/2009, PCBS 2009).
**Literacy/illiteracy:** In 2008 the illiteracy rate in the '67 occupied territories was recorded as 5.9% (among those of 15 or older), illiteracy in Israel in 2008 was 4.68%; 13.4% of Arab women were considered illiterate compared to 3.4% of Jews; 5.5% of Arab men, compared with 1.9% of Jewish men (CBS 2008, 2009, PCBS 2009).

**Location of people:** The *Palestinians* living in Israel are concentrated in certain regions, especially in Jaffa and Haifa, both on the coast, in the so-called triangle around Um-el Fahem, as well as in the north in Galilee with Nazareth as their main city and the Bedouins living in the Negev. In Israel, a special definition is used for a group of Palestinians: ‘unrecognised people’, living in unrecognised areas. They are Palestinians and compose around 100,000 people, including around 86,000 Bedouins in the Negev, in approximately 100 villages (IMEMC 2006, see section III). The *Jewish Israelis* are urban, a high percentage concentrated in the coastal cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants from Haifa to Ashqelon (11 of 14 such cities, with together 2.2 million people according to CBS 2009), only 500,000 *Jewish Israelis* or 8% live and work in rural localities, *moshavim* or *kibbutzim* (CBS 2009).

The Palestinians in the occupied territories as a fact of circumstance are becoming more and more urban, 73.3% living in the main cities (5 of them with more than 100,000 inhabitants according to PCBS 2009). Many of these are especially attracted by Ramalla's growing financial and administrative importance.

*Israelis* in the occupied territories of 1967 live exclusively in colonies, some in cities of up to 50,000 inhabitants (Ma’ale Adumim), and some in small ‘pioneer’ military camps of houses, intended to become villages or part of cities (see chapter IV).

Of approximately 11 million *Palestinians* in the world, more than 7 million, or around 67%, are so-called ‘displaced persons’, among them 5.2 million estimated as living outside of Palestine; 6.6 million are registered refugees.

The entire *Jewish* world community is estimated at 14 million; more than 8 million Jews live in countries other than Israel. Some 6.5 million Jews live in North America, the biggest Jewish community outside of Israel, and 1.5 million live in Europe (see table 1).

### Table 1 Population composition and regional distribution in Israel/Palestine 2004/5, different sources and information (in million, rounded up)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Palestinian 69 occupied Territories POT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Location / No. in mill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews *</td>
<td>5.472</td>
<td>0.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>0,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews outside</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians outside</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Jews</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Palestinians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Palestinian Refugees

According to United Nations statistics (UNWRA, 2008), today about 4.7 million Palestinians are registered refugees, descendants of those who were expelled in the first ‘ethnic cleansing act’ and fled from their homes during the wars of 1947/1949 (around 750,000 displaced persons) or 1967 (around 950,000 displaced persons); thus about 43% of all Palestinians are registered refugees (PCBS 2009, Pappe 2002). 1,373,732 million, or 30%, still live in camps run by the UNWRA (United Nation World Relief Agency for the Middle East, established for the Palestinian refugees), the majority of which are in Jordan, with some in Syria and Lebanon as well. In the West Bank, the Gaza Region, and East Jerusalem, 1.8 million, or 32%, of all Palestinian inhabitants in the o.t. are registered refugees, of which 754,263 are in the West Bank and 1,059,584 in Gaza. A total of 688,376 are still living in camps; in the West Bank in 19 camps, forming 6.5% of the West Bank’s population, and in the Gaza Region in 8 camps, forming 31% of the total Gaza Population (PCBS 2006). These refugees and their descendants still maintain their right of return to Palestine, which is upheld through UN resolutions such as 194 Art. 11, and international law (UN 2007). (see table 2)

Table 2 UNWRA registered refugees June 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location/Region</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>In Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Bank</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>19,111</td>
<td>8,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>222,140</td>
<td>46,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>174,572</td>
<td>48,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>338,440</td>
<td>97,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Bank total</strong></td>
<td><strong>754,263</strong></td>
<td><strong>191,408</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gaza</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabalia</td>
<td>192,258</td>
<td>107,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rimal</td>
<td>170,118</td>
<td>81,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeitun</td>
<td>135,281</td>
<td>61,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuseirat</td>
<td>123,838</td>
<td>20,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deir El Balah</td>
<td>88,048</td>
<td>31,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Yunis</td>
<td>179,199</td>
<td>67,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafah</td>
<td>170,842</td>
<td>98,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gaza total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,059,584</strong></td>
<td><strong>492,299</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>50,066</td>
<td>0,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>81,217</td>
<td>37,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saida</td>
<td>101,627</td>
<td>59,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre</td>
<td>107,025</td>
<td>56,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>59,767</td>
<td>49,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beqaa</td>
<td>16,906</td>
<td>7,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon total</strong></td>
<td><strong>416,608</strong></td>
<td><strong>220,809</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syria</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>358,603</td>
<td>72,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>25,636</td>
<td>9,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homs-Hama</td>
<td>39,366</td>
<td>22,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>33,378</td>
<td>18,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syria total</strong></td>
<td><strong>456,983</strong></td>
<td><strong>123,646</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The number of real displaced persons from 1967 is approximately one million according to PRRN information; many of whom were also 1948 refugees. The overwhelming majority of these are in Jordan.

**Economic and living situation**

For both parts, Israel and the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories, an extremely high dependence on external financial help is necessary. While huge international help to Israel was always a ‘must’, not only for Germany (‘Wiedergutmachung’), America and the international Jewish and Zionist community support half of Israel’s national budget; Palestinians, as they have lacked and continue to lack sovereign state and an independent government, have since the occupation obtained support from Arab countries for ‘resistance’, or ‘sumud’, and family remittances from abroad have played and continue to play a major role. Since the Oslo agreement, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Region (not in usurped East Jerusalem) have been funded by international agreements, with specific requirements on how the money is used. Furthermore, the economy is extremely dependent on Israel for its market, electricity, and water supply. While Israel has a modern industry-based economy, the Palestinian territories still subsist mainly on small family businesses.

For both societies, the unstable political situation does not allow a healthy, self-sufficient economic environment. Military and ‘security’ costs are a burden for Israel, and damage and closures hinder Palestinian development. However, Israel as a state pays for much of the social costs for individuals: housing, health and education are subsidised and sufficient and affordable in general. Only those Palestinians who are able to pay may achieve good standards of education, health, or housing from private, religious or charitable institutions. Consequently, among the Palestinians poverty is widespread, especially among those living in refugee camps. The same applies to Palestinians in Israel, who cannot afford the same standard of living as the Jewish majority.

The unemployment rate in the ’67 occupied Palestinian territories is recorded as 25.4%, 19.5% for the West Bank and 37% for the Gaza region in 2007 (PCBS 2009; in comparison to the Israel average 6.1% in 2007 (CBS 2009), for the Arab population 11.9% in November 2009 (Jerusalem Post 5.11.2009) and 7.6% in May 2009 (Selengut 2009).

The relative poverty line according to consumption patterns (for reference household consisting of 2 adults and 4 children) were recorded as 2,375 NIS (New Israel Shekel) or US$ 580, and deep poverty line 1,975 NIS (US$ 482) in 2007 (PCBS 2009).

The poverty rate among Palestinian households was 34.4%, 23.6% for the West Bank and 55.7% for the Gaza Strip. The poverty rate according to income patterns was 57.3%, 47.2% for the West Bank and 76.9% for the Gaza Strip. (PCBS 2009)
The **deep poverty rate** was 23.8% for the whole Palestinian Territories in 2007, 13.9% in the West Bank and 43.0% in the Gaza Strip according to consumption patterns; according to income patterns, PCBS found 48.0% suffering from deep poverty, 37.3% in the West Bank and 69.0% of the Gaza Strip people (PCBS 2009).

In Israel CBS found 25% of all *Israelis*, or 2.1 million households, suffering from *poverty* below the poverty line of US$ 1,337 for a 5-person household in 2005 (Selengut 2009).

**Income**: In 2007 *Palestinian* workers earned on average 74.40 NIS (New Israeli Shekel) per day, in the West Bank 78.6 and in the Gaza Strip 65.4 NIS; monthly (6 working days per week) income was 1,765.60 NIS or US$ 431.18 in Israel, 1,866.40 NIS or US$ 455.80 in the West Bank and 1,569.60 NIS or US$ 383.17 (4.0948 NIS = 1 US$ in 2007) the Gaza Strip (PCBS 2009a); while Jewish workers in Israel got on average 7,749 NIS or US$ 1,892.40 in 2007 (CBS 2008).

*Israeli* workers at the same time earned on average 111 NIS (PCBS, 2000). Average *wages* per employee in Israel was about 7,755 NIS monthly in 2006 (CBS 14.09.06 (CBS 2006); the daily wage in 2005 for *Palestinians* was 65.4 NIS in the *West Bank* (6 days per week means monthly 1,570 NIS) and 57.7 NIS (means monthly 1,385 NIS) in the *Gaza Region*. (PCBS May 2006) (NIS 4.4877 per 1 US $ in 2005; 28.07.07 1 Euro = 5.89 NIS).

**Political Status**

*Israel* unilaterally proclaimed the state in May 15th in 1948 in borders agreed on as *cease-fire lines*. These ‘borders’, shutting in more land than proposed by the UN in the division plan (No. 181) of 1947, were the result of military aggression. *Israel* claims to be the only democratic state in the Middle East, but does not have a constitution. Instead *Israel* has a ‘Basic Law’ and many discriminatory practices and regulations towards the non-*Jews* in the country (see chapter III). From its first session, the Knesset, the *Israeli* parliament, proclaimed Jerusalem as the ‘indisputable capital’ of *Israel*. Tel Aviv was seen as an interim location of governmental institutions.

These activities of territorial usurpation against international agreements were immediately disputed in UN assemblies; many resolutions were passed demanding *Israeli* withdrawal – but were never executed. Furthermore, the occupation of the other parts of Palestine in 1967, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as the proclamation of Jerusalem as *Israel*’s capital in 1986, were rejected by international decisions and withdrawal was imposed on all *Israel* governments. Moreover, the colonisation, the changing of the demography, economy and political status, especially in East Jerusalem, were condemned as a violation of international law and the *Geneva Conventions* – and still are (UN Resolution 242, 1967) (UN 2007) (see map 3).

The political situation of the *Palestinian community inside Israel* is still precarious. Officially inhabitants of the state of *Israel*, they lack many of the benefits of *Jewish* inhabitants and suffer from various forms of discrimination (see chapter III).

*Palestine* was supposed to exist after the end of the Mandate status – but the double game of the imperial powers promised and planned the land for both: Britain to the Zionist Movement in the ‘Balfour Declaration’ in 1917, France and Britain to the *Arab Nations* in the Sykes-Picot-Treaty of 1916. The immigration and colonisation policy of the Zionist movement and international protection led to several division plans
between areas for ‘Jews’ and ‘Arabs’. Finally, in 1947 the imposed division of Palestine came to pass, and the Zionist Movement established the State of Israel as a Jewish State in 1948 after the withdrawal of Britain, guaranteeing all Jews in the world citizenship through the ‘law of return’ of 1950.

The Palestinians, like all other Arab nations at that time not at all willing to accept the division of their country by international force and law, could not establish their promised state, not even on what remained of their territory. The West Bank, including East Jerusalem, came under Jordanian rule and the Gaza region under Egyptian governance (see map 4). In 1967 Israel occupied both, and since then Israel’s military forces control both land and society. The ‘peace-process’ did not lead to peace; on the contrary both areas are again under Israeli military control and are divided into cantons. The two entities are extremely separated from each other, and a division of the West Bank into three parts is planned. The West Bank is already fragmented into three kinds of status: area A, under Palestinian ‘sovereignty’, includes the built-up areas only, consequently most of the villages and towns; area B, which should be under the control of both sides but in reality is under Israeli control, since Israel dominates security affairs; and area C, the area of the colonies, infrastructure, and by far the largest amount of land and main water resources, under complete Israeli government control (see map 5).

With the erection of the segregation wall and fences, a division into areas of Palestinian governed territory and Israeli governance has become even worse (see map 6). Most of the planned actions of withdrawal according to Oslo were not fulfilled on the Israeli side, even though the PLO and former president Yassir Arafat, as the head of the elected Palestinian Government, factually recognised Israel in signing all agreements with its governments. The efforts in the first years after Oslo to implement state structures and the planned development of rural and urban areas were hindered through political and military threats. However, the Palestinian leaders still demand a Palestinian state in the borders of 1947/48 with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine (see Declaration of Principles from 13.9.1993, Washington, signed by both sides). See the real development (map 3-6).

**Map 3 UN Distribution Plan '181'**

**Map 4 Palestinian Governorates today**

Source: Mid East Web 2010

Source: Mopic 1999
Summary

Palestine was and is a country rich in history and nature; a bridge between the Middle East and Europe and part of the Mediterranean region, it saw many invaders, occupiers and rulers, but to this day it has kept its rural character, its beautiful and varied landscapes, and a socio-cultural community, influenced mainly by the Islamic period from the time of the Mamluks. The Bedouins of Palestine trace their roots back more than 3,000 years, before the time of Moses. Many monuments exist as testimonies of history from different empires, from all periods where mankind represented civilisation through architecture and cultivation of the land. Palestine is a unique place on earth, with the lowest point on the surface of the earth, the smallest desert, and a large variety of nature from seaside, hills and valleys. In addition, three important religions exist in this land. Becoming a state or nation after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, having lived without national borders for nearly 700 years and being an open space from Baghdad to Sofia, Palestine had no chance. Again foreign powers, those imperial forces who decided about a new world order after the first and second world wars, hindered such a process for other interests, eventually leading to the creation of a European outpost in the Middle East: Israel.

And the State of Israel played its role well in destroying the unit of a promised Palestinian state by means of planning, including military aggression. Thus it destroyed and is still destroying the unique character of this historic region, the once existing socio-cultural cohesion, the landscape, even nature.

The Palestinian Palestine today is reduced to some islands in a sea of an Israeli majority, without any noticeable sovereignty or space for possible political or
economic action. The political leadership, despite an elected government, is entirely dependent on international funding and Israeli/American acceptance. How this could happen is the content of this publication.

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II

Viktoria Waltz

The Fabrication of Israel with Tools of Spatial Planning since 1897

1. The Zionist Plan from Basle 1897 until 1948

This section intends to give an outline of the colonisation process from its beginning at the end of the 19th century, programmed at the 1st Zionist World Congress at Basle in 1897 until the end of the 2nd World War. It will follow main actions and outlines to fabricate the Jewish State in Palestine until its first achievement: the partition plan of the United Nation in 1947. (UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan) November 29, 1947)

At first, the relation between Ottoman land and planning laws, as well as British Mandate planning after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and Zionist operating during this period will be revealed. The observation will follow land policies leading to expropriation and change of properties of the Palestinians in the context of master-plans and colony building, and investigating demographic and social changes. It will finally sum up the transformation process from the end of the 19th century until today as a ‘blueprint’ for following steps, concentrating on the differently used planning instruments.

As to methodology, this paper is based on the evaluation and interpretation of maps and statistical information and related literature. The analysis follows a political-economic approach interpreting facts as basis of material and political interests. Basic theory is the character of planning and space as a political power, eventually misused oppressively against minorities or ethnics (Foucault 1977, 2000). Theories about settler colonialism (Lemkin 1944, Rodinson 1973, Metzer 2006) are seen as another background. In this context land property measures and spatial plans were seen as the most precarious planning tools used by the Zionist movement.

1.1 Prior to British Mandate and after – Essentials for the Fabrication of the Jewish State

Growing anti-Semitism in Europe made the Zionist project to establish a Jewish State reasonable for part of the European Jewry. Eventually Palestine was chosen as place for the ‘national’ solution to the ‘Jewish Question’, as Herzl described the Jewish problem. Before England was approved by the Council of League of Nations on 24.7.1922 to be the Mandate power in Palestine, Lord Balfour had already promised support for the creation of a ‘national home for the Jewish people’ to the Zionists in the name of the British Government (‘Balfour Declaration’ of 1917; UNISPAL 2007). Both decisions, the mandate approval and the Balfour Declaration, were totally against Arab intentions expressed to the King/Crane Commission in their interrogations of 1919 (King/Crane Report 1920). This commission was an official investigation by the United States government concerning the future of former Ottoman Empire areas and was conducted to inform American politicians about the region’s people and their desired future. The commission visited areas of Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Anatolia and surveyed local public opinion. The majority of the interrogated personalities demanded self determination and/or national independence within a Greater Syrian State under ‘King Faisal of Iraq and Syria’.
However, the League of Nation (LoN 1931) decided according to French and British interests and gave Palestine to England (see map 1). Moreover, LoN integrated this intention in article 4 of the Balfour Declaration proclaiming that the “Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine” (see website unispoal.un.org). This made the Zionist colonization of Palestine internationally accepted and facilitated the procedures between the Zionist Movement and the Mandate power, at the beginning represented by a Zionist, Sir Herbert Samuel.

**Map 1 Palestine within the British Mandate, 1922-1948**

A far-reaching change in the Ottoman land law and urban regulation system during the late 19th century set also vantage condition for Zionist colonization. This change, inspired by French and Italian model, began with so called ‘Tanzimat’ reforms in 1839 intending to modernize the empire, followed by a so called ‘Islahat’ (improvement or reform) Edict in 1856 and finally the ‘Civil Code’ in 1869, creating among others a secular jurisdiction and a common citizenship irrespective of religious or ethnic divisions (see later). (Deringil 1993, Shaw 1977)
1.1.1 The Zionist Colonisation Plan - Ethnocratic Aims of the Zionist Movement

Zionism developed at the end of the 19th century as a nationalist-colonialist movement (Herzl: "We can be the vanguard of culture against barbarianism' Europe's bulwark against Asia", Segev 2000). The main goal of which was to establish a Jewish State. Theodor Herzl was the prominent protagonist of this project. He claimed autonomy and self-determination for the world ‘Judentum’ (Jewry). His suggestion was submitted as the only lasting solution for the ‘social questions of the Jews in Europe’, whose existence was endangered by the generally existing anti-Semitism in Europe, and especially pogroms in Eastern Europe. Areas in Africa or South America were options; however, Palestine as a relevant ‘historic place’ was preferred by Zionist Congress members. This decision was in good harmony with European interests in the area, which was recognised as a promising sphere of economic concern. Herzl, the ‘designer’ of the Zionist project, consequently tried to win the support of Germany and England as well as France; at length he succeeded with England.

Comprehensive tactical and strategic Zionist approach

First Zionist colonies had already been built up since 1892, one of them Petah Tikwah in the coastal area. However, initiatory was the ‘First Zionist World Congress’ in Basle in 1897. This congress passed the following decision (original in German):

‘Der Zionismus erstrebt fuer das juedische Volk die Schaffung einer oeffentlich rechtlich gesicherten Heimstaette in Palaestina. Zur Erreichung dieses Ziels erwaegt der Kongress folgende Massnahmen:

- die Foerderung der Kolonisation Palaestinas durch juedische Einwanderer aus Landwirtschaft und Industrie nach sachgemaessen Richtlinien,
- die Organisation und den Zusammenschluss des Gesamtjudentums durch entsprechende lokale und internationale Einrichtungen, welche mit den Gesetzen der jeweiligen Laender in Einklang stehen,
- die Staerkung und Pflege des zionistischen Volksgedankens und – bewusstseins,
- erste Schritte mit dem Ziel, die Genehmigungen der Regierungen zu erlangen, sofern diese den Zielen des Zionismus notwendig erscheinen.’ (First Zionist Congress: 144)

(‘Zionism intends to achieve the construction of a legally bound national home for the Jewish People in Palestine. To reach this goal the congress considers the following measures:

- promoting the colonisation of Palestine by Jewish immigrants with agricultural and industrial experience along proper guidelines;
- organising and uniting World Jewry, forming suitable local and international institutions in harmony with the laws of the concerned countries;
- stabilising and fostering the Zionist idea of a Jewish nation and Jewish national awareness;
- first steps towards obtaining the authorisation of governments, if necessary to reach Zionist aims),

(www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/FirstCong&BaselProgram.html 24.07.07)
Nebulous definition of borders

About final borders no clear comments were made. Theodor Herzl offered many options, playing with pragmatic arguments as well as with religiousness:

- "Wir muessen wegen unseres zukuenftigen Welthandels am Meer liegen und muessen fuer unsere maschinenmaessige Landwirtschaft im Grossen weite Flaechen zur Verfuegung haben" (Herzl, 13.6.1895) ("Because of our prospective role in world trade we need the coast and for our mechanised agriculture large scale areas at our disposal")
- "Als Ruf auszugeben: Palaestina wie zu Davids und Salomons Zeiten" (Herzl, 13.6.1895) ("Our slogan will be: Palestine in the dimensions of David and Solomon’s era").
- "Gebiet: vom Bach Aegyptens bis an den Euphrat" (Herzl, 9.10.1898) (From the river of Egypt to Euphrates’)
- "Wir verlangen, was wir brauchen, - je mehr Einwanderer, desto mehr Land" (Herzl, 9.10.1898) ("We claim, what we need - the more immigrants, the more land") (transl. VW)

Erection of Zionist bodies and institutions under British protection

According to pronounced goals, basics like financing, acquisition of appropriate land, immigration policy and political representation in Palestine were crucial assets to implement. Within short time after the establishment of the British Mandate suitable institutions and measures were arranged as follows:

- 1898, the ‘Jewish Colonial Trust Society’; the following ‘Colonial Bank’ guaranteed the transactions of money from Europe to Palestine.
- 1902, the ‘Anglo Palestine Bank’ (APB) to cover credits.
- 1905, the ‘Jewish National Fund’ (JNF) was instituted as the main political instrument. JNF tasks were to purchase, govern and register land and to finance the colonisation of this land (JNF is still the central body to expropriate Palestinian land). The land acquired by the JNF became ‘inalienable property’ of ‘Jewish People’ and therefore not accessible to Non-Jews – still existing regulation (Granovski 1925: 116; Diner 1980).
- 1907, the ‘Palestine Office’ opened in Jaffa to play the role of a national agency, later called the ‘Jewish Agency’. Under British Mandate this ‘Jewish Agency’ (JA) functioned as the legal body of the slowly growing Jewish settler society. Under British protection the JA speeded up the colonisation.
- 1907, the ‘Palestinian Land Development Company’ (PLDC), designated to explore country and resources, figuring out the most strategic available localities and preparing plans to purchase land. (Elazari-Volkani 1932)

Bank, JNF, PLDC and JA were expediting the colonisation process as far as possible. PLDC regularly informed the Zionist congresses about the results and the status of the colonisation process. It also suggested new options where to intensify next purchasing activities. (Elazari-Volkani 1932)
1.1.2 Land policy and planning reforms under the Ottomans since the 19th century fostering Zionist settlement

The Ottoman Empire was committed to Islamic Law (Shari’ a). There was no special system of town planning, but some conceptions to social and ecological development, as we would call it today. Three basic elements were influencing spatial development and changes as follows:

- Ottoman administration hierarchy,
- Ottoman juridical system,
- Land Code of 1856.

The Ottoman administrative structure
During the 19th century Ottoman administrative structure considered the Belediye (municipality) responsible for buildings and roads, improvement of the environment and the economic development within municipality borders. The governor of the province or Wilayet was responsible for government buildings (Saray), public parks, and clock towers and opening of wells. There was no local or regional body of town planning and comprehensive development. The absence of a central administration and appropriate spatial development concepts enabled the Zionist Movement to build new Jewish areas, quarters and villages and even a completely Jewish new city, Tel Aviv, approved as such in 1922 (Kedar 1999: 95).

The Ottoman juridical system in spatial context
Reforms and the ‘civil code’ promoted modern built up environment in accordance with the former Islamic principles. These principles were summarised in the ‘book of the partnership’, where ‘harmony’ and a desirable ‘partnership between light, air and land’ were set as values. In addition, the principle demanded not to ‘hurt’ neither public nor private interests. These principles even allowed demolishing what was in opposition to this standard. Finally there was an important principle of ‘property’. According to this, the owner of a piece of land had the right of unlimited use of what was found under and over the soil, as long as neighbours’ rights, the principle of harmony and public building activities like roads were not offended. This principle intended to encourage building and investing in land thereby promoting productivity. However, as all principles were soft and did not set concrete limits, conflicts were pre-programmed, in particular when it came to water. Wells were public and shepherds or farmers since centuries had a right to use them. When land came under Zionist property they were suddenly restricted from using them (Mahrook 1995).

The Land Code of 1856 and opportunities for Jewish purchases
Islamic Law generally regards land as divine donation (similar to the conception in the European Middle Ages). The Sultan as representative of God on earth was considered the governor of the land. He could give his subjects the right to use the land and he could take this right away again. Consequently, until the late Ottomans, a system of legal titles on private land did not exist and was not necessary. Most regulations were dealing only with the use of land.

The land code of 1856 influenced by Europe changed this situation giving property titles to land users and served in a way the Zionist colonisation later on, as will be shown later. The idea of this code was to achieve a more effective use of the land and accelerate the development of the agricultural sector and increasing the income of the Ottoman Empire.
This code started to categorise land and land use. The aim was to gradually register property and to give legal titles with property documents like in Europe. According to the type of land, properties were divided into different categories (Mahrok, 1995; Stein 1984):

**Mulk** land: mostly in cultivated areas and at the edges of the pastureland. It is the central kind of land property in cities and villages and still the main title of existing Palestinian properties. This title allowed to inherit and could be seen as ‘private’ property.

**Miri** land: agriculturally used land outside the cultivated areas. This land title was assigned by the state and given to farmers as an extra land. The idea was to protect and enlarge the agricultural areas. Given the user neglects Miri land and make it ‘abandoned land’, it dropped back to the state and became again state or public land.

**Marwat** land: unsettled and unused part of Miri land. After payment it entitled the user to cultivate it and when he did so successfully, Marwat could change into Mulk land and used like ‘private’ property (see above). In many cities and villages this opportunity under the Ottomans led to an increasing development of urbanisation and agricultural production. Beneficiaries were the Palestinian farmers, landlords and investors as well as the Zionist institutions.

**Mahlul** land: land, which had fallen back automatically to the government after a period of three years in which the owner did not use, produce or build on it.

**Waqt** (donated) land: land donated by law to Islamic institutions for religious or charitable use (mosques, churches, synagogues, poorhouses, hospitals, pilgrims’ hospices, public wells); in the Old city of Jerusalem Waqt was also given to families who had to keep the charitable use of the land or houses, especially for poor pilgrims. Waqt became over centuries the main property category in Jerusalem. It was important that selling and speculation on this land was prohibited. Until today, Christian institutions benefit from this Waqt system. Churches, hospitals and pilgrims guest houses do still stand on historically Waqt donated land from Islam institutions. Contracts were given for 99 years and should be given back meanwhile or contracts renewed – but until today with no sovereignty over the city the Auqaf, the custodian of waqf in Jerusalem, could not reclaim this once donated land.

**Matrok** land: land dedicated to public purposes e.g. roads, open spaces, holy places, joint pastureland and municipality forests. It belonged to the state and could not be sold.

**Mudawarah or Jiftlik** land: land, which belonged to the Sultan, a category that existed only in Bisan and in the Jericho district.

**Musha’a** land: land used by the village community or a group of villages. This category was planned to support co-operation and assigned periodically to different groups. However, villagers did not pay for long-term investments on that land and the idea failed.

Gradually private use of land and right to inherit were extended and private land ownership became normal. At the end of the Ottoman Empire under the ‘Young Turks’ further laws encouraged this way of ‘secularisation’ of the land (in 1908, 1913 and 1914). Furthermore, ‘non-Islamic’ members of society were assured ‘equal
treatment’ regarding the purchase and resale of (governmental) Miri and Matrok land. It was possible only for Muslims before.

**Interim Statement**

The Ottoman land system in Palestine can be considered the first in the region that recognises public interest in road construction, open spaces and places for the well-being of the population (parks, wells). The institution of Waqf secured building and preservation of urban infrastructure for various public, cultural and religious purposes and provided social residential districts in old cities like Jerusalem (Al Quds), Nablus, Hebron (Al Khalil) or Bethlehem.

General effect of the late Ottoman land regulations and laws was a certain planned spatial development that explicitly encouraged the economic progress of the country:

- cultivated areas were clearly defined,
- local administrations became responsible for the municipalities’ spatial, structural and economic development,
- registration of private properties generally increased, and
- residential areas expanded.

Although Miri land was restricted to agriculture, urban sprawl increased under the Ottomans. In addition the new land principles facilitated Zionist land grabbing. Miri (and Marwat) became a central opportunity of land allocation to the Zionist Movement when the British Mandate took over such ‘state land’ and forwarded it to them. When Miri fell again under ‘public’ land, it automatically came under legal control of the mandate power. The definition of Miri land was used again after England left Palestine and Zionist militia and later the Israeli state forced Palestinians to leave their land. The ‘absent’ owners were titled as absentees and their land was considered to be abandoned, hence fell back to ‘public’ land.

Mahlul regulation could later be used for expropriation, when owners were simply hindered to work on their land for the so called 'safety reasons', especially at the time under Israel control. Waqf too became a ticket for changing it into Jewish property when after 1948 the Israeli government took the Christian and Muslim Waqf land and buildings in Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, Taberiya and Jerusalem while Muslim or Christian institutions had no authority any more. Also Matruk land easily changed into British Mandate property and was later simply transferred into Jewish ‘national property’, as well as Jiftlik land. Mush’a land was taken by Kibbutzim because per definition these villages were co-operatives.

The central changes in land use and land property gave foreign investors, Christians as well as Zionist land institutions, finally, the full right to purchase land for private use.

However, until 1922 only approximately 2.5% was purchased by Zionist institutions, mainly from the Jewish National Fund. Until 1947, the year of the UN division plan, Zionist institutions owned not more than 6-7% of Palestinian land (Palaestina, Geschichte in Bildern, 1973: Abb.13, PASSIA 2008). Furthermore, despite deep changes, the land registration developed slowly, covering only about 10% at the end of the Ottoman reign. This fact made it later difficult for Palestinians to defend their property having no ‘legal’ documents in hand.

At the end of the Ottoman Empire, around 700,000 Palestinians and about 88,000 Jewish ‘colonists’ lived in Palestine, concentrated in some locations. The Palestinian
population was living in the hilly regions and cities like Nazareth, Nablus, Jerusalem, Bethlehem or Hebron. They were successfully earning their living from agriculture; pasturing in the coastal planes and selling products abroad from markets like Jaffa, Acre, Haifa and Gaza (Nakhleh 1991, Schoelch 1982, Granott 1952).

The Jewish colonists had settled strategically in some fertile areas of the coastal region near the historical cities of Acre, Haifa, Jaffa and Gaza, around the Lake of Tiberias and mainly in areas, where Miri land was made available (see map 2/3).

Map 2 Major Arab towns (red), major Jewish colonies (black), other Jewish colonies (o) 1881 - 1914

Map 3 Location of Zionist colonies in 1918

Source: PASSIA 2008

Source: Richter 1969, fig. 7; Waltz/Zschiesche, 1986: 65
1.2 The Zionist Colonisation Process under British Mandate and Side Effects of Ottoman Land Laws on Palestinians

Building activities speeded up under British Mandate when British planning laws, the definition of ‘Town Planning Areas’ and obligatory ‘Town Planning Schemes’ or ‘Master Plans’ were conditional to get building permissions. However, the Palestinian landowners were also negatively affected by the Ottoman land reforms, especially that secularisation led to disastrous commercialisation of land. New town planning orders were opening new areas for urbanisation and land use restrictions changed farming into green areas. Reducing rural development on the one hand and encouraging urbanisation on the other served especially the Jewish colonists who were mostly urban and settled particularly in the coastal area. Two Mandate plans of the forties are still used in a restricting manner: the S15, ‘Samaria-Plan’ of 1942 and the RJ5, ‘Jerusalem Regional Plan’ of 1942. They restricted building to certain areas: huge areas in the hilly regions (today big part of the West Bank) were designated ‘green areas’, not allowing building and settling without special permission (Mahrok 1995, Coon 1991, Goadby/Doukhan 1935, Nakhleh 1991, see chapter IV and V).

1.2.1 Pushing Concentration of Ownership and Transformation of Palestinian Land Properties

In addition, Ottoman legislation and British planning regulation speeded up the commercialisation of land. The following concentration of land ownership was detrimental to Palestinian farmers’ interest. In 1909, 250 families possessed 4,123 dunam (10 dunam around 1 ha) of the agricultural land – the same amount that was held by the majority of thousands of small enterprise farmers (Granott, 1952:38 f). These 250 families were ‘landlords’, officially holding the property rights of a group of villages, functioning as their Mukhtar (traditional mayor), dealing in their name with the Ottoman and later British authorities for taxation, military service and other official affairs. In 1930, 30% of the small enterprise farmers had lost their properties to such landlords and changed into their ‘tenants’. The ‘landlords’ mostly were not even living on the land. They spent and invested the income from agriculture in the larger commercial cities of the region namely Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus. They were ‘absentee lords’.

However, the Mandate policy was not without detriments for these landlords; the British Mandate government charged them highly. While income from agricultural land dropped and economic difficulties increased the ‘landlords’ lost interest in their administrated land. With less income perspectives and high costs these Makhateer felt constrained by the new circumstances to sell land, even to Zionists. According to tradition this land had been in possession of the farmers’ families for hundreds of years. Deals with the Zionists ignored these historic rights and treated the land as a package of land and people. Property rights of many farmers and villagers were ignored, when tenants or ‘subjects’ lost land and income in these deals. Some contracts included expressively to expel the farmers from their land.

The most famous deal concerned the land of more than 30 villages of a plane called ‘Marj Ibn Amer’ (today Yizreel Plane). Landlord ‘Sursuk’, a banker who lived in Beirut was dreaming of a railway between Haifa and Lake Taberiya, to sell wheat and crops of this fertile plane more profitably. However, the Mandate governor refused him a licence and he gave up. In this deal farmers of 22 villages were forced to leave their land and Zionists took it. Immigrants from Europe immediately started to build kibbutzim on the very same land (Granott, 1956:38 f; Richter, 1969:93).
Zionist property principle was to 'exteriorise' the purchased land. Jewish property was forbidden to purchase to Non-Jews. Hence this principle together with the principle of 'Jewish labour on Jewish land' reduced opportunities for work and land to Palestinians (Hope Simpson Report 1930). In the end landless farmers and poverty increased and the Mandate administration decided to help them. After 1931 the administration provided Palestinian farmers with new uncultivated land (LoN report 1931). However such measures were only supporting further usurpation of Palestinian land by the Zionist movement.

In 1936, the land situation of Palestinians was very critical. On the one hand, the mainly agriculturally used Palestinian land was split into thousands of too small plots difficult for farmer to earn a living from. Around 37% of the total land was split into 66,000 plots, of which 92% consisted of less than 100 dunam (10 ha). Bigger plots, from 100 to 1000 dunam (10 – 100 ha), nearly 36% of all land, were split into 5,700 plots. While huge properties, of more than 1,000 to 5,000 dunam (around 19% of them bigger than 5,000 dunam), forming about 27% belonged to only 150 owners. (see table 1)

Table 1 Structure of Palestinian Land Properties in Mandate Palestine 1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>No. of plots</th>
<th>In %</th>
<th>In % of total area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 – 100 dunam</td>
<td>65 933</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 – 1000 dunam</td>
<td>5 706</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 1000 dun. (of them 5000 a. more)</td>
<td>150 (13)</td>
<td>0.2   (0.01)</td>
<td>27.5 (19.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Granott, 1952: 34 (10 dunam = 1 ha)

Sales like Sursuk's deal obviously did not happen coincidentally, but were pushed by British Mandate policy. The majority of all sales were done by these absentee 'landlords'. However, when the economic situation became more critical, not only 'landlords' on their fields but also small farmers sold land to the Zionists (see table 2). Consequently farmers started protesting against the British/Zionist policy and 'landlords' sales. The first big uprising against the land and discrimination policy of England started between 1936 and 1939. Palestine had its first martyrs killed in these uprisings. (Passia 2006)

Table 2 Origin of Zionist Properties according to Sells 1920 – 36

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Outside Landlord</th>
<th>Landlord on his fields</th>
<th>farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-1922</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-1927</td>
<td>86.0%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-1932</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-1936</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Granott, 1952: 277

The major part of purchased land, nearly 75%, was in the hand of Zionist institutions like JCA and JN; private Jewish purchases happened only occasionally and are still a small amount. In 1936 with 1.231.000 dunam purchased, mainly public fallen land, the Zionists had not more than 4.4% of the total Palestinian land. In 1947 with
1,735,000 dunam, it was not more than 6% of all or 8.6% of the later Israel territory. (see table 3)

Table 3 Zionists Properties in Dunam acc. to Institution and Purchaser 1882 – 1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>JCA</th>
<th>JNF</th>
<th>Individual colonies</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>218,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>167,000</td>
<td>416,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>233,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>426,000</td>
<td>1,231,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>323,000</td>
<td>147,000</td>
<td>426,000</td>
<td>1,231,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>435,000</td>
<td>370,000</td>
<td>1,735,000</td>
<td>(1.735 km²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>935,000</td>
<td>1,735,000</td>
<td>(1.735 km²)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Granott, 1952: 28; Orni, 1981:40

Finally, it is worth mentioning that all the deals were part of a usurpation plan to expropriate the Palestinians from their homeland and as such hostile and illegal actions and not at all simple purchases. The spatial strategy behind this will be revealed in the following section.

**1.2.2 Strategic Distribution of Zionist Land Purchases**

The Zionist Movement had created the ‘Palestinian Land Development Company’ (PLDC), to make sure that land acquisition followed strategic interests and in chosen regions:

- the economically important coast,
- the productive plane Marj Ibn Amer (later Yizr-eel plane),
- the Jordan valley,
- the Negev, known for minerals and a useful entrance to the desert and the Red Sea,
- the Hula region in the north of Galilee, famous for the water resources and serving area for the Jordan valley,
- the entrance to Jerusalem and Jerusalem itself.

*Israel Pocket Library, 1973:96*

In 1945 the preferential regions of the Jewish National Fund were correspondingly:

- the coastal region, where JNF land property constituted 39%,
- the districts of Jaffa and Haifa and the Marj Ibn Amer plane with 27%,
- the district of Bisan in Galilee with about 36%,
- the districts of Taberiya, as well as Hula and Safad with each about 16% of the area.

The acquired portion of cultivatable land within each of these districts was even higher, nearly 40% of the used agricultural land in these areas. (See Map 4, 5, 6)
1.2.3 Strategic location of Zionist Colonies on the usurped land

The Jewish colonies were established accordingly. Until 1939 colonies were concentrated in the coastal region between Haifa and Jaffa, the plane from Haifa to
the Lake Tiberias and in Bisan. As explained before, building activities speeded up under British Mandate. When different international division plans for Palestine were published (British Peel 1936 and White Paper 1939 and finally the UN decision 181), colonisation activities speeded up even more and additionally other regions were of interest like the Negev region, the Dead Sea area, the Gaza region and the so called ‘passage’ to Jerusalem (see map 7/8) to occupy new ‘landmarks’. Thus creating ‘faits accomplis’ the Jewish Agency and the WZO determined future borders (Israel Pocket Library, 1973:96).

Map 7 Distribution of Zionist colonies in 1944

![Map 7 Distribution of Zionist colonies in 1944](source: Waltz/Zschiesche 1986: 90)

Map 8 Distribution of Palestinian villages and towns before destruction

![Map 8 Distribution of Palestinian villages and towns before destruction](source: Waltz/Zschiesche 1986: 91)

In comparison to colonies, land acquisition usurped much more land than settled. However, according to proclaimed ambitions of the first WZO sessions land usurpation was done strategically:
- to divide, split and surround the Palestinian settlement areas on the one hand
- to fix ‘cornerstones’ for the creation of a coherent Jewish settlement area on the other hand
- to get influence in areas of special and spatial importance.

At the end of the British Mandate the Zionist movement owned land in the coast area ‘for future trade’, access to Negev and the Red Sea, hence Africa and most fertile areas like Marj Ibn Amer (today Yezreel plain) for ‘agriculture’ and influence in areas of water resources like Hula - as Herzl had demanded. Also, more land was demanded from the British Mandate administration and international bodies ‘according to immigration’ (“We claim, what we need - the more immigrants, the more land”) (see the development in figure 1,2).
At the end of British Mandate – and especially after 1933 - immigration speeded up dramatically and changed the social fabric enormously. Nonetheless, it is to point out
that the Zionist and later Israeli confiscation of land, whether private, communal or governmental, was a hostile expropriation of Palestinian property from the beginning.

1.3 The Imposed Division of Palestine by UN Decision 181 and Zionist 'Ethnic Cleansing'

Before Israel was declared, in May 25, 1946, part of the total Transjordan British Mandate became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and formal independence from Britain alongside Palestine.

The British left Palestine on 14th May 1948, leaving the Zionists a ‘helpful’ tool: the ‘Defence (Emergency) Regulations’ of 1945. These regulations gave military forces permission to execute curfews, house demolitions, expropriations, imprisonment and so on in ‘case of emergency’. This law is still in power. (see section III)

The scattered however strategic distribution of Zionist land ownership finally led to the absurd partition plan. In November 1947 the United Nation in resolution 181 proposed a division plan for Palestine, dividing the Mandate area into three parts. About 60% was designated for the Zionist Jewish State, Jerusalem in new borders including Bethlehem should become an internationally controlled area, and the rest was seen for a Palestinian State. This would have created a completely new map (see map 9). The plan mixed up the existing social fabric. While a Palestinian state with at that time around 1.38 million Palestinians on only 42.88% of the land, the Jewish state should be established on 56.7% of the land, with only 0.6 million inhabitants - majority of them refugees from Europe during the last period. (Granott, 1956:37; Voelkerrecht und Politik, 1978:25)

Map 9 UN Division Plan for Palestine 30. Nov. 1947
(map No 3067 Rev. 1 United Nations1983)

Source: wewewe.domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/
This unfair division plan was not accepted by the Arab members – Palestinians were not included in the decision. The Zionist movement saw it as a chance and a beginning - the UN decision became a trigger point for Zionist attacks against the Palestinians.

Meanwhile, it is well known that the militarily organised and well equipped leading ‘falcons’ in the Zionist Movement were prepared to change reality in their favour. Driving as many Palestinians out of the territory as possible and destroying as many villages and quarters as possible led to a brutal ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Pappe 2006). Since 1947 terror groups, Irgun, Stern and others systematically forced thousands of Palestinians to flee their homes and destroyed their villages and houses afterwards (‘Plan Dalet’, A,B,C). The Haganah, an official military arm and later the Israeli army threatened the inhabitants of cities like Ramleh, Acre and Safad to leave or to be killed. The less equipped Arab army, which entered the battlefield, after the state proclamation and defending the UN suggested regions for the Palestinians, was not able to do so. Ultimately Zionist troops occupied more land than the UN plan had prospected, nearly 70% of Palestine. After the proclamation of the Jewish State on the 15th of May 1948, only 156,700 Palestinian inhabitants were registered as inhabitants of the area, which then became the State of Israel. Those who panic-stricken had run away from their properties to other villages or to the cities within Israel were registered ‘absentees’ in their own country (first census of Israel 1948, see Pappe 2006).

Finally, approximately 750,000 Palestinians, three quarters of all inhabitants, were expelled by force and became refugees in the West Bank, the Gaza region and in the neighbouring Arab countries. From 364 villages, which were counted in 1948 in the territory of Israel and in total more than 500 villages were destroyed and the inhabitants expelled. The remained Palestinians lived mainly in Galilee and the so called ‘triangle’ in the north-western area around Um-el Fahem (compare map 10/11/12/13).

The majority of the Bedouins in the Negev were driven out and not more than 10% remained under Israeli control. In a very short time they were expropriated from their land to 80%, lost freedom of movement, hence the basic of their culture and identity. From the 10.5 million dunam of cultivatable land only 0.8 million were officially registered as still in Palestinian possession. 9.9 million dunam of Palestinian property were expropriated immediately by the State of Israel and transferred to governmental land according to the different aforementioned laws. At first the title of ‘state’ and ‘abandoned land’ was used and later so called ‘land of absentees’ was usurped according to the Ottoman laws explained before. (Perez, 1956:87; State of Israel, 1962:98, Richter, 1969:130; Granott, 1952: 28; Ansprenger 1978: 75; Abu-Sitta 2004, Pappe 2006)
The costs of this first phase of 'fabricating' the State of Israel were high especially on the Palestinian side: devastation of land and buildings, thousands of deaths, three
quarters of a million refugees. Exact figures about this exodus are still in dispute (see table 4).

### Table 4 The Palestinian Refugees, 1948–1950 acc. diff. sources

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>208,000</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>201,173</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>363,689</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arab Count.</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>667,000</td>
<td>256,000</td>
<td>284,324</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>810,000</td>
<td>875,000</td>
<td>726,000</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>849,186</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>590,000</td>
<td>714,150-744,150</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>957,000</td>
<td>590,000</td>
<td>770,100-780,000</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>620,000</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Diff. sources:</td>
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Results of the systematic land grabbing and ethnic cleansing by war, was a complete demographic and geographic reverse: From around 1.4 Million Palestinians living in Mandate Palestine before 1947, 750.000 people or half of the Palestinian people were chased away from their land and home. From the total land of around 27.000 sqkm, of which the Zionist Movement through unfair deals and tactics purchased not more than 6-7%, (about 1.700 sqkm) Israel usurped at the end of this war 70%, around 19.000 sqkm. Palestinians began to share the fate of an exiled people, without recognition or a factual right to return although international laws and conventions are recognising these rights and demanding Israel to implement them. (Diff. UN resolutions from 1947 until today, see UNISPAL 2007)

What remained was a divided country, divided into three parts: Israel, the West Bank region under Jordan governance and the Gaza Region under Egypt governance. Jerusalem was cut into two pieces: West, the 'New City' under Israeli control and East, including the Old City under the Jordanian rule.

### Conclusion

It took the Zionist Movement 40 years and a war from the First Zionist Congress in Basle to reach the international ‘ok’ for establishing the Jewish State in big parts of Palestine. The disaster in Europe helped. Planning tools like town planning, master plans, development plans and property laws in addition to money and international policies helped the Zionists to extend the spatial vision of Herzl as far as possible until 1948. The process was planned; land purchases were done strategically and purposefully. Part of the Jewish world and the British Mandate supported it since the end of the Ottoman Empire. Sophisticated regional and local planning policy and strategic thinking made the fabrication of a Jewish state in Palestine possible. It was done first of all by grabbing Palestinian property through planning measures, but also using force. However, the fabrication of Israel was a colonial project from the
beginning of the idea – and a settler state by reality, according to what Rodinson stated (Rodinson 1967).

The proclamation of the state on 15th May 1948 did not complete the original plan, it was not established on the whole Mandate area promised to them by Balfour. Only 6-7% of Jewish land ownership existed on around 70% of the Palestinian land on that day. The Jewish population settled mainly at the coast. About 150,000 Palestinians living in about 100 villages and small cities were still existent within Israel’s ‘borders’—a challenge for a state, which declared itself to be (solely) ‘Jewish’. Consequently Israel never defined its borders, the ‘provisional state’ existed in ‘armistice lines’ after agreements with Jordan and Egypt. Jerusalem, especially the Old City, was under Jordan governance. Stabilisation of Israel’s Jewish society in the achieved borders was the issue of the next period before looking to new horizons.

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Annex: Sources Overview 6 (Refugees):


g. The estimate is as of 1992, based on a report by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, published in Al-Quds, 10 September 1992.


III

Planning in Israel – from Fostering the Jewish Character of Israel to an Ethnocratic Planning System

With regard to territorial shifts, Israel was established on about 20,000 km² – i.e., more than 70% - of the Mandatory Palestine, while the remaining West Bank including East, Arab Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip had been governed by two neighbouring Arab states Jordan and Egypt.

When the 1947-1949 war ended 156,000 Palestinians, about 18% of the total population lived still as citizens in Israel. According to Israel's Declaration of Independence (which is not a constitution) ((Isr.) Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, Moyal 1998), all social groups in Israel were guaranteed social and political equality. By contrast Palestinian Arabs democratic rights in the Jewish state have remained precarious. (Coon 1992) The judaisation of the country through planning, land regulations and laws marginalised them in many terms.

The Palestinian citizens of Israel can be viewed as a national (Palestinian), ethnic (Arab), and linguistic (Arabic) community. According to official Israeli statistics in 2009, they number about 1.7 million, comprising 20.6% of the total population of Israel that is about 7.4 million. According to a research published by Soffer (2001), the Arab population of Israel could reach 23% in 2020, and 31% in 2050. The common terms used by Israelis to describe the Palestinian minority are “Israeli Arabs,” “the Arab Sector,” “Arab citizens of Israel,” or “Arabs or Palestinians inside the green line.”

The Palestinian community in Israel identifies itself as an integral part of the state of Israel and they have full Israeli citizenship. Nonetheless, they are not accorded the same rights as Jewish citizens of the state. “Institutionalised inequality, discriminatory policies, and informal prejudice all combine to prevent Palestinian citizens in Israel from attaining [spatial], social and economic equality” (Ittijah, 1998). A report published by the International Crisis Group (2004) indicates that Palestinian citizens are largely cut off from the geographical, cultural, economic and political mainstream of the state.

Successive Israeli governments have regarded the Palestinian community as a hostile and alienated element in a foreign country, especially after the entry of most right wing Knesset members like Avigor Lieberman in the election of 2009. Furthermore, 'Arab' citizens are often perceived as a security and demographic threat to the state of Israel. Accordingly, they feel themselves neglected and discriminated by the state, particularly on issues of land ownership, education, housing, employment, social services, resource allocation and political representation. For instance, is fact that between 1975 and 2000, public housing units built for the Palestinian Arab population were only 0.3% of the total public housing in the state. With regard to socio-economic aspects, 'Arabs in Israel' have the lowest socio-economic status of all groups in the state. Sikkuy, the ‘Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality’ in Israel, in its annual report on equality between Jewish and Arab citizens in 2008 reported that the Arab population receives only 49 percent of the benefits they are entitled to. The state of Israel invests NIS 508 in every Jewish citizen on average, while only NIS 348 is invested in Arab citizens. Nearly 65.7 percent of Arab children are living below the poverty line however 31.4 percent of Jewish children (Sikkuy 2008). In 2008 around 20 percent of all Israelis
were suffering from poverty and about 35% of them were Arabs. Moreover, 60 percent of all 'Arab' families lived below the poverty line. (CBS 2009)

The geographic and demographic reverse in Israel - from a 6-7% control over Palestinian land to an usurpation of more than 90% and transfer into Jewish national property on the one hand and the establishing of a Jewish majority in most of the Israeli regions and the systematic usurpation planning behind it is the issue of this section.

The first chapter of this section (Waltz) aims to understand the continuity of this process from prior 1947 until 1967. Hence this article will light up the rapid change of the geo map from some Jewish spots in a historically and well composed Palestinian habitat to a judaised country with 'western' style environment, emptied as much from Palestinian footprint. The next chapters (Egbaria) aim to illustrate the actual and after 1967 spatial expropriation and discrimination of the Palestinians within Israel: the first will go into principles of Israeli planning; in fact there are two spatial systems in one land; the second shows in detail how ethnic discriminating system affects the housing conditions of Palestinians in Israel on the example of Tayibe city and the third tackles the situation of the Bedouins in Israel, as one example of 'unrecognised' people in 'unrecognised' localities, again Palestinian localities.

Egbaria regards the problem of discrimination and alienation against the Palestinian citizens in Israel as deep and not easily to be resolved because it goes to the heart of Israel's self-definition as both a Jewish and a democratic state. Palestinians enjoy greater political rights in Israel than in other states in the region but they suffer from an unequal allocation of three basic components of a democratic society: resources, rights and representation. It is argued that the relationship of the urban needs of the 'Arab' citizens and the state is mainly a result of constant political pressure. Therefore, in order to face the challenge of systemic inequities that are facing Palestinian or 'Arab' Israelis, there should be an inclusive and comprehensive framework to define the needs of this segment of population, otherwise prospects for internal conflicts and instability and beyond of all underdevelopment will remain high – and this is fact until today, Egbaria argues.

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III

Viktoria Waltz

1. The Usurpation of Palestinian Land in Israel – steps until 1967

At first after 15th May 1948 Zionist planners wanted to change the unbalanced settlement of Jews in some mainly urban spots into a fully covering Jewish presence, where Jewish structures and Jewish population dominate. This would foster more occupation of Palestinian land, radical expropriation and a strategic immigration policy. Despite the refugee disaster at the end of the British Mandate in some areas Palestinians still formed majorities - while the Jewish population, nearly 80% of them, lived compact in the coastal towns. These facts show clearly that the Zionist plan was not yet completed and Israel in Mandate size not achieved as proclaimed. In addition, the country was even not yet 'Jewish' (see map 1).

Spatial planning again became that governmental tool in order to restructure geomap and demography in order to strengthening Jewish existence in Palestine. Jews to work and to settle on all the Palestinian land became central governmental goal: converting the (urban and highly intellectual) immigrants into farmers and workers, and the land from a 'mixed living area' into a 'pure Jewish' one (Granovski, 1929:58; Ben Gurion, 1960:51 f). Likewise the Palestinian society was expanding and to provide them with land for housing, farming, industry and infrastructure might be as well demanded as well as master plans, housing programs, road network plans and social infrastructure in their living areas. Would the Israeli governments serve both and supply the still existent two societies? Or would it continue displacing and destructing the remaining Palestinian society? To shed light on these questions again plans and programmes are examined and their factual results interpreted.

Map 1 Israel in the region

Source: Egbaria 2003
First Israeli activity concerning the Palestinians was bringing the Palestinian areas under military command. This step deprived the Palestinians of fundamental democratic rights – and this until 1966. (Israel Law Resource Center 2007, Badi 1961)

For Judaising the country three actions were executed:

- moving the Jewish population from the coast to the rural regions, an internal migration,
- increasing the total population through immigration from outside,
- reducing Palestinian presence, hence properties, settled areas and population through planning and political measures

Chief designer of this 'scheme' was Ben Gurion, first leader of the state himself and his planning office created the most important tools for it, the 'First National Plan' and the 'Program of 30 New Cities'. These plans aimed to move and settle the Jewish population rapidly into the 'hinterland'. (Sharon 1951; Ben Gurion 1960; Spiegel 1966; Meyer 1967; Cohen 1970, Richter 1979)

The Jewish Agency – once it had reached the fabrication of a Jewish state – took over the responsibility for immigration from outside. Within an agreement between the Israeli State and the World Zionist Organization WZO in 1954, the Jewish Agency got the task to campaign immigration and secure ‘land acquisition’. The WZO thus became the leading body to accomplish the judaising of the 'Palestinian areas' - it is working on this until today (Badi 1961, Waltz/Zschiesche, 1986: 119ff).

To expropriate and displace the remained Palestinians at length - now in the State of Israel within legal manners - a vicious mix of the still existing Ottoman and Mandate laws and regulations as well as newly created Israeli laws was executed.

1.1 Initial Steps of Judaising the Country – Expropriation and Planning

To achieve the above mentioned goals different activities were executed from fostered demographic changes, huge confiscation of land, deep social and economic discrimination to comprehensive spatial planning. Initiatory were the following actions:

- The ‘Census’ of 1948: to 'clarify' the ethnic distribution of the existing population: Jews and 'non Jews'. Palestinians, 'non Jews' were called 'minorities' and Palestinians by force or accident absent from their land or house became 'absentees' according to that census and aforementioned laws and regulations (State of Israel, 1948);

- The subordination of the Palestinian living areas, the Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev under the British mandate 'Defence or Emergency Regulation' of 1945, appointing military commanders in the villages and the regions, imposing restrictions of mobility and freedom (speech, writing, publishing and politics). It became also basic for closure of areas, land acquisition, house demolition and the fabrication of new spatial structures like roads, infrastructure for the new colonies (Israel Law Resource Center 2007);

- The ‘Law of Return’ of 1948: it offered to all Jews of the world 'the return to Israel', while the return of the Palestinian refugees to their land and houses was mainly refused; this in addition facilitated the expropriation of their so called ‘abandoned’ land (Badi 1961);
The building of a ‘Commission for City and Regional Development’ in 1948: in 1950, when it became the planning department under Ben Gurion, it drafted the ‘First National Plan’ to push the judaising of the country in a planned and structured manner; the plan was accepted by the Israeli parliament in 1950;

The ‘National Plan for the Redistribution of the Population and for Building New Cities’: done by the Ministry of Interior in 1950, aiming the following ‘urgent’ judaising acts:
- the colonisation of the ‘provisional border areas’ to Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, these were the areas of the Jordan Valley, the North Galilee and the area close to the Golan Heights;
- the definition of the remaining Palestinian areas to areas of ‘urgent colonisation’, these were the north and Galilee, the so-called triangle and the Negev;
- the building of 30 New Cities, as centres for the distribution of Jewish population according to the theory of ‘central places’ as centres for rural development;
- the development of Jewish agricultural areas, establishing new villages, the so called kibbutzim and moshavim;
- the development of Jewish industrial zones and centres, as part of the town development program.

The contract with the ‘World Zionist Organisation’ of 1954: this gave the WZO the strategic task to campaign all over the world for migration into Israel and for planning new colonies and the financing of colonies in addition to the already immigrated population (Badi, 1961, Sharon 1951, Spiegel 1966).

Not to forget, that Ottoman land laws and regulations as well as the Mandate planning and emergency regulations were never repealed, hence could be reinforced according to the situation and transferred into Israeli regulations. Main new planning tools were the ‘National Plan’ of 1950, the Program of ‘30 New Cities’ and a huge expropriation program as a main set to turn upside down what was before Palestinian into Jewish.

1.1.1 The National Judaising Plan of 1950

The central ‘National Plan’ aimed to change the ‘unbalanced’ distribution of the Jewish population. First goal was to form a Jewish majority in the inner regions of the country, especially in the Palestinian areas. At first step 700,000 new immigrants were settled between 1948 and 1951 in this ‘hinterland’. In detail main goals of this ‘inner colonising’ were:
- avoiding a further concentration of the Jewish inhabitants on the coast;
- de-urbanisation of the (coastal) cities;
- avoiding traffic at the coast and to use the coast for recovery and leisure time activities;
- housing supplies for the daily nearly 1,000 arriving new immigrants (Sharon, 1976:87 pp; Mayer 1969).

This was executed systematically through constructing new cities or new city quarters, new villages and new economic centres, distributing at first the immigrants to strategically chosen locations forming a colony network over the Palestinian land. This was done in newly created governorates in the before emptied areas and along the still provisional borders (‘armistice lines’), especially the border to the West Bank called ‘green line’. (Jewish Agency 2005)
The National Plan maps of 1950 demonstrate clearly the demographic and geographic usurpation idea (see the following maps 2-8).

**Map 2** Emptied areas: Hula, Marj Ibn Amer, Galilee, Triangel coastal plain, Bir Saba,

**Map 3** 'Wrong' Population Relation 1949

**Map 4** 'Planned' Population Relation 1956

Source: Waltz/Zschiesche 1986:104

**Map 5** Planned distribut. of Jewish popul.

**Map 6** Planned Jewish rural centres (all according to National plan of 1950)

**Map 7** Planned industrial centres

**Map 8** planned transfer of water resources

Population distribution consequently followed these plans. Main fields of action were the areas left by the Palestinians by force:

- the coastal plane,
- the Hula region,
- the surrounding of the Palestinian Galilee living areas and
- special industrial project areas in the Negev (Dimona).

The full control over the north, including military command, in addition eased usurping the water resources of the Hula region, of Taberiya as part of the Jordan Valley and of the southern slopes of the mountain region of Lebanon and diverting the water resources to the Negev region. (Orni 1972, Richter1979)

1.1.2 The Program of 30 'New Cities' - Jewish Centres of Rural Development

According to the national development plan the section of the so called 'non-Jewish' population was planned to shrink from 63 percent in 1948 to three percent in 1957 and in the Negev to 28 percent, while the Jewish population was planned to be raised from 37 to 72 percent (Spiegel, 1966:15).

Until the year 1965 the program of ‘30 New Cities’ was completed and inhabited by the new immigrants. According to the European ‘garden city’ model they were issued to function as future centres for the ‘development of the rural regions’. In a first stage until 1957 18 of them were established: seven in the north region, six in the south region and five in the region between Jerusalem, Gaza and Jaffa. After 1957 the remaining 10 ‘New Towns’ were established. In 1957, the portion of the new immigrants in 12 of 18 cities of them amounted to 96 percent (Louvish 1970). Nearly 50 percent of the ‘New Towns’ were built on ruins or partly destroyed remainders of former Palestinian cities or villages. See the following list of the 30 New Towns and their Palestinian origin (in italic) (see map 9, 9a,b, images 1-4):

Table 1 List of 30 New Towns and their Palestinian origin

| 1.Qiryat Shoma/ Khalsa | 16.Yavne/Jibna |
| 2.Zefat/Safad | 17.Qiryat Malaki/ Qastina |
| 3.Hazor | 18.Ashdot/ Isdud |
| 4.Maalot/ Al Kabri | 19.Ashqelon/ Majdal |
| 5.Shlomi | 20.Qiryat Gat/ Arad al Manshiya |
| 8.Tiberias/ Taberiyah | 23.Netivot |
| 10.Migdal ha Emeq/ Ma'alul/Al Mujadil | 25.Beersheba / Bir As Saba |
| 11.Afula / Afuleh | 26.Arad/ Tel Arad |
| 12.Bei Shean /Bisan | 27.Dimona |
| 13.Or Aqiva/Qisarya | 28. Yeroham |
| 14.Lod /Lud | 29.Mitzpe Ramon |
| 15.Ramlah/ Ramleh | 30.Eilat/ Um Rashrash |

Map 9 Location of 30 New Towns 1967
Map 10 New Towns built until 1951, b: built until 1966


Image 1 Iraq al Manshiya 1945
Image 2 Iraq al Manshiya after destruction
Image 3 Kiryat Gat 1991

Image 4 Ruins of Iraq al Manshiya center 1991

Sources: Kedar 1999, Khalidi 1992
Planning of cities and villages could only be executed on the land of the Palestinians. The previously explained land laws and the census were basic to enforce a tremendous expropriation process of Palestinian land. (see the following chapter).

1.2 The Usurpation of the Palestinian Land ‘by Law’

Expropriation of the Palestinians because of their nationality would have caused troubles with the international community, which was already irritated from the refugee problem caused by the military aggression of Zionist militia (Abu-Sitte 2004, Pappe 2006, see section II). The inherited Ottoman laws as well as the British emergency regulations were used instead and supplemented with new Israeli regulations:

- ‘Abandoned Area’s Ordinance’ of 1948: to register land as abandoned;
- ‘Emergency Land Requisition Law’ of 1948: to seize land for so called emergency reasons;
- ‘Emergency Regulation of Waste Uncultivated Land’ of 1949: to demand the cultivation of fallow land; this targeted especially the land of the so called ‘absentees’, including those who were not absent, but in neighbourd locations when the registration took place, the so called ‘present absentees’;
- ‘Absentees Property Law’ of 1950: to define and register the property of the so called ‘absentees’;
- ‘Land Acquisition Law’ of 1953: to acquire especially this land for governmental projects;
- ‘National Land Law’ of 1958: it declared once confiscated land as Israeli, Jewish property as irreversibly – the way to court or any claim of property rights was excluded for ever;
- ‘Basic Law – Israel Lands’ of 1960: defined the land owned by the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and the Jewish Agency (the main holder of land) as ‘Israel Land’, non saleable, under the ‘Israel Land Authority’. (see in detail chapter III.2)

(Yiryis, 1973)

The Jewish National Fund (JNF or KKL) was already the principal planning instrument of the Zionist Movement. Its main objective, as analysed before, was to purchase land in Palestine from public and state institutions, individuals and organisations. By 1947, the JNF had purchased a total of about 935,000 dunam (one dunam equals 1,000m²) or 93,500 hectares, about 4.6 percent of the total land of Israel. Another 800,000 dunam (80,000 hectares) were purchased by other Jewish organisations, such as the Jewish Agency, and individuals (Granott, 1956:28; Orni, 1981:40).

The total land owned by all those institutions of the Zionist Movement amounted to about 1,735,000 dunam (or 1,735 km²), making up about 8.6 percent of the total area of what would later become Israel. According to Aumann (1976), more than 70percent of this land was so-called public land vested in the British Mandatory Authority, while the rest was acquired from private owners. Yirjis (1966) asserts that with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the public land previously accessible to the Palestinian population and forested land (largely utilised as grazing fields) was regarded as Israeli state land. Thus, when the 1948 war ended, the State of Israel controlled about 20,770 square kilometres—77percent of the land previously under the control of the British Mandate in Palestine.
In 1960, when the Israeli authorities had adopted and implemented the above mentioned laws they defined the land owned by the JNF, the Jewish Agency and the government as ‘Israel Land’. Moreover, the Israeli government set officially this fatal precedent, namely, that land belonging to the state could not be sold but only leased. The JNF and the Jewish Agency, quasi-governmental institutions, retained ownership of their lands. In 1960 with the ‘Israel Land Law’ a newly created quasi-governmental agency called the ‘Israel Land Administration (ILA)’ was assigned administrative responsibility for all land owned by these three bodies – they were also member of ILA (Kretzmer, 1990).

According to the Israel Land Law of 1960, acquiring land from the ILA to develop for communal purposes, such as housing developments, roads, schools, cultural centres, etc., could and can still occur in two ways. The first is through tenders awarded by the ILA. The second is through contractors who have already leased the land and subdivided it to plots. Often these plots include what is known as tashtit or infrastructure. This includes electricity, water and sewage up to the edge of the subdivided plots.

1.2.1 Colonising through Land from the ‘Absentees’ and ‘State Land’

The land of the ‘absentees’ constituted the largest part of the land expropriated until 1950, about 4.18 million dunam (10 dunam = 1 ha). From 1948 until 1953, 320 new colonies were established on such confiscated land, in addition to the ca. 370 colonies built on land of the 500 destroyed villages, which existed before 1947. More than one third of all Jewish inhabitants and around one third of the immigrants settled on this property called ‘absentees’ land. It was purposefully devastated and therefore became ‘abandoned’ land in the areas of:

- the Hula valley in the north of the country (devastated up to 90%),
- the environment of Bisan (today Beit She’an, up to 88% devastated),
- the area between Jaffa, Gaza and Jerusalem (up to 100% devastated). (see map 10)

Map 12 Devastated regions during 1947 and 1949

![Devastation of Pal. Areas 1947 1950 from 10% (light) to 100% (dark)](source: Waltz/Zschiesche 1986: 105)
Beside land grab as ‘governmental or public land’, another big portion of land grab was executed mainly expropriated for ‘security reason’ and backed by the emergency regulation of Mandate time. This was the fact mainly in the area of the north, in the Galilee and in the Triangle. Similar happened in the south, where 80 percent of the pastureland of the Bedouins had been confiscated as ‘state land’. Thus the Bedouins were deprived from their living conditions and cultural tradition. (Granott, 1956:110 f; Lustick, 1980:167)

In big towns like West Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Bisan or Safad, after having chased out the Palestinian inhabitants by force or threaten, huge groups of new immigrants were directed to settle in these depopulated houses as ‘urgent cases’. Thus also these locations became ‘purely Jewish’ populated areas in a short time. (Waltz, 2000)

The following maps (11/12/13) show the colonising ‘progresses’ in the new locations, the so called ‘hinterland’ from 1956 until 1974.

Map 13 Remained Palestinian Villages and towns

Map 14 rural and urban new colonies 1956

Map 15 rural and urban new colonies 1974


For the Palestinian population living conditions and existence in the remained areas became unsecured until today. Confiscating land for different purposes and discrimination in terms of planning and developing beside culture and political suppression still goes on (see next chapters).

1.2.2 Land Grab for Water Control

The usurpation of Palestinian land also affected the sovereignty over the water resources. The Hula Basin in the north was the important water area, catching the winter rain falls from the Golan Heights, Lebanon Hormon mountains and headwaters of the Jordan River. It is the northern opposite water resource area of the Litani water area - also desired from the Zionist movement from the very beginning of their plan (Dolatyar 2000, see chapter IV). This important area before 1948 was full of lakes and swamps, a rich fishing and farming area – giving around 40 Palestinian villages a living. Only some non Zionist Jewish villages near the lake of Taberiya were located there before Israel controlled the area.

This area of strategic value, comprising around 200 sqkm and lots of water was devastated in the 1947/48 war as part of ‘Plan Dalet’ (Pappe 2006, Waltz/Zschiesche
1986, Orni 1973, Richter 1969). It was completely transformed under the Israeli national development plans. The so called 'Hula Project' had three national goals:

- collecting the water from the swamps through a huge drainage system, thus
- gaining more than 12,000 ha land for agricultural use and finally
- providing the south with water and 'greening' the desert through the 'Jordan-Negev' pipeline.

1951 began a transfer of the Jordan riverbed and the drainage of the former Hula Lake. The 'Hula Development Corporation' started to construct 37 new Jewish rural villages and the new city of Qiryat Shmona (former Khalsa) on ruins of Palestinian villages. (Spiegel 1966) Nearly half of Israel’s fish production of today comes from this Hula area. (see the following maps 14-17)

Map 16 Hula Region
Location of project area

Map 17 Hula-Negev
Water Project

Map 16 Hula ‘transformation’
1944: 7 Jew. Colonies, 34 Pal. Villages, 1 town

Map 17 Hula area in 1966
1966: 35 Jewish colonies, 0 Palest. Villages or town

From around 40 Palestinian villages and two Jewish villages the Hula region changed from no Palestinian presence to completely Jewish. The supply of the Negev with Jordan water from the Hula area used the steep gradient of more than 900 metres between the two regions. It consisted of a complex system of mainly open surface channels, pump stations and tubes of nearly 200 kilometres (see map 12; Spiegel 1966, Richter 1969)

**Conclusion**

At the end of the sixties, approximately 800 rural colonies and 30 New Cities had built a network of Jewish majority all over Israel as planned. The infrastructure from electricity, communication or water was established through all modes of international help, big part of it through the German compensation program (Wiedergutmachung) (Lewan 1984). Within less than 20 years Palestine in the 48 borders was turned into ‘Israeli (Jewish) Territory’. A new map was fabricated, what was former Palestinian was turned upside down into new Jewish reality.

However, the colonisation planning and policy fabricating a new, mostly Jewish space could not hinder a growing Palestinian presence. The Palestinian communities - though under military command - increased too, still forming majorities in three main areas: the Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev. Consequently, from Israeli point of view the fight for an exclusive ‘Jewish homeland’ on the land of Palestine was not yet finished. Israel had not yet achieved to be pure Jewish and had not yet achieved the ‘promised land’ of Lord Balfour ‘from the coast to the river’. Consequently Israel started a war to reach new borders. And also in Israel expropriation and destruction policy did not come to a halt in the Palestinian areas and continues to be so today.

However, for the Palestinians the usurpation policy had already a crucial effect in Israel: until 1967 the Palestinian space was sharply reduced to less than 10 percent of the land, the living areas were neglected in all plans. The Galilee was divided into 30 sub-zones. These were executed ‘residence’ borders. No Palestinian could leave or move to other zones without permission of the military governor. The Bedouins of the Negev were allowed to move only within the boundaries of Beersheba (Bir Saba). They had to live in reservation camps, which prevented them more and more from their main bases of life, the pasture land and livestock. Moreover, in later programs they were forced to settle in special Bedouin villages - their freedom of movement had been anyway limited to nearly zero (see next chapters).

To conclude, under Israeli Zionist rule the Palestinian land was turned into Jewish/Israeli to an utmost level. The Palestinian communities suffered from restriction of mobility, spatial, social, cultural and economic development. Military governance was not lifted before 1966, just before a new war. Discrimination and racist plans in the Israeli leadership still followed the same aims of restricting living conditions, expulsion and expropriation (Koenig’s Report 1976). These policies prevented the Palestinians in Israel until today from equity in a 'democratic system' and equal development chances as Egbaria will show as a special ethnocratic system in the following chapters.

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Kassem Egbaria

2. Two Spatial Systems for one Land: Spatial Inequality in the Development of Palestinian Communities and the Actual Need for Equity

The national spatial planning system in Israel, which is the main vehicle of space development, allocates land areas within which local, regional and national authorities can develop socio-economic and environmental projects, as well as open spaces. The term spatial planning in the state of Israel refers to the allocation, management and use of land in planning processes. The Israeli spatial planning system, which guides the process of allocating land for urban and rural development, operates under a centralised framework (top-down approach), i.e., the higher tier, the National Commission, obligates the lower ones, the District and Local Commissions, (Sharkansky, 1997; Fenster, 1996). Without such plans, no buildings can be approved, and no state services such as water, electricity and telephone are provided.

According to Alterman (1994) and Yiftachel (1995), the Israeli spatial planning system is divided into two principal branches: developmental/initiative and procedural/regulative. The main goal of the former is to develop and promote sustainable patterns of land use, roads, open spaces and forests across the country. However, the procedural/regulative system (i.e., zoning plans of various scales) functions according to the Planning and Building Law of 1965. It mainly operates under the auspices of the Israeli Ministry of Interior to develop national, regional and local, spatial master/outline plans. This branch is characterised by a hierarchical and centralised structure, with virtually no input from the communities who need and are affected by the plans. Khamaisi (2004) argues that Jewish citizens experience both branches of spatial planning, while Palestinian residents in Israel primarily experience the procedural branch of planning. (Even though they are Palestinians for the use of official Israeli statistics we have to use the official Israeli term, Arabs. Otherwise, we will use the term Palestinians).

Accordingly, it is argued that the spatial planning system in Israel is directly connected to the larger ideological, geopolitical and security dimensions of the state and to the efforts to judaize the remaining land of the Palestinian community. In essence, this institutional and spatial framework controls and confines the spatial development of the Palestinian minority by putting more restrictions on and obstacles to the conversion of agricultural and forested land into urban usage, mainly via land confiscation and settlement expansion. Thus, the spatial framework not only severely affects the socio-physical and economic development of the Palestinian community, but also creates very strong feelings of frustration, distress and alienation. In addition to this policy, the government has adopted more than thirty laws, such as the Absentees’ (meaning Palestinian refugees) Property Law and the Emergency Defence Regulations, to control, shrink and expropriate Palestinian land and allocate it to Jews, as previously explained.

As a result, at present, about 93% of the land in the State of Israel is owned and controlled by governmental bodies, and managed by the Israel Land Administration (ILA). Palestinian citizens who owned and used most of the land before the establishment of the state, now own only about 3% of the land in Israel. This unjust land policy has caused severe problems for Palestinians not only in territorial and
spatial dimensions, but also in other fields, such as housing, infrastructure, economy, environment and public services. Therefore, the questions of land control, land confiscation and land allocation, which all aim to limit the development of this significant segment of the population, became the source of dispute and conflict between the Palestinians and the Israeli government, and continues to be so today.

The main objective of this chapter is to assess the impact of the Israeli national, district and local spatial planning system on the physical development of the Palestinian citizens in Israel. This assessment may bring forth important information and clues to help the actors involved in the planning process to allocate national resources equally to all citizens without discrimination based on race, colour, religion, sex or other limitations. Addressing the needs of indigenous Palestinians residing in urban environments in Israel is a critical issue, as government initiatives have tended to neglect such urban issues, and subordinate them to political and ideological considerations.

This study has utilized literature about Israeli spatial planning, as well as official reports and documents from various governmental and quasi-governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of Interior, the Israel Land Administration (ILA), the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), local building and planning commissions, and national organisations that deal with Israeli-Palestinian affairs such as the Association of Human Rights. Tangible indicators of spatial planning, such as land management, land confiscation and land use, were the standard measurements in the investigation process. Needless to say, such data was a vital reference to insure that the research results objectively reflect Israeli planning policies.

**Theoretical Perspectives**

The purpose of this section is to examine how the spatial planning sphere is used as a means of controlling disadvantaged groups and keeping them outside of the cycle of relevant development. This sphere of planning has been recognised as the foundation of urban planning theory (Yiftachel, 1995; Healey, 1992, 1997; Rydin, 1998; Hall & Pfeiffer, 2000). Yiftachel (1995:127) defines the physical sphere of planning as “the spatial [territorial] land use content of plans and polices.” The plan is the expression of this vision, showing the spatial arrangement of land usage, such as the form and location of colonies, neighbourhoods, administrative boundaries, and commercial and social activities. According to this definition, planning practice must conform to a human rationale for achieving social reforms.¹ This analysis indicates that spatial planning executed by public authorities should be perceived as “societal guidance” to achieve “social reforms” that move in the direction of “social transformation.” Friedmann (1973), Friedmann & Weaver (1979) and Harvey (1973) argue that this can only be achieved if the fairness of land distribution and social reforms are taken in consideration.

However, it has been observed that in the context of deeply divided societies, such as the state of Israel², governmental authorities can use land as powerful mechanisms for controlling the spatial development of ethnic minorities (Khamaisi, 1990, 1992; Abu Rass, 1997). This shows that spatial policies in deeply divided societies are composed of “non-assimilating ethnic groups that occupy their historical (real or mythical) homeland” (Yiftachel, 1995:124).

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¹ Planning as social reform refers to “finding ways to institutionalise planning practice and make action by the state more effective” (Friedmann, 1987:76). Thus, the word reform implies making things better and producing activities for the public good that narrow the inequalities between groups.

² Deeply divided societies are composed of “non-assimilating ethnic groups that occupy their historical (real or mythical) homeland” (Yiftachel, 1995:124).
divided societies can increase or decrease the amount of social and cultural autonomy of minorities that do not (and actually cannot) assimilate into the majority group in the same country.

Yiftachel (1995) points out that social, political and cultural autonomy for indigenous ethnic minorities can be achieved by establishing autonomous local and regional administrative units in spatial settings where ethnic groups have the ability to use and control the spatial distribution of land for building, resources, housing or infrastructure, as exists, for example, in Canada. The reason for seeking this type of autonomy as discussed by Marcuse (1993) is that top down governmental planning policies can be used to contain and control the land of minority groups by imposing restrictions on urban development, land ownership, colonies’ expansion, colonies’ jurisdiction and creating new colonies for the majority groups at the expense of minority groups.

Davidoff (1973) and Rabinovitz (1973) argue that the social and physical dimensions of planning can be used as tools to create social repression if planning is moulded to control and exclude diverse interest groups. In this case, the social development of disadvantaged groups, like the Palestinians in Israel, becomes dependent on State benefits, which automatically are moulded in accordance with the interests of the dominant (Jewish) beneficiary groups. Yiftachel (1995, 1999) has identified this phenomenon; a systematic repression of subordinate groups by social policies often results in a growing level of dependence by weaker groups on dominant interests. Douglas (1998) indicates that conflict between the state and a community, or a specific group of people, may emerge if that mutual relation is weak. Connor (1987) points out that conflicts between the state and specific groups of people (e.g., minorities or powerless “under-represented” groups) are most likely to occur in a deeply divided society or state. For that reason, “government policies in such societies often attempt to control ethnic minorities, hoping to prevent serious challenges to the character of the social, political and physical aspects of the state”. (Yiftachel, 1995:125)

In the context of modern urban politics, planning is considered as reform and a rational intervention into social life (Faludi, 1973; Healey, 1997; Rydin, 1998). This analysis indicates that effective, sustainable urban development is essential; reform and rationality should replace control and irrationality. It is argued that if socio-spatial planning is used as a tool to deprive, weaken and suppress certain groups, particularly in a deeply divided, democratic country, it often augments social and cultural conflict between the disadvantaged and the privileged groups. In this case, social urban planning becomes a tool for control and frustration rather a tool for reforms and advancement. Socio-spatial planning and its outcomes should be conceived of as tools for reform and modernisation, rather than for controlling powerless minority groups. Accordingly, spatial urban development is a mutual relation between the interests of the state and the interests of the socio-political community.

2.1 The Israeli Context

Until the year 1948, the area that is now known as Israel was known internationally as Palestine. Palestinians were the predominant group, while Jews comprised less than 30% of the overall population. During the war between the Palestinians and the Jews at that time, Jewish Agency President Ben-Gurion declared the foundation of the State of Israel, in May 1948. Due to the war during that chaotic period, most Palestinians were expelled from their homes. As a result, when the war ended,
Palestinians had become a minority group—the non-Jewish Arab minority, constituting about 19% of the overall population of Israel.

### 2.1.1 The Israeli Society

“The Israeli society has been shaped by immigration patterns more than most other countries.” (Goldscheider, 1996:41) The country comprises a mixture of people with a variety of ethnic backgrounds, lifestyles, religions, cultures and traditions. At the end of the year 2008, according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (2009), the population of Israel has grown eight times since 1948, numbering about 7.4 million inhabitants. Jews comprise 79.4% of the country’s population, while the Palestinian citizens constitute about 20.6% or 1.498 million.

As a result of the violent disruption of life in historical Palestine, the transfer of land ownership from the Palestinians to the Israeli state and the implementation of the Zionist ideology, Israeli society is characterised by deep-seated and long-standing geo-political and territorial conflicts between the Palestinian and Jewish communities. The two communities live in divided and segregated urban spaces, each of which has its own characteristics and narratives. Palestinians, the Arab citizens of Israel, have had a difficult struggle to maintain their land ownership since the Israeli government uses different policies, such as preservation of open spaces and agricultural land, and environmental protection, as excuses to confiscate their land. These policies resulted in Jewish spatial domination, while preventing the expansion of Palestinian localities (cities, towns, villages and neighbourhoods). Although Palestinian citizens enjoy political rights, they suffer from unfair distribution of national resources in most fields such as education, housing, employment, income and socio-cultural services.

For instance, only 4% of the state development budget is allocated for the Palestinian community, although today they constitute about 20% of the population. Another example is the inability of non-Jews to purchase or lease state land, which constitutes about 93% of the total land in Israel. The Washington Post (Oct. 1, 1997) puts it this way, “Non-Jews are barred by law from purchasing or leasing most properties (Jewish National Fund property, "state land," and land under the control of the Custodian of ‘Absentee’ Property).” In this respect, Jews and Palestinians have different perspectives on this phenomenon. Jews legitimise this policy as they have the right to control the spatial strategies of the land, while Palestinians see it as an obstacle.

It is important to emphasise that despite limited natural resources, Israel has intensively developed its agricultural and industrial sectors over the past 20 years. The country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2001 reached about $110 billion, or about $17,500 per person. It is important to emphasise that the real standard of living in Israel is determined not only by income level but also by the amount of benefits gained from official channels, such as social benefits and military service. The society is mostly urban, with some 92% of the population living in cities. Although 8% of the population lives in rural areas, only 2.7% of the total national work force is engaged in agricultural production.

### 2.1.2 Current Conditions of Palestinian Citizens in Israel

Palestinians in Israel today are those who did not leave their homeland in the forced evacuation carried out by the Zionist militias and army in 1947-1949. A useful reference to this campaign of ethnic cleansing can be found in Pappe (2006). After the formation of the Israeli state in 1948, most of these Palestinians became Israeli citizens. Although Palestinians and Jews in Israel coexist as two segregated
communities (in residential terms), the future of the Palestinian Israeli is closely tied to that of the State of Israel. The majority of the Palestinian Israeli population lives in self-contained towns and villages in three main regions of the country: The Galilee in the northern region, the Triangle in the central region, and the Negev in the southern region of the country. Only a small segment (about one-tenth) of them live in mixed cities where Jews form a majority, such as Acca, Haifa, Lud, Ramle and Tel Aviv-Yaffa (CBS, 2009). Most Palestinian communities are small and characterised by a lack of socio-economic opportunities; they have inadequate access to housing, land and other urban and agricultural assets. Furthermore, the infrastructure in their communities is insufficient.

Over the years, Jewish and Palestinian Israeli citizens have come to accept each other. However, the Israeli authorities have not sought to assimilate or integrate the state's Palestinian citizens. Rather, they have tended to exclude them from public life, and to leave them marginalised and neglected (Lustick, 1980). The most obvious example of this is the case of the unrecognised villages dispersed throughout the country. These localities are deprived of rudimentary services and subjected to seemingly arbitrary home demolitions (see III.4). Another example is that Palestinian citizens cannot have access to the land that is owned by the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency. Theoretically, Israeli Palestinians have equal access to land owned by the state; however, in practice, the reality is different. The Washington Post newspaper (May 20, 1997) puts it this way, “Zionists devised formal and informal mechanisms to prevent Palestinians from acquiring Jewish land that persist today”.

Moreover, Palestinians in Israel have the lowest socio-economic status of all groups in the state (Khamaisi, 1995; HRA, 2000, Mossawa 2001). In 2008 according to CBS and the National Insurance Institute NII (2008) 1.651 million people in Israel lived below the poverty line, poor families constituted 19.9 percent of Israel's population. The number of children living in poor families had reached 783,600. Arab Palestinian Citizens of Israel constitute 34% of all poor families and 49.4 percent of all Arab (Palestinian) families in Israel. It was estimated that 60 percent of all Arab children in Israel live below the poverty line. Summing up the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics Abstract figures of 2009 indicate the wide gaps that exist between Palestinians and Jews in all major indicators, including infant mortality rate, education level, income and housing density (see selected figures in table 1, see section II).

Table 1 Selected figures indicating the gap in social conditions of ‘Arabs’ and Jews in Israel 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items compared</th>
<th>‘Arabs’</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average number of persons per household</td>
<td>4,80</td>
<td>3,10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of persons per room</td>
<td>1,43</td>
<td>0,84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of children per household (up to age 17)</td>
<td>2,16</td>
<td>0,94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average gross monthly income per work hour in 2007 (NIS)*</td>
<td>30,30</td>
<td>47,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average gross monthly income per employee in 2007 (NIS)</td>
<td>5.419</td>
<td>8.434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Dec 2009: 1$=3.7896 NIS New Israeli Shekel
Sources: (I)CBS 2009, NII Annual Report 2009 poverty and social gaps 2008

This analysis indicates that no Israeli government has ever enacted a clear, comprehensive, strategic spatial urban and environmental plan to address the needs for growth and development of this large segment of the population. It is argued that the urban state policy towards Palestinians is mainly based on constant political pressures. Therefore, in order to meet the challenge of the systemic inequities facing
Palestinian Israelis, there should be an inclusive and comprehensive framework to define the needs of this segment of the population. Otherwise, the possibility of internal conflicts, instability and, above all, underdevelopment will remain high.

2.2 Land Ownership and Management in Israel

The present state of land ownership in Israel is a complex, intertwined process. It can be traced back to the idea of creating a Jewish national home in Palestine, as was adopted by the First Zionist Congress in 1897, as mentioned before.

At present, there are three main types of land ownership in Israel, as seen below:

- The *Israeli government* owns about 80.5% of the land in Israel. This land was inherited from the Mandatory Government or expropriated from Palestinian citizens using various laws such as the Law of Absentee Property of 1950, and laws on Military Zones and Emergency Defence.
- The *JNF* and the *Jewish Agency* own about 13% of the total land in Israel.
- *Private* Palestinian and Jewish citizens own about 6.5%. It is important to highlight that Palestinian citizens own about 713,000 dunam, i.e., 3.5% of the total land in Israel. From this area only 508,000 dunam is under the jurisdiction of Palestinian localities, and the area that is designated for development is about 160,000 dunam or about 0.7% of the state area.

Analysis indicates that land ownership relations, land registration policies and taxation imposed during the Ottoman Empire and British Mandate contributed to the reduction of the amount of land owned by Palestinians in Palestine. Furthermore, ownership policies and the legal system made it much easier to pass land rights on, and in this way both the Ottoman Empire and the British Government contributed to Jews acquiring land (see section II). However, with regard to land management, analysis indicates that, theoretically, Israeli Palestinians have equal access to land owned by the state. However, in practice, the reality is different. Furthermore, Palestinian citizens have no access to land owned by the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency. This raises an interesting question: How do Palestinian citizens in Israel cope in terms of land?

2.3 One land - two spatial planning systems

To understand the way in which the territorial control of Palestinian citizens in Israel was applied after the establishment of the state, it is necessary to explain the role of Israel’s spatial planning policies in systematically limiting and decreasing the Palestinian community’s land ownership, as well as confining their urban and rural development. Understanding the Israeli spatial planning policy deductively will provide essential background for inductive, empirical study at the regional and local levels.

2.3.1 Goals and intentions of comprehensive National Spatial Planning

Comprehensive National Spatial Planning in Israel places much emphasis on designating land usage, dispersal of population and colonies, allocation of national resources, and conserving land for agricultural and open space activities. It also aims to address the role of unleashing the potential for development as a basis for balanced regional development, as well as developing Israel as a Jewish and
democratic state (TAMA 35). The spatial planning system in Israel is governed by the Planning and Building Law of 1965, which evolved from a similar act originally passed during the British Mandate in Palestine. Under this system, virtually all proposed development from additions to a house to building a quarry or airport needs planning permission from various levels of Planning and Building Commissions. Planning and Building Commissions operate in the framework of the Planning Authority (PA), which is a part of the Ministry of Interior.

According to Alterman (1994) and Yiftachel (1995), the Israeli spatial planning system is divided into two principal arms: developmental/initiative and procedural/regulative (Figure 1). While the Jewish side is well represented and initiative in the development and initiative part of planning via different bodies, the Palestinian side is more an addressee of the regulative and procedural part. Strategic public bodies, such as the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Construction and Housing, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the Jewish Agency, the Israeli Land Authority and the Jewish National Fund, the latter pivotal Zionist organisations, determine developmental planning. The main goals of these bodies are to develop and promote sustainable patterns of land use, roads and forestry across the country for the Jewish sector. (see figure 1) The privileged position accorded to the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund derives from their vital contribution to the establishment of the State of Israel. These two bodies constitute quasi-governmental authorities and receive financial support from the Jewish Diaspora and are not, therefore, accountable to Israel’s non-Jewish groups (Yiftachel, 1995:133).

**Figure 1: The Israeli Spatial Planning System**

Source: Yiftachel 1995
The hierarchical administrative system (i.e. zoning plans of various scales: ‘top down’) aims at developing national, regional and local spatial master/outline plans for securing development. This planning system operates on three main levels: the National Council for Planning and Construction, six district committees, and about 130 local planning committees that generally reflect the requirements of the (Jewish) residents (see figure 1). According to the Planning and Building Law of 1965, clause 49, the national outline plan is located at the top level of the hierarchical planning framework and supervises the district outline plans that set out details for implementing the national plan in that district (see figure 2). This scheme lays down the planning structure for the whole area of the State and assigns purposes for various areas; for example, setting aside residential and industrial zones; laying out highways, railroad lines and electricity grids; enacting provisions for recreation areas, nature reserves and holy places; and forecasting demographic changes. Without such plans, no buildings can be approved, and no state services, such as water, electricity and telephone, are to be provided. These outline plans regulate most building and land use management in Israel, and in addition establish a framework for environmental planning. These plans are a key instrument for Judaising the country.

Figure 2 Hierarchy of the Israeli Planning System

The National Board that is chaired by the Minister of the Interior consists of government representatives such as the Committee for the Protection of Agricultural Land and the Israel Land Authority, scientists, engineers and a representative of environmental interest groups. The primary responsibilities of the National Board are to enact overall planning in Israel, review regional outline plans and serve as an appeals board for decisions made by the District Planning and Building Commissions (Alterman, 1994). Alfasi (2003) argues that there are various barriers to public participation, hence democratisation in this system of spatial planning. The exclusion and/or minimal representation of individuals and communities in planning processes has affected mostly the Palestinian community, since representation in planning processes in Israel occurs via indirect mechanisms, i.e., by virtue of being member of planning commissions. Egbaria (2003) argues from practice that the Palestinian community in Israel has access to formal spatial plans only by submitting objections, a procedure reserved for stakeholders who are directly influenced by a spatial plan. Therefore, Palestinian residents in Israel have a very low level of representation or incorporation into the planning processes (Yiftachel, 1995; Khamaisi, 1990; Sikkuy, 2000, 2001). According to Yiftachel (1995), this policy has controlled and contained
the process of Israeli Palestinian urbanisation development, because it is carried out without taking the Palestinians in Israel into consideration. According to an extensive literature review carried out by the author, the absence or low level of representation can be summarised as follows:

- The council of the National Planning Committee is composed of 30 members. Today there is only one Israeli Palestinian citizen in this council. Until recently, there was none.
- The council of the Israeli Land Authority is composed of 24 members. Today there is no Palestinian representative in this council, despite the complexity of the daily problems faced by the Palestinian community in Israel.
- Israeli Palestinians are severely under-represented in District Planning Committees. For example, there is only one Palestinian member in the Northern District Planning and Building Committee.
- There is no Palestinian representation in the Committee for the Conservation of Agricultural Land.
- There is an absence of Palestinian representation in governmental committees, such as the Kubersky Committee of 1976, and the Markowitz Committee of 1986, that deal with unrecognised Palestinian localities and so-called informal and illegal buildings.
- Moreover, there is low representation of qualified Israeli Palestinians in all planning institutions.

Furthermore, only in four cities, constituting 6% of Palestinian localities are there local planning commissions. The case is quite different in Jewish localities, 55% of which have their own local planning and building commissions. This means that most Palestinian citizens cannot initiate an application for building permission in order to develop their municipalities. For instance, the Palestinian city of Um El Fahem, which counts about 40,000 residents, has no local planning commission, while Jewish cities with comparable populations, such as Rosh-Ha'ayen, or Kiryat-Tivon, which is about 1/3 the size of Um El Fahem, have their own local planning commissions. Certainly, the lack of Palestinian representation at all planning levels, and the lack of local planning commissions in Palestinian localities, seems systematic, and limits their ability to influence spatial planning and land allocation for development and growth.

Undoubtedly, gaps are clear and visible since the Zionist state's ideological, demographic, geographic and political goals are the main criteria shaping Israeli spatial planning polices and their implementation. The Different Israeli planning institutions and quasi-institutions use the concept of regulative/procedural spatial planning as a mechanism to control and confine Palestinian spatial development and territorial expansion. Procedural spatial planning in Palestinian areas follows the concept of "fill-in" policy within defined small 'blue-line boundaries', in which building is possible for them. One impact of procedural planning is the tremendous overcrowding created in Palestinian localities. Data reveals that population density in Palestinian rural areas (villages) is about 3.5 times higher than in Jewish rural localities, i.e., 4.7 persons per dunam as compared to 1.3 persons. Another example of the effect of Israeli procedural planning concerns the approval of local master plans: only about 30 out of 81 Palestinian local authorities have had their master plans for development approved. This has created many problems in the localities that lack such approval. About 57% of Palestinian residential buildings lack building
permits, and there are more than 30,000 outstanding demolition orders for ‘illegally’ built structures in Israeli Palestinian residential areas. It is important to highlight that in the Jewish sector, there is not a single illegal settlement, but there are more than 100 so-called illegal and unrecognised Palestinian localities, although some of them existed before the establishment of the state. The main goal of this spatial policy is to force the inhabitants of these localities, especially the Bedouin communities, to leave their homes and land, and move to government planned areas (see III, 4).

2.3.2 The National Master Plan: Israel 2020

It is crucial to discuss the main goals of the current institutional framework for strategic planning and environmental management in the State of Israel, because polices pursued by the government towards Palestinian citizens can positively or negatively affect the development of this large segment of the population. (Mazor 1993)

Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, governmental and quasi-governmental bodies have prepared a number of strategic spatial plans to deal with specific fields, such as transport, and comprehensive policies that deal with all aspects of urban and rural development. The two recently prepared National Master Plans (TAMA 31 and TAMA 35, in Hebrew) have strategic visions for the development of the State of Israel over the next two decades. These plans are basically normative and lay down long-range targets. The primary objective of all National Master Plans, including the latest one, TAMA/35, Israel 2020, is to encourage the establishment of new Jewish colonies throughout the State of Israel and to further the “in-gathering of the exiles.” In addition, they aim to allocate areas and distribute land resources for social, cultural, economic, security and other aspects of urban and rural development in Israel, and to establish national priority areas within a framework of sustainable development. Certainly, these objectives directly influence the lives and welfare of all social groups. They also influence the future landscape of the country.

Analysis of the latest National Master Plans (such as TAMA 3 for roads and railways, TAMA 31 and TAMA 35) and District/Regional Plans (such as TAMAM 2 and TAMAM 6 which details land use), indicates that in spite of the government's stated goal to improve and modernise citizens' lives, including the Palestinian minority group, through redevelopment programs, Palestinians in Israel continue to suffer from uneven development and unequal distribution of national resources when compared to Jewish citizens. For instance, a map of the Trans-Israel Highway reveals that about 12 regional industrial zones will be established and linked to it; none of them are located within the jurisdiction of a Palestinian locality.

Another example is the obstacles that face the spatial distribution of the socio-economic development of the Palestinian community in Israel as compared to Jewish colonies. The government divides the country into three economic zones (A, B and C), and categorises their status on a 1-to-10 scale (10 being the optimum socio-economic condition, while 1 is the least advantaged); benefits are distributed accordingly. The National Master Plans indicate that the government has designated certain areas as preferred national socio-economic development areas. The majority of these areas are Jewish development towns, and they are then eligible to receive social and economic benefits, including special tax programs for industry, educational programs, and housing incentives. In this respect, Sikkuy (2005) and others have found that all Palestinian localities and Bedouin communities in the Negev region are concentrated in the lower cluster. Nazareth, the biggest Palestinian city in Israel, with
a population of about 60,000 people, is in the third cluster. It was found that the only Palestinian town ranked in the sixth cluster is Ma‘iliya in the Galilee region. Comparative studies indicate that most of the Jewish towns are ranked in the 5 highest clusters, and only one Jewish town is in the lowest cluster. (Falah 1990; Falah 1992)

The population of rural areas in Israel constitutes about 9% of the overall population, and these rural areas are controlled by 53 regional councils. According to Groag and Hurtman (2003), in administrative terms, these communities control about 90% of the state’s land area and benefit from property related taxes. In fact, Palestinian regional councils do not enjoy such benefits and their communities lack territorial continuity. Certainly, territorial continuity not only has many positive effects on the process of development, but also on the integration between Palestinian and Jewish communities. Even the possibility of continuity and integration between Palestinian localities exists due to geographical and territorial locations, but the Israeli government attempts to separate and control them via planting new Jewish colonies or infrastructure networks in and around the Palestinian living areas. Accordingly, the national policy has resulted in uneven administrative areas. The area that is under the administration of Palestinian localities (towns, villages and regional councils) is about 2.5% of the state’s land and accounts for about 20% of the total population.

Since the 1960s, Bedouins in the Negev region have been subjected to a policy of forced sedentarisation (ayur habdawim). This began with the establishment of some new recognised semi-urban areas (such as Rahat and Tel Sheva). Israeli policymakers see this process as improving the Bedouins’ quality of life and moving towards modernisation and new development. However, research conducted by Sikkuy, RC and HRA (2000/2001) indicates that Bedouins of the Negev see this process as a discriminatory policy which breaks down their traditional economic and social life while making land available for Jewish-only colonisation programs. They also see it as a way of creating a source of cheap labour for the Jewish economy.

This does not mean that Palestinian citizens have not experienced positive developments after the formation of the state in 1948, things such as free education, freedom of speech and association, and the formation of a new intelligentsia. However, they are suffering from the slow and complicated pace of growth and development. A report published in Haaretz newspaper (September 4, 2003 edition) covered the formation of an official commission of inquiry to discuss the reasons for the political and security incidents of October 2000, which led to the killing of 13 Palestinian citizens by the Israeli police forces. This commission headed by Supreme Court Justice Theodor Or found that the clashes of October 200 between the police forces and Palestinian citizens were directly related to government policies towards Palestinian citizens, saying that “Government handling of the Palestinian sector has been primarily neglectful and discriminatory. Evidence of the distress included poverty, unemployment, a shortage of land, serious problems in the education system and substantially defective infrastructure.” This shows that Israeli national policy has been neglecting the basic indicators for improving the urban and rural living conditions of Palestinian citizens. A policy debate on development issues and civil rights at national level is thus urgently required to address the needs of this segment of population.
2.4 Ethnocratic Planning – Results

The purpose of this section is to provide a detailed investigation into the process of land control implemented by the Israeli government against Palestinian citizens after the establishment of the state.

2.4.1 Land shrinkage for a growing community

It is important to indicate once again that before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1947-48, the Palestinian community owned and used most of the land within its boundaries (see table 2). Today this community has lost most of its lands which were transferred to the hands of the government (Khamaisi, 2002). The Israeli government has used over 30 laws, such as the Absentee Property Law of 1950, Restrictions on the Use of Agricultural Land and Water Law of 1967, the Emergency Defence Regulations, etc., (see annex) to expropriate land owned by Palestinians and allocate it to Jewish control. A report published by Mossawa Center (2001:24) states that in the period of “1948-1975, over 800,000 dunam were taken from Palestinian citizens and used for the creation of sixty new Jewish villages.”

Table 2 Changes in land ownership and population in Palestine (until 1948) and Israel (after 1948)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jews Land</th>
<th>Jews Population</th>
<th>‘Arabs’ Land</th>
<th>‘Arabs’ Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mossava Center 2001

In 1976, the Israeli authorities expropriated about 20,000 dunam from Palestinian citizens in the Galilee region for the purpose of establishing a new Jewish settlement called Carmiel as well as military training camp. Palestinian citizens held mass demonstrations protesting this policy. Those demonstrations were confronted by the Israeli police forces, and six Palestinian citizens from the villages where land expropriation carried out were killed. That tragic event sparked the first Land Day (Yoüm al Ard in Arabic) uprising. Every year Palestinians in Israel demonstrate to commemorate this occasion.

After the first Land Day, between the years 1978 and 1983, the Israeli government adopted a new territorial policy for Judaising Palestinian land in the three regions where Palestinians are mostly concentrated. This policy aimed at the establishment of new Jewish towns instead of confiscating Palestinian land. This does not mean that land confiscation stopped during and after this period. For instance, annual reports of the ILA (such as report no.28 in 1989, and report no. 31 in 1992) indicate that from between 1987 and 1991, ILA took over about 25,500 dunam from Palestinian citizens.

In addition, since the mid-1960s, the Bedouins of the Negev, who constitute about 11% of the Palestinian minority in Israel, have been subjected to a systematic process of land confiscation. According to a report published by the HRA (2000),
Bedouins in the Negev were using most of the Negev land, which constitutes more than half of the state’s area. Analysis of land ownership extracted from planning documents indicates that by the year 2003, the Bedouin population holds in total only 240,000 dunam. A large portion of this remaining land (about 180,000 dunam) is owned by the residents of the unrecognised villages (see III.4). Nevertheless, the State of Israel continues to expropriate from the remaining land that belongs to Bedouins in the Negev, using a number of mechanisms, some of which were mentioned previously, to facilitate the transfer of Palestinian land to the hands of the state such as:

- The Land Acquisition Law (Validation of Acts & Compensation) (1953) states that land that was not in the possession of its owner in April 1952 could be registered as state property.
- The Land Rights Settlement Ordinance (1969) classified all marwat lands (Ottoman term, literally meaning dead) as state property, unless a formal legal title could be presented.
- Marwat land was defined as unused land at a distance of more than 1.5 miles from the nearest Jewish settlement.
- The Negev Land Acquisition Law (1980) facilitated large-scale confiscation of bedouin lands for building military bases and an airport in the wake of the peace treaty with Egypt.

A review of Israeli planning documents, files in the archives of the local planning commission, newspapers and human rights association reports, reveals that about 85% of all land confiscated (from private owners) for the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway was taken from Israeli Palestinian citizens. The Trans-Israel Highway (Highway No. 6) is an eight-lane expressway that will run 324 kilometres from the Negev in the south to the Galilee in the north. The land expropriated for the establishment of this highway has been taken disproportionately from Palestinians in Israel: Of the 20,000 dunam of land which the government will expropriate for the highway, 17,000 are currently Palestinian owned.

Obviously, the confiscation of the land of Palestinian citizens by the state has resulted in diminishing the amount of land owned by the Palestinian community. Today, Palestinians own approximately 3% of the land in Israel (Yiftachel, 1999), while 93% is owned by the state, and the rest belongs to private Jewish owners. Citizens have little legal recourse against land confiscation since wide powers are given to the executing authorities. Certainly, shrinkage of the amount of land accessible to them will affect the development of the Palestinian sector, since they will find only limited options for growth and development.

2.4.2 The opportunity for development

In Israel there are about 1,200 Palestinian and Jewish localities (cities, towns, villages). Recognised Palestinian localities constitute only a small portion of the 108 local governance bodies in Israel. Only 9% of local governance bodies are Palestinian, although Palestinians are about 20% of the overall population in Israel. Most, if not all, of the Palestinian localities have applied to enlarge their municipal boundaries for development, but only a few of their applications have been accepted, and with very limited increases. On the other hand, when Jewish localities request expansion of their municipal boundaries, they are usually allocated generous additional areas (Groag and Hurtman, 2003). An example of this biased, ethnocratic policy is the case of the Palestinian town, Kfar Kasem, and the adjacent Jewish city,
Rosh Ha’ayen. In the 1950s, about 2,600 dunam of land belonging to Kfar Kasem were transferred to the jurisdiction of Rosh Ha’ayen. Only a small part of this land was returned to the village in 1993; the rest of the land that was supposed to be returned has still not been transferred.

As indicated before, the process of expropriating and controlling the land of the Palestinian community in Israel began before the establishment of the state, and is still in operation. Thus, spatial planning, i.e., the management of land use, settlement expansion and development, is at the core of the conflict between the Palestinian citizens and the Israeli authorities. Yiftachel (1999) argues that ethnocentric planning has become the major reason for ethnic conflict over land, settlement development and expansion, jurisdiction and boundaries, between the powerful Jewish majority and the marginalised Palestinian citizens in Israel. On the other hand, Khamaisi (2002) calls this process a part of the enduring colonial process to judaize the land of Israel.

National planning documents indicate that the government has adopted several means to differentiate between Jews and Palestinians with respect to land allocation, land management and other matters of spatial planning. The difference in national priority for land use and the establishment of new cities can be understood by comparing land allocation for the two different communities. For instance, there is a large gap between Jewish and Palestinian towns in terms of municipal boundaries. Data obtained from the Southern District planning archives indicates that there are considerable differences between the two neighbouring communities, Omer, a Jewish settlement, and Tel Sheva, a Palestinian Bedouin locality, in terms of the allocation of land for development. The municipal boundaries of Omer town, which counts about 6000 residents (as of 2003), encompass about 17,000 dunam, while Tel Sheva, which counts about 10,000 residents, has an area of about 4,000 dunam. This gives an idea about the ratio of population density. The density ratio in Tel Sheva (0.4 dunam per person) is about 7 times greater than of Omer (2.8 dunam per person).

Putting some of the land of Israeli Palestinian localities under Jewish regional council control, such as happened to Um El Fahem in the Triangle region, has limited the town’s physical development and expansion (Egbaria, 2003). This policy has created an increasingly overcrowded built-up area compared to neighbouring Jewish colonies, such as Me-Amee. Another example in the Galilee region, according to the HRA (2000), is that the Palestinian city, Nazareth, controls a total area of 14,200 dunam (1,420 hectares) for 60,000 people, whereas the nearby Jewish town of Nazerat Illit (Upper Nazareth) has 34,000 dunam (3,400 hectares) for a population of 45,000; moreover, a significant proportion of Upper Nazareth’s land was originally Nazareth’s land. Khamaisi (1990:174) argues that “this has caused Nazareth’s residents to suffer a severe shortage of land and limited possibilities for development and expansion” needed to cope with natural population growth.

A study conducted by Egbaria (2003) revealed that the Jewish town, Roash Ha’ayen, and the Palestinian city, Taybeh, located in the same district, have almost the same population. However, Roash Ha’ayen has an area of 7,650 dunam exclusively for residential development, and an industrial area of 1,403 dunam, while Taybeh has only 2,750 dunam for residential purposes and about 220 dunam for industrial purposes (see III, 3). Comparison between Taybeh and Roash Ha’ayen in terms of area allocated for industrial development reveals that the difference is about seven times more in favour of the Jewish city. It is important to mention that most (about
85%) of the Palestinian locations in the Triangle region lack local or regional industrial zones.

The Israeli authorities have pursued a policy of constantly establishing new colonies for Jews only; Palestinian citizens are not allowed to move into most of them. However, no parallel settlements have been established for Palestinian citizens since the establishment of the state except for a very small number of Bedouins in the Negev, which is part of a forced urbanisation process. This policy has led Palestinian citizens to build their houses without licenses in unplanned areas, leading to the urban phenomenon of unrecognised Arab locations (see more in III.4). It is important to highlight that about 100,000 Palestinian citizens live in unrecognised villages which are threatened with destruction, prevented from development and not shown on any map (see image 1). Despite the fact that most of the “unrecognised villages” existed before the establishment of Israel on private land, state policy considers their inhabitants as lawbreakers. It prevents them from repairing existing homes or building new ones.

**Image 1** Police evacuating unrecognized built homes in al-Arakib, 2010

![Image 1](Image1.png)

Source: Ha'aretz 4.8.2010

The result of ethnocratic planning is overcrowding in Palestinian localities, poor living conditions, unlicensed buildings and underdevelopment. Furthermore, this policy ignores the needs of Palestinian citizens and explicitly tries to concentrate this community in certain localities, while breaking the territorial continuity between them. In this respect, the Markowitz Commission Report (1986) on unlicensed (informal) buildings in the Palestinian sector recommended the following: “The planning authority within the Ministry of Interior should set a policy on the detailed directions of the development plans in the 'Arab sector' and the special aspects of this sector, to encourage vertical construction, to allow construction on smaller lots and to earmark state lands for public and private construction by the Israel Lands Authority.” Thus, Palestinian citizens have only one option, that is, to live in confined areas if they are to satisfy their housing needs; they have little land for other urban and agricultural activities.

**Conclusion: Meeting the challenges**

It was found that the principal factor used to control and retard urban and rural development in Palestinian localities in Israel is the prevention and restriction of expanding built-up areas and municipal boundaries to match the needs of the
Palestinian community. Decisions on municipal boundary changes (settlement upgrades, outline and development plans and jurisdiction limits) are influenced by the ideological and political positions of the Ministry of Interior much more than are decisions that involve Jewish local authorities. This has meant that the development of the physical planning of the Palestinian Arab sector is guided by the geopolitical views and ideological considerations of the planning authorities, aiming to promote Zionist ideology and enhance Jewish immigration and settlement. Fear of being surrounded by Palestinian villages and towns was the primary factor influencing the physical development of Jewish colonies; consequently, this affected all Palestinian localities.

Furthermore, control over land was also achieved by expropriating land from Palestinian residents and transferring it to the state for the establishment of new Jewish colonies, or the development of national and regional infrastructure networks. This transfer was carried out gradually and systematically from the earliest days of the state, and has resulted in decreasing the space available to Palestinian localities.

Accordingly, it is obvious that the expropriated private land owned by Palestinian residents as a matter of fact constituted the Israeli urban and rural development. On the other hand Palestinian citizens suffered from the fact that very little public land was devoted to the development of their community, whether in urban or rural areas. In addition, Israeli Palestinian citizens have very limited possibilities to own or use Israeli public land due to a series of discriminatory laws and practices. Recently, the government decided to support a bill “proposed by MP Haim Druckman of the National Religious Party that would enable state land to be apportioned for Jewish use only.” This would mean reserving it for private Jewish ownership and in effect, rewriting the historic land ownership in Palestine (Yideot Aharonot, 7/8/2002).

It becomes clear that existing spatial planning in Israel harms the Palestinian citizens in all aspects of life. Certainly, such policies can create very strong feelings of frustration and alienation. Land and questions about control of land are the main issues of the dispute between the Palestinian citizens and the governmental institutions. Allocating space and land on an equal basis regardless of ethnic belonging might solve the problems of spatial development of Palestinian citizens. Thus, it becomes clear that the problem is not easy to be solved, since the Israeli territorial planning is an issue of ‘ethnocracy’. For this reason, a policy debate on land allocation, land ownership, municipal boundaries, land confiscation and settlement patterns is urgently needed – against and in opposition to the announced policy of ‘transfer’ (of the Palestinians) of some members of the recent Israeli government. Comprehensive institutionalised spatial planning covering all aspects of inequality in the allocation of spatial resources might be the first step to creating a more equitable situation for Palestinian and Jewish communities. Certainly, such a framework would not only improve the socio-economic situation of the Palestinian residents, but will also enhance the solidity of the state and serve as evidence of a real change to a democratic character of the State of Israel.

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III

Kassem Egbaria

3. Discriminative Housing Policy in Israel's Palestinian localities: The Example of Tayibe

Israel is a country of a widely diverse population from many ethnic, religious, cultural and social backgrounds. Of its 7.411 inhabitants, 5.472 million Jews (including 187.000 living in West Bank colonies, 20.000 in Golan Heights and around 177.000 in East (Palestinian) Jerusalem). According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2009), 'Arabs' in Israel comprise about 20.6% of the overall population. Almost all Palestinians have been resident since before the establishment of the State of Israel. The Palestinians in Israel are mainly concentrated in three geographical regions that include; the Galilee, Triangle and Negev regions.

Israel is a welfare state that views the development of housing for its citizens as a major goal within which all social and ethnic groups should have an easy access to housing market mainly through offering subsidised mortgages and land provision and other aspects that help in the process of housing supply. It is argued that in contradiction to that, the combination of urban factors such as demographic growth, lack of development/master plans; land expropriation applied by the state; rigid building and planning regulations; lack of an appropriate housing finance system; limited land market; and discriminative government social policies contributed to the decline of housing provision (supply) in the Palestinian areas in Israel.

With regard to demographic growth, according to a research published by Soffer (2002), the projected number for the Palestinian population could reach to 23% per cent in 2020 and 31% in 2050. Accordingly, the total population of Israel (including East Part of (Arab) Jerusalem) in the 2020 is predicted to rise to about 9.5 million. The Jewish population will increase to 7.2 million, or 77% of the total – and that is on optimistic assumptions about continued immigration. The non-Jewish population (mainly Palestinians) will increase much more rapidly, to 2.3 million. According to Israeli CBS (2009), people under the age of 15 comprise about 42% of the non-Jewish population and about 28.4% of the Jewish population. This indicates the high amount of population growth of Palestinian Israeli population as compared to Jewish Israeli population. This means that continued rapid urban growth can be anticipated and the potential of growth must be incorporated and integrated to the development of the whole country.

However, with respect to urban factors which have direct relationship with the phenomenon of housing supply, institutional and ideological principles as well as geo-political objectives guide the general housing policy in Israel. Several Israeli authors argue that different discriminatory mechanisms and policies are applied by the state to control the urban factors and housing resources in the Palestinian areas in most urban development spheres such as the availability of land, housing funds and socio-physical infrastructure networks (Khamaisi, 1990, 2002; Rosenhek, 1996; Yiftachel, 1995, 1999). For instance, the exclusion of most of Palestinian areas from equal opportunities in state assistance programs (e.g., land allocation, housing finance, housing aid, social and public housing) negatively influenced their access to housing resources. This unequal institutional treatment resulted in severe disparities.
between Jews and Palestinian citizens in housing domain as well as in other dimensions. This does not mean that the government has not paid little efforts to solve housing problems in some Palestinian localities (via giving approvals to some land use plans [developmental plans] or providing a limited number of residential plots). However, these little efforts were not comprehensive and characterised by little success. For instance, the government decided in the year 2000 to plan and develop land plots for 40,000 housing units in the Palestinian areas. However, this program was delayed until the year 2003, and only a limited number of new plots (in Nahaf and Manda – Palestinian villages) were approved and completed.

Thus, the present institutional housing delivery system has been leading away from direct housing provision for the Palestinian citizens in Israel, particularly for those who are ranked as low-income households. The most obvious and visible manifestations of this failure are the numerous ‘illegal’ and informal housing areas scattered in the peripheries of most Palestinian localities (cities, towns, villages and neighbourhoods). These policies have resulted in about 36,000 house units that lack building permissions in the Palestinian sector versus a very limited number in the Jewish sector. In addition, the average number of persons per room is about 1.41 in Palestinian homes versus 0.88 in Jewish counterparts. These policies and others such as the rise in land price, limited access to land owned by the state, imposing restrictions on municipal boundaries and land use and the lack of formal and stable flow of housing funds are obstacles that tackle Palestinian residents to meet their residential needs. The limited governmental interventions in housing market in Palestinian areas, has resulted in overcrowding, high occupancy densities, with inadequate or non-existence of public facilities and amenities in some cases, beyond of all social and political uncertainties. In recent years, rapidly deteriorating economic conditions in Israel and particularly in Palestinian localities have encouraged families to build another house/s, or expand existing buildings in the same residential plot by breaking building regulations.

The primary objective of this research is to systematically analyse land supply, housing finance and planning and building regulations, that influence the process of housing provision/supply of the Israeli Palestinians (as a minority ethnic group) in Israel (as a democratic state) in order to advance appropriate guidelines of urban residential policies that meet their present and foreseeable future needs. It is believed that this goal promotes sustainable patterns of social well-being, physical and economic development in Israeli Palestinian residential areas. In addition, the study provides an insight into the general housing delivery system in the Palestinian areas in Israel and the problems associated with the failure of the Israeli planning authorities to provide housing for all inhabitants. This study does not focus on all issues and problems that affect housing development in Israeli Palestinian residential areas, nor addresses all of the relationships and effects of the Israeli planning system on the housing development phenomenon. (see III.2)

**Housing Policy versus Housing Supply – Theoretical Perspective**

Shelter is one of the most fundamental aspects that people need in their life in order to protect, secure and sustain themselves. Satisfactory homes (in terms of durability, spaciousness, crowding and density, cost etc.) help users to develop roots and personal (or collective) identity with the place. Furthermore, it helps to develop a sense of community, family and personal achievement (Rappaport, 1969; Duncan, 1981). Not least, the economic investments households make in their homes represent an important goal.
Due to the importance of housing to the human psyche, as well as in society or the economy, it is not surprising that government policy in this area is subject to more than just commentary and criticism. Insufficient and inadequate (qualitatively and quantitatively) housing as well as an inability of people to obtain (or construct) a home, can immediately expose a government (especially in welfare democratic states), to a great criticism by the disappointed and needy. This is not to say that the author is titled ‘Utopias, ideals and dreams’ with housing policy, communities and environments, but it is important to be aware of housing in its wider context, and the ways in which social public “government” planners link policies for better housing, better communities and better environments.

Housing policy refers to a wide range of government (or quasi-government) and non-government organisations. In this study, the focus is solely on government intervention (directly and indirectly) with residential activities. A government is the formal body of a policy making process. Keeping this argument in mind, Balchin (1995) and Blakemore (2001) define housing policy within the context of government domain, as any government action, legislation or economic policies which have a direct and indirect effect on housing, whether this relates to the supply of housing, house prices, tax policies affecting house purchase, housing standards or patterns of tenure (such as rental agreement or ownership).

Nevertheless, such definitions do not indicate why housing is of any special significance in the community development and social policy. Blakemore (2001) identifies three reasons for such importance:

- Housing is an area of welfare in which the market is by far one of the most important means of settling who gets what, or how needs are to be met.
- Housing is an area of special interest because it highlights the complex nature of needs and how needs can be defined.
- Housing is intimately connected with a wide range of other welfare issues such as health.

In this context Blakemore (2001:144) argues that “in terms of social division, a housing policy may for instance contribute to either a lessening or a heightening of racial tensions, or to either prevent or encourage the formation of ‘underclass’ housing estates, where people with low income and who are experiencing high rates of unemployment, may be concentrated”. This does not mean that a government housing policy has the ability to solve every issue related to housing development, but it can be argued that decisions made in housing policy have a direct impact on the social, demographic, economic, territorial (spatial) and environmental qualities of the users.

Any successful housing provision policy (either with a direct or indirect involvement of authorities) has to develop functioning housing markets with flexible supply mechanisms – especially a flexible supply of land, public infrastructure and housing finance to suit people of different income and preferences. In this context, Friedmann (1973:144-45) states that a housing policy is “basically concerned with the provision of shelter, land and essential public services (water, waste disposal, electricity, and transportation), and building of community environments that will facilitate social process (family formation, upbringing of children, social mobility and social integration)”. Turner (1976) and Friedmann (1973) argue that these are needs whose satisfaction depends, in part, on public intervention.
This analysis indicates that material quantities and qualities of housing goods and services depend on the availability and use of resources, such as land, services, finance, infrastructure networks and materials. Social, economic and political authorities govern both the accessibility and use of those resources. Despite this fact, Kelly & Becker (2000) emphasise that governmental institutions should help to ensure that there would be housing opportunities for people of many different socio-economic and cultural conditions. One of the key challenges facing localities (especially in communities characterised by rapid population growth) is the provision of adequate housing (Kasarda & Parnell, 1993; UNCHS, 1996; Ogu & Ogbuozobe, 2001).

The chances of making efficient and adequate housing policy are high in any particular society, if they are properly studied. In order to study housing provision phenomenon, Hall & Pfeiffer (2000) and Tipple, et al, (1999) have adopted a comprehensive approach that includes the following components: land provision, housing finance, building regulations (land use and zoning), infrastructure networks, building materials and labour. Therefore, the author will use this approach to investigate housing provision in Palestinian residential areas in Israel in two aspects: housing finance and building regulations.

**Why case study**

Because of the complexity of the issues under investigation, it was essential to establish a strong, clear and transparent research design that facilitates the translation of the abstract (or implicit) meaning of the key factors identified in the theoretical framework into an operational definition (or practical explicit descriptions). Therefore, a research design that utilises the use of a case study as an analytical approach seems to be the ideal tool for this study. Yin (1989:13) discussed the power of selecting such a research approach, and he states “case studies are preferred strategies when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on contemporary phenomenon with some real-life context”. Moreover, Babbie (1998) and Stake (1998) argue that the case study approach has the potential of establishing a research design that embraces the combination of multiple methods, approaches and techniques of data collection and analysis. Using as many data sources as possible is crucial to a strong case study (Yin, 1994). Because the subject of Palestinian urban housing in Israel and its direct relation to living conditions is complicated, the investigation went beyond this specific case study to include the current conditions of the Palestinian in Israel since the city of Tayibe cannot be isolated from the general society of the whole Israeli Palestinian population. Thus, the approach of discussion has taken the form of a top-down approach, in other words, from general to specific, i.e., from the state to shelter.

Following an exploration visit to most of the urban localities in the Triangle region to investigate this study, the city of Tayibe was selected to be the setting of the current investigations. The city of Tayibe is considered as a typical urban Israeli Palestinian settlement in terms of residential development, historical background, socio-economic development, size, population and geographical characteristics. Furthermore, the existence of approved (by Israeli authorities) contemporary planning development “Master Plan/ Outline or Development Plan” associated with more detailed land use plans was another criterion, since not all Palestinian towns in the Triangle region have approved master plans.
As indicated previously, the power of case study stems from its ability to embrace multiple methods and approaches. Multiple sources of quantitative, qualitative and documentary information were sought and used for this study. Within the scope of collecting qualitative empirical data, 16 in-depth open-ended interviews were conducted with families living in the case study location, and 20 interviews were also conducted with key figures in and around the city. In addition to this technique, social and physical observations were recorded in the period of data collection that was between August 2001 and December 2003. All interviews were tape-recorded, and later transcribed. Moreover, these methods were supplemented by visual methods, as they include photographing and sketching.

However, with the scope of quantitative data, a face-to-face questionnaire was used. The questionnaire was distributed and conducted with 300 informants (households). The rate of return and completion was encouraging, and resulted in the accumulation of 264 (88%) completed questionnaires. The questionnaire helped the researcher to get a sharper and insight understanding of the linkage between the Israeli urban residential planning and housing development issues in the city of Tayibe. Documentary information was also utilised for the investigation process, and it was obtained from a variety of sources, most notably: public planning archives, national newspapers, literature, protocols and documents. Descriptive and content data analyses were used to interpret and evaluate the findings.

Even though this research goes back to 2003 facts, results are not out of date. Quite the contrary, the situation of Palestinian Israelis in general is declining and in the housing sector accordingly.

The Palestinian community in Israel identifies itself as an integral part of the Palestinian people, while at the same time accepting full Israeli citizenship. However, they are not provided with the same rights as Jewish citizens of the state (see previous sector III 2). Discriminatory laws are placed to disadvantage the Palestinian Arab population in Israel (Adalah, 2000). The common terms used by Israelis to describe the Palestinian minority are “Arab citizens”, “Israeli Arabs”, “Arab Israelis”, “Palestinian Arabs”, “Arab sector”, “Arab minority”, “non-Jews” or “other”. We will use Palestinians if not other context demand to speak about 'Arabs'.

3.1 Tayibe, Palestinian Community in the Israeli Context

Tayibe lies in the southern part of the Triangle region in the central district in Israel. It is located at a distance of about 15 kilometres from the coastline on the coastal plain terrain, and 5 kilometres from the West Bank town Tulkarem (see figure 1a,b,c). Literally, Tayibe means “the good settlement” or “the fertile settlement” (Dabbag, 1988). Tayibe is located between two Palestinian localities that are closely related and dependent on it for various services such as Islamic judicial courts, business centre and local building materials. These localities are: Tira and Kalansawe forming a sub region called the Small Triangle. Its prime location also enhances its position in any future development plans, as it is located at the regional road that extends from Tulkarem in the West Bank to Kfar Saba city (near Tel Aviv).
The total jurisdiction of Tayibe is approximately 19,053 dunam (10 dunam = 1 ha). Nearly 14,158 dunam are agricultural land and about 4,895 dunam are assigned for 8 different land use categories. The amount of land in Tayibe devoted to each of the 8 designated land use categories is shown in Table 1. Most surprising is the amount of land occupied by regional and national infrastructure and national overhead transmission lines. They occupy about 15.35% (2,925 dunam) of the total jurisdiction area of Tayibe, or 20.66% of the total agricultural land (see table 1). This figure includes setback lines of the regional and national roads.

Table 1 Land use acc. to Tayibe's land use plans (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Approx. Area (in dunam)</th>
<th>% without agri-culture land</th>
<th>% includ-agri-culture land</th>
<th>Gross square-mtr./person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>residential</td>
<td>2,764</td>
<td>56,47%</td>
<td>14,5%</td>
<td>55,3 qm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public open space</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>7,96</td>
<td>2,05</td>
<td>7,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for public buildings</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>5,61</td>
<td>1,44</td>
<td>7,8 qm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cemeteries</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0,31</td>
<td>0,08</td>
<td>0,3 qm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial zone</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>4,49</td>
<td>1,15</td>
<td>4,4 qm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>roads and parking</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>24,51</td>
<td>6,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private open space</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0,64</td>
<td>0,16</td>
<td>0,61 qm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agricultural land</td>
<td>14,158</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>4,895</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>19,053</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tajibe municipal council archives 2003
A review of documents in the archives of the local municipal council indicates that the population of Tayibe has undergone rapid growth during the last century. Analysis of data collected from both the Central Bureau of Statistic and the archives of the local council indicates that at the end of 2002, the city had a population of approximately 31,000 inhabitants living in approximately 5,200 dwelling units (today 2009 35,800 inhabitants, CBS 2009). It is expected that by the year 2020 the total population will rise (natural population growth) to about 50,000 inhabitants.

Examining land use plans targeting the years 2015-2020, reveals that about 85-90% of the allocated land for residential purposes is already developed and dwelling units have been constructed, leaving nearly about 10-15% left to be built. However, demographic analysis indicates that by 2020 the population of Tayibe will increase by 60%. Linking the rapid growth of the population with the spatial organisation of the city, it reveals that residential density will increase from 15.38 persons/dunam (or 64.6 persons/acre) in 2000, to 18.18 persons/dunam (or 76.36 persons/acre) in 2020.

As a result, residential development in the city is taking the form of “fill-in” policy within small municipal ‘blue-line’ boundaries. This is achieved by preventing the expansion of the built-up areas on to privately owned agricultural land. This indicates that the urbanisation process will be behind and overcrowded. In other words, the city will witness housing and land shortages.

In addition to the demographic and spatial situation of Tayibe, it is important to mention that economic disparities between the Israeli Palestinian and the Jewish areas are visible and clear. According to Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS, 2009), about half of the Palestinian families in Israel live under poverty line, compared with about 17% of Jewish households (see III.2 CBS 2009). It is suffice to indicate that the current socio-economic situation in Tayibe is much worse than the numbers presented here (Egbaria and Lucky, 2002). All these facts have to be considered in a research about housing needs and a beneficiary system.

3.2 The Israeli Housing Policy

Once again, Israel is a welfare state that views the development of housing for its citizens as a major goal. Contemporary Israeli housing development is the combination of two approaches. These are the “provider” and the “enabler” (supporter), depending on the extent and the nature of public involvement in housing delivery (Rosenhek, 1996; Khamaisi, 1994). In the main, both are carried out according to a statutory (procedural) planning framework that is operated under the auspices of the Planning and Building Law of 1965 which is the basis for statutory planning in Israel and does not differentiate between ‘Arabs’ and Jews in all its means and forms. However, these two communities have substantial social and cultural differences. Nevertheless, procedural planning attitude has been favoured by the authorities because of “the multi ethnic nature of its society and the overriding need to foster a national consensus ideology in a young state” (Fenster, 1996:406).

In Israel, the provider approach advocates that public authorities essentially control the development of houses in order to reduce housing deficits and improve quality of housing. It ensures the provision of land, financial sources and the production of housing units with related public amenities. It is mainly operating in urban areas and large cities. However, the enabler approach favours indirect involvement of public authorities by encouraging householders, co-operative organisations and private construction firms to develop private houses by securing all housing components.
such as the provision of land, facilitating housing finance schemes and providing public facilities. This approach is mainly operated in small towns and rural localities.

The Israeli government published its housing policy statements since the date of the establishment of the state. The statements set out a wide range of policies to modernise housing so that every resident has the opportunity of a decent home and to promote social cohesion, well being and self-dependence (Building and Planning Law of 1965; Soffer, 1983; Schnell, 1994; Kipnis, 1991, 1996; Carmon, 1999; The State of Israel, 1999; Ministry of Housing and Construction, 2000). Accordingly, the key aims of housing planning policy are:

- To provide a sufficient supply of housing land during the plan period to meet the needs of the local inhabitants.
- Where possible to locate housing development near employment opportunities and existing or planned facilities.
- To ensure that the need for different types of housing accommodation, including affordable housing and special needs can be met.
- To encourage quasi-governmental bodies such as the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund to establish new socio-economic developments over all the regions in the state.
- To insure that the housing provided meets the needs of the population in respect of location, size, affordability, whilst achieving the aims of sustainability and preserving the quality and character of the environment.
- To provide housing aid and long-term loans from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Construction and Housing.

But why is this not realised at all for the Palestinian minority?

Goldscheider (1996) and Yiftachel (1995, 1999) argue that all consecutive Israeli governments emphasise the need to increase the size of the Jewish population relative to Arabs to assure Jewish political legitimacy and control in order to solve Jewish problems of disadvantage, anti-Semitism, and assimilation of Jews from countries where Jews lived as minority. To further Israel’s demographic goals, the Israeli government continuously establishes new Jewish localities, expand the existing limits of villages and cities and grants them significant budgets in order to make better social and economic development for them (Kark, 1994; HRA, 2000, Sikkui 2005). Goldscheider (1996) confirms that to fulfil the Zionist ‘dream’ there was a need to develop lands for adequate housing, health care, education, jobs and cultural activities to new Jewish immigrants. (see III 1,2)

3.2.1 Housing Policy and Housing Development in Israeli Palestinian Localities

Contrary to described official policy contemporary housing development in Israeli Palestinian urban areas is substantially the product of the private sector carried out by householders, independent builders, and private enterprise and mostly executed on private land (Khamaisi, 1990, 2002). This housing sector is characterised by formal, informal and ‘illegal’ (squatter) units constructed through self-management construction methods for most of the Israeli Palestinian residents, regardless of their social and economic status. The direct governmental contribution in the housing development to the Israeli Palestinians comprises supply of only quite small numbers of residential plots, limited financial resources and the provision of a basic infrastructure of formal housing stock.
In a report published by Mossawa (2003), it is indicated that “Arab families are disqualified from 70% of the budgets allocated by the Ministry to assist families in buying their homes. The percentage of Arab families that received this aid is 0.28% while in the Jewish sector 0.68%”. Furthermore, analysis of a report published by the Ministry of Housing reveals that in the last four years only 40% of Land Administration budget allocated for Palestinian households was used and utilised. The indirect governmental intervention is the provision of legislative measures concerning building, zoning and regulations. (see III 1.2)

According to Sikkuy (2000), in the years between 1975 and 1999, about 337,000 residential units have been built throughout the country under public initiative, including planning, marketing and supervision by the Ministry of Housing. Only 1,000 residential units have been constructed in Palestinian communities since the establishment of the State. These figures indicate that successive Israeli governments consider housing development to be one of its top priorities, however obviously mainly for the Jewish Israelis. According to Khamaisi (1990) and Sikkuy (2001), about 64% of all housing in the Israeli Jewish urban localities is public, less than 0.3% of all public housing has been built in 'Arab' urban areas (Sikkuy, 2000).

These issues are considered in the context of the institutional principles and political objectives that guided the "general" housing policy (that is, the governmental allocation of housing resources to selected groups within the Jewish population). This crystallised into a dual policy that led to the almost total exclusion of the Palestinian citizens of Israel from the domain of governmental action in the sphere of housing. Their exclusion from the groups eligible for state-run assistance programs severely reduced their access to residential elements and housing resources and negatively influenced their chances in other dimensions as well. This has meant that Palestinian areas in Israel have been provided with inferior levels of development, service, public amenities, infrastructure, limited access to land and housing finance.

This is the fact in addition to lack of social and cultural activities and facilities and limited access to jobs when compared with the rest of Israel's population, despite their nominal status as equal citizens of the state. It is significant to highlight that as a result of these severe polices “there exist over 130 Arab localities (villages) that the government does not recognise officially” (HRA, 2000). About 100,000 (nearly 8-9% of the total Palestinian population in Israel) Palestinian citizens live in these neighbourhoods and villages that are threatened with destruction, prevented from development and growth. (see III.4)

This had a serious impact on the ability of the Palestinian citizens whose population growth (3.8%) has exceeded their capacity and ability to participate in the housing market as consumers, especially in a shrinking private land supply market and difficulties and hardship to access to public land owned by the government. At the same time Israeli Palestinians are characterised by the lack of residential mobility between residential areas especially to the Jewish. Various factors are responsible for this phenomenon. The most obvious are the ideological priorities. Fenster (1993), Yiftachel (1995, 1999) and Khamaisi (1990, 2002) argue that Palestinian citizens in Israel clearly have suffered discrimination, and they do not have the choice of lifestyle either urban or rural that is available to Jews; hence, it is argued that housing policy in Israel is also serving the judaising process as revealed before.
3.3 The Case of Tayibe: Residential Environment and Housing Conditions

In order to understand the phenomenon of housing provision and analyse its main components (factors or aspects) in the research settings, it is important to reflect the national policy implemented by the Israeli planning authorities as revealed in previous sections. It was stated that planning regulations and decisions in Israel disadvantage the residential development of Arab minority citizens by lack of participation and representation in planning institutions on the one hand, and the general ideological approach related to Zionist conception of the Jewish character of Israel on the other (see section III 1,2).

The main purpose of this section is to evaluate the current housing conditions in Tayibe (as an Israeli Palestinian locality) and to investigate the main components that affect the phenomenon of housing provision. Thus, the main questions that arise here are:

- What is the current condition of housing in Tayibe?
- How do the main components of housing supply influence the housing sector in Tayibe?

3.3.1 Housing Conditions in Tayibe

Based on the conceptual framework developed in this study, housing in Tayibe can be divided into two main modes:

a) **authorised**: houses located in approved residential zones located within the boundaries of land use or outline plans, and

b) **unauthorised**: this mode is divided into two main subcategories.
   - **Firstly**, houses located within the approved residential areas, are built (the whole structure or parts of them) without building permits (for the purpose of analysis this type will be called informal).
   - **Secondly**, houses located outside the allocated residential areas, i.e., in agricultural areas within the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the city. This type will be called "illegal".

It was found that 97.7% of the houses included in the survey were built through the use of self-management construction method (houses developed and provided by households). However, only 2.3% of the informants reported that private local commercial entrepreneurial construction companies and private developers provided their houses. These houses are mainly rented to tenants. Data revealed that the houses provided by government or quasi-government organisations are non-existent.

The dominance of privately built houses, the insufficient number of houses initiated by commercial construction companies and the lack of houses developed by public agencies in Tayibe, has three implications.

- **Firstly**, Israeli planning authorities did not make any move toward (directly and indirectly) housing production by public entrepreneurial construction companies such as Solel-Bonah and Amidar.
- **Secondly**, acquisition of housing finance and public land for residential development remains a serious constraint to housing development in Tayibe.
- **Finally**, the determining factor of house type, construction method and home ownership, in both authorised and unauthorised houses, are not only due to the latent patterns of life of the households, rather it is the complex interrelation between land supply, household income and building regulations.
Ownership

With relevance to dwelling type, analysis indicates that slightly less than one half (48.1%) of dwellings surveyed were owner-occupied in a single family detached unit (see table 2). Owner-occupied unit in a multi-family apartment building (several nuclear families residing in separate dwelling units, usually brothers or a father and his son/s), was rated in second place (39.5%). While, 7% of the dwellings surveyed were owner-occupied in semi-detached units (duplex), and only 5.4% of the informants reported that they lived in dwelling units located in private apartment buildings assigned for rental use.

Table 2 Housing Typology in Tayibe in Terms of Tenure 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of dwelling</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied in a single family detached unit</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied in semi-detached units (duplex)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupied unit in a multi-family apartment building</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A rented unit in a private apartment building</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>258</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Egbaria 2003

Density

The issue of high-density buildings is evident in the fact that the number of houses per dunam (1 dunam = ¼ acre, or 1/10th of a hectare) and the high number of persons per bedroom are significant factors that determine the quality of life as well as the quality of the residential environment. Calculations of plot areas and the number of people per household, indicated that the proportion drops to about 275 persons per hectare in single semi-detached dwelling units (duplexes), and reached to about 180 persons per hectare in single-family detached dwelling units. It is worth mentioning that the housing policy in Tayibe allows for more residential density depending on types of residential zone. Furthermore, analysis reveals that about one-fifth (20.5%) of the informant’s housing was made up of two bedrooms. 51.5% of the informants lived in three bedroom houses, and 21.2% lived in four bedrooms. Only a small fraction (6.8%) of informants lived in more than four bedroom houses. Furthermore, statistical analysis revealed that the average number of persons per room is 1.94, although about one fifth of all dwellings included in the survey have three or more people per bedroom.

3.3.2 Unauthorised Buildings: a Home rather than demolishing it

The phenomenon of unauthorised residential buildings in Tayibe is divided into two parts.

- Firstly, unauthorised buildings located within authorised land use and outline plans (i.e. informal buildings).
- Secondly, unauthorised residential buildings built outside the authorised land use and outline plans (i.e. 'illegal' buildings).

Both forms are considered incompliant constructions because such constructions were executed in a manner that does not comply with planning regulations, or the Planning and Building laws of 1965, which lays down the statutory regulations and the rules according to which a building permit may be granted. According to those laws, buildings without a permit transgress the law, and sanctions (such as fines,
imprisonment and demolition) must be imposed on transgressors (see III 1.2). This section will focus on the second form of unauthorised buildings—'illegal' buildings located outside the authorised outline plans.

Data collected from both local municipal council and interviews with informants living in 'illegal' dwelling units (mainly located in the south-western part of the city in Goshem (“Block or Land Parcel” No. 7835 and 7832) indicated that the total number of 'illegal' houses reached about 600-700 dwelling units. Those units were built on private lands designated for agricultural use. Interviews revealed that of those 'illegal' houses about 400 had demolition orders issued against them by 2001. Data extracted from the planning archives of the local municipal council indicates that the number of 'illegal' houses increased in the last fifteen years (when the Markowitz committee was appointed), by about 1000%.

It must be stressed that despite the demolition orders and powerful restrictions employed by Israeli planning authorities, residents of Tayibe still continue to build their houses outside the approved outline and land use plans in their private land. Households of 'illegal' houses in Palestinian localities (including Tayibe) know that they intentionally violate building laws via building houses in their agricultural lands without permit; nonetheless, they were forced (by their social, territorial and economic circumstances) to violate such laws because this community lacks an appropriate framework to resolve their urgent and basic needs — i.e. shelter. It was found that 'illegal' neighbourhoods (Gelemeh and Bedew) in Tayibe lack most municipal services such as sanitation, modern sewage, urban roads, and open parks and so on. Such conditions have caused extreme difficulties such as overcrowding and absence of health and education facilities.

'Illegal' neighbourhoods and 'illegal' buildings do not only suffer from a lack of modern and urban social and economic development and poor living conditions, but also this phenomenon affected their residents financially and psychologically. Residents that built their houses 'illegally' are aware of the consequences of breaking the rules. However, lack of alternatives forces them to do so. It can be concluded that the phenomenon of 'illegal' residential buildings in Tayibe developed as a result of two main factors.

- Firstly, growing demands for housing caused by natural population growth – so crucial in solving housing demands.
- Secondly, local outline plans that were supposed to provide more approved residential areas for building new houses provided limited areas under the jurisdiction of the local authority.

There are differences in the treatment of 'illegal' residential buildings in the 'Arab sector', as opposed to the 'Jewish sector'. Alexander (1979:20) pointed out that there were many cases of unauthorised buildings and deviation from plans in the 'Jewish sector'. Furthermore, Alexander (1979) found in his research that demolition orders issued by the court (against Jewish house owners) were rarely, if ever carried out. Accordingly, execution of demolition against unauthorised and 'illegal' residential structures in the 'Jewish sector', are found to be non-existent.

3.3.3 Housing Provision in Tayibe

Traditionally, the provision of housing in Tayibe has been within the remit of the local households, and informal measures (such as borrowing money from other family members or friends, or getting help from the local community), and have helped to a certain extent to solve the most urgent housing needs. Today, to some extent, the
same principles still continue, despite shifts toward modernisation and urbanisation that occurred since the last half of the last century. Housing activity in Palestinian localities (including Tayibe) did not receive much support from the state and relied principally on individual and family sources (Lustick, 1980; Khamaisi, 1990; Yiftachel, 1995; Abu-Rass, 1997; Ittijah, 1998; Sikkuy, 1999, 2000, 2005; Bubis, 2000).

Insufficient government involvement in housing development has significant impacts on the phenomenon of housing provision because the government controls most of the factors that contribute to the process of building residential buildings. Such policies (insufficient and inadequate government involvement) pose many challenges for the provision of housing and to all sections of the population in housing need, especially those who are more weak and helpless in the local community.

Housing supply and conditions in Israeli Palestinian localities have not yet been fully explored. Accordingly, new roles and responsibilities have not been fully established. Thus, in order to understand the provision of housing in Tayibe, the following sections will discuss in detail the key factors of this phenomenon. In this study, also factors of housing finance and planning regulations will be investigated.

3.4 Israel's Housing Finance Policy

The policy (the regulations for calculating the amount of a government mortgage) of the Ministry of Housing in terms of providing subsidised government housing loans (mortgage or “Mashkanta”) and aids (grants or assistance) is based on some socio-economic criteria of the recipient. Subsidised government mortgages are offered by governmental mortgage banks whereas housing aid “grant” is offered directly by the government. Almost every eligible household who takes up his/her eligibility in Israel has the right to obtain both. The most predominant factors that affect the amount and eligibility of mortgage are: family size (number of children), period in army service, marital status (marriage certificate) and number of years married, location of dwelling to be purchased or built, and other documents such as building permit and proof of land ownership.3

In the context of housing finance in Israel, the figures in Table 3 reflect that the financing sector is well developed. About New Israeli Shekel (NIS) 10 billion (about US $2.5 billion 2001) is allocated for the Ministry of Housing. According to the Israeli Ministry of Finance (2001), the proposed budget for fiscal year 2001 submitted to the Knesset was about NIS 199.4 billion (about US $ 44 billion). This means that the government allocated about 5% for housing purposes with the intention of allowing sufficient dwelling units to be built to meet the growing demand. Of its NIS 10 billion, about 5.4 billion is allocated for housing grants and mortgages, 1.8 billion for grants and 3.6 billion for mortgages.

These figures indicate that Israel is one of the most predominant countries in the world which allocates housing finance for its citizens (see Israeli Ministry of Housing and Ministry of Finance). Furthermore, numbers in figure 1 indicated that the amounts of housing loans for purchasing or building a house were stable between 1994 and 2000. However, the decline in housing aid perhaps reflects the fact that

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3 Housing aids (grant or assistance) is a non refundable (free money) amount of money given by the government to every eligible household in Israel. This means that a part of a government subsidised mortgage (Housing finance loan) turns into a grant. The aim of this grant is to support in resolving the housing problems and improving housing conditions. The amount of aid depends on many factors, most profoundly are: building permit, location, service in army and proof of land ownership (see Israel Ministry of Housing and Construction, 2000).
most of the Jewish immigrants during that period took up their eligibility. It also can be explained that the real value of government housing aid decreased. Nevertheless, according to the Ministry of Construction, Tenancy Division and Central Bureau of Statistics (1990), over 87% of all Jewish immigrants who arrived in 1989 have bought apartments with the provision of governmental housing finance. Moreover, provision of adequate, stable flow of institutional funds promoted over 80% of overall Jewish Israelis to own houses.

**Figure 1: Housing Purchase Assistance Budget 1994-2000 in NIS billions**

![Graph showing Housing Purchase Assistance Budget 1994-2000 in NIS billions](image)

Source: Ministry of Finance, Adva Center, Ministry of Construction and Housing, for various years

### 3.4.1 Housing Finance and the 'Arab Sector'

The socio-economic gap between Palestinians and Jews in Israel is also deeply rooted in the disparity between the governmental allocations of housing finance (building or purchasing a house) to selected groups in the country. Chronological analysis of the Palestinian situation based on a review of literature, may give the reader a general overview of this phenomenon. Statistical analysis indicated that there is a difference in housing financial support (for both mortgages and aids) per household of the two social groups. For instance, a report published in 1971 shows that the Ministry of Housing “through the Department of Minorities”, allocated only about 1% of its housing loans and aid for the ‘Arab sector’ living in Palestinian localities, as opposed to 93% for the ‘Jewish sector’ (Kessek and Gerissi, 1977:3). This comparison revealed that the issues of housing resources to selected groups are considered in the context of political objectives that guided this dual housing policy. This policy led to the almost total exclusion of the Israeli Palestinians from the domain of governmental involvement in housing finance and subsidised mortgages in the private housing market.

In 1978, the Ministry of Housing ordered a survey that aimed to gather information about housing aid in Palestinian localities. The team submitted conclusions and recommendations (see Kipnis, 1982). It appears that the recommendations dealt solely with housing aid and excluded housing mortgages. Nevertheless, statistical figures reported by the Ministry of Housing and Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (2002) revealed little improvement of Israeli Palestinians access to the mortgage and aid programmes. It has been reported that only 8% of the Israeli Palestinian (not including Druze and residents who live in mixed cities), received building loans and aid.
It should be stressed that both reports did not mention appropriate solutions or alternatives to the housing finance issues in the 'Arab sector'. The low proportion of government housing finance of Israeli Palestinian households was also confirmed in an interview during data collection with Jerusalem Bank (Israeli Mortgages Bank) Manager Mr. Mehameed in Um El Fahem city. Mr. Mehameed said “since 1994 the percentage of Palestinian households almost did not change...the ratio was fluctuating from 12.0% to 13.5%, including the Druze and other Arab minorities who join the army” (see table 3). This indicates that the rate of government housing mortgage for Israeli Palestinian did not improve over time, while the value of government housing assistance is decreasing.

Table 3 Proportion of Palestinian householders who receive Governmental Housing Finance Loans during 1994-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent among all Arab Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>12,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>13,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>13,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>13,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>13,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jerusalem Bank Manager in Um El Fahem; figures are on estimation

3.4.2 Housing Finance versus Management Costs in Tayibe

In order to investigate the effects of the phenomenon of housing finance and aid in relation to housing provision in Tayibe, four related questions were asked to the informants (respondents). Informants were asked whether they have applied for government financial loan and aid. Analysis of the questionnaire revealed that one third (88 out of 264) of the informants applied for housing loan. This indicates that the number of mortgage applicants is not high despite their low economic status. This can be explained in two ways:

**Firstly**, the amount of government housing loans and aid for citizens of Tayibe in particular and Israeli Palestinians in general (as they do not serve in the army services) covers relatively a small fraction of the cost or the value of the dwelling unit. It was revealed that “the amount of loan and aid given by the government covers only about 25-30% of a house of an area of about 100-110 square metres built out of standard building materials”. Investigation revealed that the average area of a dwelling unit of low and middle class households was 140 square metres.

Furthermore, it was found in the literature that government housing aid ranges from NIS 30,000 to 80,000 (about $7000 to $18000) according to areas designated National Priority Areas (see Ministry of Construction and Housing, 2000). Tayibe is located in a Class B Area within which only NIS 30,000 is granted for every eligible household. This small amount (proportionally) of housing finance aid is insufficient to Palestinian householders to make the effort to apply for housing finance, since

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4 Interview with the Manager of Jerusalem Bank (Israeli Mortgage Bank) in Um El Fahem, 12/08/02.

5 Interview with a builder (small-scale construction contractor) from the city of Tayibe, 1/07/02.
applicants have to pay building permit fees (about $15-20 per square metre) to get a building permit and to hire an architect and surveyor to make the application, and in most cases to hire a mortgage commissioner to get the mortgage. These entire criteria add up to thousands of dollars.

Secondly, only high-income groups are able to comply with limitation and conditions of the current housing loans policy. A report published by Ahavat Israel (2002) states that mortgage banks give 75% of the value of the residence for Jewish immigrants as well as for Israeli born Jewish citizens. Some other banks give as much as 80% of the value of the residence if the monthly repayment of the household (of both spouses) is equal to a third of their monthly income. This indicates the disparities in the amounts allocated for both groups.

Previous discussions indicated that most of Tayibe’s households particularly and the Palestinian citizens in general were ranked in the category of low-income, and most spouses do not have jobs despite that the majority of Tayibe’s households fall within the low-income brackets. An interesting question can be raised. Why don’t Tayibe’s households apply to get the opportunity of government housing finance loan and aid despite its relatively small contribution to the cost of constructing a dwelling unit? This will be discussed in the next section.

3.5 Fulfilment “Obligations” of Housing Finance Criteria

Government funds are expected to ease and facilitate the provision of the housing sector for every eligible Israeli household and ensure improvement of their houses. Accordingly, a related question that informants were asked was if they applied to government housing finance and was the application approved. Slightly more than one third of households who applied for housing finance said their applications were approved (see table 4). This low rate of approval can be explained in two ways:

- Firstly, the present practice of mortgage banks clearly discriminates against non-salary people, small business owners and workers in informal sectors since they have to show their salary slips (i.e., Tlush Maskoret). Loans are deducted directly from salary cheques through banks. Most of that segment lacks such proof because they do not have a steady income.

- Secondly, householders, developers and beneficiaries of housing finance are required to present a valid building permit (authorised building) according to planning specifications and regulations and proof of site ownership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency (N)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Egbaria 2003

Investigation revealed that in many cases these conditions were not fulfilled because some of the residential areas in the city are located outside the approved outline boundaries (‘illegal’ buildings) or were not built according to building regulations (informal within formality). Similarly, the process of land ownership approval or
transferring inherited lands from fathers to sons or to grandsons is still limited and involves high costs. Consequently, a high segment of Tayibe’s population does not have the right to housing finance – i.e. mortgage and aid.

3.5.1 Financing a House in Tayibe

It was found that only 34 (about 13%) of the 264 informants had access to government housing finance for housing construction. 108 (about 41%) informants reported that they financed their dwellings from personal savings, 56 (about 21%) had borrowed money from family members and friends, while 66 (25%) informants had obtained a loan from private banks at a high interest rate (see figure 2). These figures show that the individual savings, particularly inheritance from parents or selling properties to other residents from the same community, form the main basis of housing investment. The informal money market such as private money-lenders was not used because of high cost of usury interest, and for religious purposes, Muslims are not allowed to deal with usury.

Figure 2: Financing a House in Tayibe

Source: Egbaria 2004

A large segment of the sampled population (especially low-income and middle income households) indicated that they are in need of government housing finance, and they showed willingness to accept financial help from Israeli authorities (Ministry of Housing and Construction) in order to overcome the process of housing provision and shortage. In an attempt to understand the Israeli planning policies on the phenomenon of government housing finance towards the Palestinian citizens, it was revealed that "we are not strangers and we are cut from the same cloth of other Israeli residents." It is our right to get better Mashkantas [Mortgages]", a household member said. The levels of need for housing finance from the government were significantly higher among families with large numbers of children and with households of low levels of socio-economic status.

The housing finance system in Israel is capable of financing the majority of Israel’s population, especially the poor segment (Adva, 2002). Nevertheless, only a small fraction of Tayibe’s community received government housing loans and assistance that covered a small fraction of the value of the dwelling unit. Furthermore, those

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6 In an interview with a low income female informant (in her early thirties) living in a rented dwelling unit located in a public apartment, 17/08/01.
who did not serve in the army are entitled to about 60% of the loans given to those who completed their army service. It is apparent that only a very small percentage of the Palestinian minority men (Muslims and Christians) join the army. However, the willingness to receive housing finance for the huge number of young couples who are in need for housing is large.

It is also worth mentioning that in theory, it is possible for any householder above 18 years old who is reasonably employed married and on a steady income, to obtain a housing finance loan for housing provision or development. However, in practice, the story is different. Accordingly, a special home buying or home building finance program is needed for the Palestinian population in Israel, especially for those who were left without solutions to their housing issues.

3.6 Planning Zoning Regulation a prerequisite for Building Permissions

As indicated in the previous discussions, the Israeli planning and building law (1965) requires a statutory outline (development plan or master plan), or land use (detailed) plans to be prepared for each settlement or zone (such as residential, commercial and industrial zone). Without such plan, no building can be approved, and no state services (such as electricity, sewage, water, roads and telephones) can be approved (Yiftachel, 1995).

In addition to the three hierarchical steps of planning committees (see Yiftachel, 1995; Egbaria, 2003, see III.2), three influential government bodies are involved in the process of approval: the Israeli Land Authority (ILA), the Committee for the Protection of Agricultural Land and the Environmental Protection Committee.

Studies carried out by Haider (1991), Khamaisi (1992), Rabinowitz (1992) Yiftachel (1995) and Egbaria (2003) argue that most 'Arab' localities in Israel encountered continuous problems when dealing with the complex Israeli planning system. Those studies have highlighted problems that dealt with the process of planning preparation and approval and the constant land conflict between the Israeli authorities and Palestinian localities. Few of those studies and others have widely investigated the consequences of those imposed planning regulations on the process of housing provision in Palestinian localities.

3.6.1. Rigid Planning Regulations, also for Tayibe

Investigations of planning regulations of Tayibe’s outline and land use plans revealed that they have five rigid characteristics.

- **Firstly**, they imply what should be done rather than describe what exists and why it should be done this or that way. This indicates that building regulations are imposed from above and dictate what should be done, rather than understand the inspirations, circumstances (especially social and economic) and the needs of the beneficiaries.

- **Secondly**, they contain a negative sense of a penalty for non-compliance such as fines, demolition and imprisonment for those who contravene regulations.⁷

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⁷ In an interview (20/06/02), an architect in Tayibe said “planning authorities provide us a set of regulations and laws, and we [architects] make plans for our clients according to those regulations, but when we visit the construction site we find clients add an extra storey or storeys, and sometimes new units for their sons or brothers…our clients are forced to do such actions because they are concerned about their children so why don’t the authorities .. make regulations accordingly”.  

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• *Thirdly*, it was also revealed that planning regulations focus only on the physical and technical aspects of housing units. Physical aspects of housing include the power to make plans, set back requirements and building height, plot coverage and housing densities, (i.e. number of houses per dunam). This means that the regulatory system had few links to the reality of the social, cultural and economic aspects of the local community.  

• *Fourthly*, building in accordance with planning regulations usually involves bureaucratic procedures for receiving building permission such as approval of land ownership, site survey and structural engineering. It is estimated that the average amount of time required for obtaining building permits stands at no less than one year, and in some cases it stands at two years or more. Finally, the associated inspection and registration fees are very high. It is estimated that the average registration, inspection, land subdivision and planning fees for a house of an area of 140 m² stands at about US $ 4,000–6,000 in 2004.

In conclusion, apart from the delays often entailed by the approval process, the cost of securing the required authorisation could be an obstacle to self-management private housing developers. Planning regulations should consider the fact that over 55% of Tayibe’s residents are low-income earners, and the majority of this segment lives below the poverty line. If building regulations are to enhance the phenomenon of housing provision they must consider the change of social, economic and physical circumstances of the majority. It is apparent that overage codes (Building and Planning Law of 1965) still apply to Tayibe. Building regulations should promote and encourage households and developers to develop more houses and residential activities. However, the condition in Tayibe is the reverse. Households, who contravene those regulations and build in their private agricultural land or build a new dwelling (mostly for their sons families) over their existing units, are subjected to fines, housing demolition and imprisonment.

Thus, it appears that instead of relaxing building regulations to facilitate proper housing provision, these regulations have made it more severe. The next section is devoted to investigating the extent to which residential development does not comply with urban development and planning regulations in the city of Tayibe.

### 3.7 Latent Informality “Informality within Formality”

Informality or incompliance here means the extent to which residential buildings deviate from the plans of residential buildings submitted to the local planning commission inside the approved outline plans. Prior to investigating the extent to which the housing sectors comply with required regulations, it is essential to have an understanding of the extent to which Tayibe’s residents are aware of this phenomenon. This is because understanding this question can in part determine the extent of compliance with these regulations. Therefore, informants were asked if they were aware of the existence of building regulations in the city. It is revealed that

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8 Most interviews with key figures and householders indicate that Arab residents prefer to live closer to their brothers and sons in one compound. “We Arabs [in Israel] prefer and do whatever possible to build our houses near to our sons’ houses and brothers...we believe in mutual relations between family members for social and economic aspects. if living far from their houses, our social cohesiveness will be broken down, and we do not want this to happen to our society...such cohesiveness gives more security, more relationship more love more intimacy”, the former Mayor of the city of Tayibe said in an open ended interview in 14/06/02.
93.2% (246) were aware of the existence of building regulation, and only 6.8% (18) reported an unawareness of this.

In searching the same phenomenon, in the pilot study informants were asked: what aspects did they deviate (i.e., not comply) from the terms of their construction permit. A very low rate (only 1 out of 15) of informants replied to the question. Probably, informants were sceptical regarding this issue because of the current political and social climate (i.e., that the planning authorities might inform about their situation). Therefore, the same question was investigated through empirical physical observations and interviews with local planners. Aspects such as set back from adjacent roads, setback from neighbour’s property, number of storeys, plot coverage, overall elevation, fence and boundary walls, interior changes were under investigation.

Investigations of 20 approved building designs were randomly selected from the municipality archives and from various planning offices in the city to study the differences and changes between the reality on the ground and what has been approved. The extent of compliance shows that 35% (7) of the residential buildings complied with the regulation on setback from adjacent roads, 15% (3) complied with neighbours’ property, while 0% complied with plot coverage because none of these buildings were built according to building permission. Furthermore, none of the residential buildings adhered to the overall elevation, and only 25% (5) adhered with the approved number of storeys. None of those buildings complied with the fence and boundary wall regulations.

This indicates that all the visited and observed 20 residential buildings have witnessed substantial informal (‘illegal’) changes (by at least one aspect of building regulations) from the original designs that were approved by the Local and District Planning and Building Committees. Households have carried out informal interior and exterior modifications and additions to their home environment, such as family rooms, bedrooms, balconies, complete floors above the existing one, or a porch, or a living room or a threshold, and so on. Informal extensions of these spaces appeared either horizontally or vertically.

This low level of compliance with planning regulations can in part be attributed to the need of land and to the use to which the plot of land is put. Poverty certainly plays a major factor to the degree of violating planning regulations. Interviews with developers, planners and ordinary informants revealed that there is a general consensus among them that these regulations are not in consonance with the socio-economic characteristics, cultural norms and values of people. They are also seen as inhospitable, not transparent, outdated, extremely rigid, restrictive and reactive. The fact is that most of them were introduced many years ago (about forty years) and that they are no longer relevant in present days, since people have witnessed social, economic and physical (territorial) changes. Furthermore, interviews with research informants revealed that the original use of more than 25% of their houses has been changed in part from residential to commercial or institutional uses such as schools, nurseries, offices, shops and so on. This can be attributed to the fact that the lack of mixed land use (i.e., uni-functional land use) and the absence of commercial and institutional land caused those houses to be converted.

Data could not be found on the number and rate of houses that contravene building regulations in the Jewish sector. It has been estimated (from personal experience in construction and architectural activities in the 'Jewish sector'), that only a small fraction of Jewish residents contravene (mostly the changes occur in interior
partitions) planning regulations. This high level of compliance suggests that building regulations in the 'Jewish sector' are designed in balance with the physical and socio-economic circumstances of this community.

The high degree of breaching planning regulations in Tayibe can mainly be related to the lack of residents' participation mechanism within which residents can participate in the development process. UNCHS (1986), Tipple et al (1999) and Arimah and Adeagbo (2000) found that participatory management ensures the goals and strategies are related to the needs and aims of the population. Interviews with research informants indicated that Tayibe’s community is not given the opportunity to participate in the planning process, especially in planning regulations.

Planning regulations should reflect the physical, economic and social context of the city, otherwise residents are most likely to breach them. Furthermore, the plan approval process is tedious, bureaucratic, time consuming and expensive. Since the inhabitants lack land and need planning approval in a relatively short space of time and inexpensive building fees, they are forced to avoid these obstacles and build in contravention of existing regulations. Incompliance with planning regulations in Tayibe should not be too surprising because the phenomenon of housing provision is the residents' daily struggle.

It is arguable that official planning regulations in Tayibe are not appropriate to the process of contemporary housing supply. The real value (social, physical and economical) of housing cannot be measured in terms of how it conforms (or obeys the rules) to decision makers, rather it must be measured in terms of how well it serves the household. Israeli planning regulations were designed in 1960s, and no major amendments were carried out through the years especially for low income and landless people. No considerable efforts were introduced to revise building regulations in Tayibe in this new millennium. The question that might rise is: can these codes apply and perform effectively in the new millennium?

**Conclusion: Towards a Supply Oriented Future**

The main purpose of this chapter has been to investigate the impacts of Israeli planning and housing policies on the factors that influence the phenomenon of housing provision in Tayibe, while at the same time to identify the current situation of the residential environment in the city.

With regard to housing conditions, analysis indicated that issues of overcrowding (houses per dunam), highly dense residence (number of people per room) and unauthorised houses phenomenon in the city are even more severe in light of the statistics. This means that there appears to be no alternative for Tayibe’s citizens to extricate themselves from severe housing and land shortage, but to build their houses either without compliance with planning regulations inside the legal (approved) residential zones or outside permitted residential zones in their own agricultural land (that is adjacent to the legal residential zones). The consequences of such understandable and known behaviour (by residents) are too great and the uncertainties too high for such actions. Demolition is the most feasible action perpetuated by planning authorities. Demolition of unauthorised, of 'illegal', of informal houses is clearly not the solution especially for the poor and landless. Demolition only serves to reduce the supply of housing and raise rents.
The provision of housing and dwelling units in the city lags behind demand, and housing conditions continue to worsen as a result of vigorous latent demographic revolution, formal and informal discriminative social and economic and political conditions and ethnic affiliation. These factors have created a multidimensional demand for housing. New generations will come, new children will be born and new young couples will get married. All will enter the housing market and look for a decent shelter, competing with each other in: a shrinkage land market, inhospitable and not transparent planning regulations, high prices of building materials, low and discriminative government residential aids and loans, high daily-fees of manpower, relatively low construction skills of households, diminishing traditional financial resources – especially among the weaker families. It is clear that these aspects are the key issues for housing provision in Tayibe.

The high level of housing issues and shortage can be explained by the lack of governmental attention and lack of empirical studies in dealing with housing developments in Israeli Palestinian localities. Accordingly, policies implemented in Tayibe and other Israeli Palestinian localities widened the gaps between supply and demands. Thus, it is essential to review the existing Israeli housing policy in Tayibe so that a new and relevant policy, approach, mechanism or a framework has to be adopted if the housing challenge is to be met (or overcome). Accordingly, this study aims to relevant recommendations that might ease the process of housing provision in terms of housing finance and building regulations.

**Improving economic conditions of housing development:** There is a need to develop a mechanism that reduces the financial inequalities between Palestinian and Jewish local authorities. Furthermore, there is a need to create more opportunities and avenues of government financial sources for housing finance that secure the needs of needy households.

**Provision of land and land configuration:** There is a need to develop mechanisms to secure sufficient suitable plots with appropriate size and configuration to accommodate decent site layout and design. Furthermore, to promote certain areas for mixed-use development that encourages a range of daily life activities such as shopping, work, and recreation activities within specific areas.

**Provision of transparent building regulations:** To review and revise residential development regulations and to include flexible, suitable techniques that reflects the socio-cultural and economic realities for creating a variety of housing types with appropriate densities following an acceptable definition of net density (according to types of residential land uses categories).

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III

Kassem Egbaria

4. The Impact of Israeli Urban Policies on the Development of Indigenous Bedouin Community in the Negev Area – the Unrecognised Villages

The Negev (Al-Naqab in Arabic) region constitutes about two-thirds of the land of the state of Israel (about 13,310 km²), however it hosts less than 9% of its 7.4 million populations (CBS, 2009). Prior to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, indigenous Palestinian Bedouins community constituted the vast majority of the population of the Negev numbering about 80,000-90,000 people, and spreading over nearly 10,000-12,000 km². After the declaration of the Israeli State, only about 13,000-15,000 Bedouins were left there, and the others were expelled or left to neighbouring countries such as Jordan and Egypt. Furthermore, most (about 98%) of the land that was used and owned by the Bedouin community has been expropriated by the Israeli government and transferred to the state for the establishment of new Jewish urban and rural areas. This has been implemented through a policy of confining the Bedouin community to a tight geographical area of approximately 1,000 square kilometers, in the eastern less fertile part of the Negev-Naqab, which was called the “Sayag” area (for distribution of locations, see Map 1) in the early 1950s after ethnic cleansing in 1948 (Yiftachel 2006: 193 pp, OHCHR 2009).

Map 1 Bedouin Locations and Confiscated Land in the Negev

Source: Egbaria

The main argument of this study is that the present Israeli planning system has failed to provide a decent house that includes all basic services and provides certainty and sustainability. The main objective of this paper is to examine the phenomenon of unrecognised and 'illegal' residential areas and the factors that brought it about, and to suggest relevant recommendations and guidelines for policy makers to improve
the residential environment in these areas with the principle of sustainability, equality and certainty.

The main goal of this paper is to present the consequences of the Israeli urban planning policies derived from geo-political visions and demographic obsession via examining major urban concepts in the unrecognised villages. Concepts such as land in the Negev, demographic shifts, socio-economic aspects, infrastructure network and 'illegal' settlements will be studied. The analysis of these concepts was based on analysing the Israeli national and district plans. In addition, data was collected from reports of governmental departments such as the Israeli Land Authority, the Ministry of Interior and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The results indicated that households of 'illegal' houses in unrecognised Palestinian villages in Israel know that they are intentionally violating building laws via building houses in their agricultural lands without permits since this community lacks appropriate urban and residential frameworks to resolve their needs.

It has been found that planning policy especially in the Negev has originated from geo-political perspectives of the state, that is to judaize the space through owning and controlling the land as well as establishing new Jewish villages and cities for new Jewish immigrants who come from abroad. Undoubtedly, the phenomenon of this unrecognised indigenous Palestinian ethnic minority group in has witnessed some progress in some aspects of urban life since the establishment of the state in 1948. Nevertheless, this large segment of population is ranked in the lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder, and suffers from pervasive institutional discriminative policies and unfair distribution of the national resources. The phenomenon of unrecognised ('illegal') Bedouin villages in the Negev, which are not included in any Israeli national strategic plan is a reflection of unfair, poor and inappropriate urban planning system imposed by Israeli governments on the Palestinian areas in Israel (see III 2).

4.1 The Confiscation and Marginalising of the Bedouin People

At the end of the 90s about 110.000 Bedouin population in the Negev were recorded, of them 57.000, half of total were still scattered in non urban areas and villages. These days and according to CBS (2009), the total Bedouin population in the Negev region is about 190,000 inhabitants, constituting about 25% of the entire population. OHCHR estimates for 2007 were 45%, nearly half of this community lives in seven planned permanent Bedouin townships, which were established with the intention of concentrating this community in a limited and crowded urban area (see table 1). While the other half, around 55%, mostly Bedouins who still own land, has remained in what became approximately 45 unrecognised (scattered settlements and population) villages that lack water, electricity, sewage treatment, or garbage collection services. These villages are marginalised and are not officially recognised by the state despite the fact that most of them were established before establishing of the state of Israel.

The land on which these localities exist became classified as agricultural land according to Planning and Building Law of 1965, and thus under this law, all buildings erected are rendered 'illegal' structures. (status of Bedouin villages see map 2)
Table 1 The Bedouin Urban Population in the Negev (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Bedouin locality with local council</th>
<th>No. of population</th>
<th>Area of jurisdiction in dunam *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rahat</td>
<td>42.223</td>
<td>2.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Al Saba/ Tel Sheva</td>
<td>14.038</td>
<td>3.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ar’ara al-el Naqab/ Aro’er</td>
<td>12.995</td>
<td>0.922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qsiefa/ Keseifa</td>
<td>10.749</td>
<td>0.785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houra/ Hura</td>
<td>10.579</td>
<td>1.592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laqieh/ Lakiya</td>
<td>8.955</td>
<td>1.563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shqueb al-Salam/ Segev Shalom</td>
<td>6.792</td>
<td>1.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>106.331</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.201</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OHCHR 2009: p. 8  
*10 dunam = 1ha

Map 2 The Status of Bedouin-Arab Villages in the Negev-Naqab 2007

Housing in the unrecognised villages is an arrangement of light (such as tents and metal shacks with corrugated zinc roofs) and hard (such as cement concrete blocks and reinforced concrete) structures. Residents of these houses are not allowed to repair their properties. Furthermore, most of these houses are subjected to demolition orders. (see images 1,2, 3)
In order to achieve the goal of judaising the space, a plan to remove the Negev Bedouins in the unrecognised villages from their historic land has been indulged into what the Israeli government calls the "Six-Year Sharon Plan". This plan aims at depriving the Bedouin residents of their land as well as concentrating them into the existing seven Bedouin towns and seven new towns of the same character (HRA, 2003). Bedouin community views this plan as an effort to disconnect it from its land for the favour of establishing new Jewish space, and simultaneously disrupting and destroying their economic base that depends on agriculture and grazing activities.

4.2 The Bedouin Community in Israel: An Invisible Community

The Bedouin community (Sunni Muslims and they consider themselves also Palestinians) in Israel, who comprises about 13% (about 190,000) of the Palestinian citizens in Israel, is divided into two main groups: About 45,000 living in the Galilee in the north, while approximately 145,000 living in the Negev Desert Region. The Palestinian Bedouin community in the Negev constitutes about one quarter of the region’s entire population. As mentioned earlier, the Bedouins residing in the Negev has witnessed a steep decline in the number of population (from about 96 tribes to 11 tribes) in comparison between the periods prior to the establishment of the State of Israel (ICBS, 1996-2001). This declination was due to the expulsion of about 65,000-
75,000 Bedouins from their residences to Jordan and Egypt (the Gaza Strip and the Sinai).

Before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the Bedouin in the Negev (about 90%) earned their living from agriculture raising livestock (HRA, 2004). It is argued that successive Israeli governments since 1948 have been implementing policies (such as restricting access to land and water and constraints on livestock farming outside their privately owned land on surrounding state lands) to prevent the Bedouins from maintaining their ties to the land by making their traditional lifestyle unworkable. The Committee for the Protection of the Environment, especially the ‘green patrols’, did their most disturbing the flocks and herds of the Bedouins, arguing for nature protection against overgrazing and etc. The policy of transferring and concentrating the Bedouins from all parts of the Negev to the north-eastern side has deprived tribes of their land and concentrated them on lands not their own, under harsh and increasingly crowded conditions. The rest of the land (about 85%), was declared off limits, designated as blocs of military zones and conservation parks as well as development areas for the Jewish community.

The outcome of these policies and other ones was the Bedouins’ suffer from a significantly lower socio-economic status than that of Israel's other citizens. In a way of comparison with Jewish counterparts in the same region, data obtained from CBS (2000) indicates that the family salary income of the Bedouins in their localities is less than half that of the average family in the Jewish city of Beer Sheva. According to CBS (2000), the average income in the city of Beer Sheva is lower than the Israeli average. Add to that the fact that the average household size in the Bedouin community is roughly double that of Beer Sheva, and the family salary per person (per capita earned income) declines to under 25% of that of Beer Sheva and perhaps as low as 20% of the Israeli average (Lithwick 2000). This inequality is also indicated by ranking between the local Bedouin and Jewish towns in the Negev (see table 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bedouin Towns</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qsiefa/ Kseifeh</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahat</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel al Saba/Tel-Sheva</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shqueb al-Salam / Segev Shalom</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ar’ara al- Naqab Arara</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Jewish Towns</strong></td>
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Source: CBS 2002, data 2000
It is important to mention that the Bedouin population in Negev has increased about tenfold since the establishment of the State in 1948. This increase was due to a high natural growth – about 5% –, which does not run parallel to the general population (including Bedouins) growth in Israel, which is about 1.5%. It is estimated that by the year 2020, the Bedouin population in the Negev will reach to about 300,000 residents. The high natural population growth among the Bedouins in the Negev in Israel is related to traditional social values regarding size of family and/or tribe as a political advantage and social power. At the same time, the Israeli government follows a disproportionately restrictive policy on issuing building permits to Palestinian citizens, on the contrary more building demolition orders against Palestinian Bedouins built structures is increasingly released.

4.3 Development of Patterns

The lifestyle of the Palestinian Bedouin community in the Negev was characterised by semi-nomadic and rural patterns. Originally the Bedouins’ economy was based on raising sheep, goat and camel herding. During the British Mandate that extended form 1923 -1948, Bedouins of the Negev also started to cultivate some of the land that is adjacent to water resources such as wadis and valleys (Kressel et al, 1991). During this period, about 20 Jewish agricultural communities (Moshavim and Kibbutzim) were established. These communities hosted about 6,000 Jewish residents (ICBS, 1996-2001). Their establishment stemmed from ideological and geo-political considerations. After 1948, the Israeli government intensified the establishment of new urban areas in this region in the pretext of re-distributing the Jewish population from congested central regions to sparsely peripheral areas such as the Negev Desert, as well as for establishing a national presence and sovereignty over the land of the Negev. For this reason, in 1950s and 1960s, the government established seven new Jewish development towns such as Arad, Yeroham and Sderot. The initial growth of these settlements was sustained by the voluntary location of new Jewish immigrants and direct government investment in their economy (Portnov and Safriel, 2003).

At the same time, the Israeli Government pursued a policy that aimed to establish a small number of recognised urban Bedouin towns within which to concentrate the Bedouins under a plan called Ayur Habdawim (the sedenterisation of the Bedouins). Therefore, in the late 1960s, the first permanent urban settlement for the Negev Bedouins –‘Tel Sheva’ - was established. To prevent further dispersal and to further land confiscation from the indigenous people of the Negev and to concentrate them in an enclosure, the Israeli government during the 1970 -1980 decided to establish new six permanent and planned Bedouin towns that include ‘Rahat’, ‘Kseife’, ‘Aro’er’, ‘Lakiya’, ‘Segev-shalom’ and ‘Hura’. The policy of sedentarisation and concentration is still pursued by the government. It is important to mention that for the next 25 years the government and planning divisions are planning to expand the urban areas for these seven localities to absorb and concentrate the rest of the Bedouin population who live in unrecognised and 'illegal' settlements located outside these towns (Meir, 1988; Porat, 2000).

It is argued that the approach that attempts to urbanise and sedentarise the Bedouins in these seven localities was not properly studied and planned. The existing plans and conditions for those settlements are not in harmony with the wishes or aspiration of the residents. The small highly dense urban areas offered in these towns failed to satisfy the large Bedouin families. Analysis indicates that planning concepts implemented in these towns stems from ideological and geo-
physical behaviour of the state that is “minimum space of land for maximum number of Palestinian Arabs”. This has meant that these towns stood in conflict with the daily needs of the Bedouin community. Restrictions on the use of land and financial support, as well as insufficient infrastructure forced the Bedouin community in the Negev to react to solve their housing problems. As a result half of the Bedouins who live in the unrecognised villages in the Negev refused to move to the existing seven townships. Indeed, this has resulted in many housing problems. One of these problems is that residents have no choice to meet their shelter needs but to build 'illegal' buildings that have created disorganised urban patterns.

4.4 The Phenomenon of 'Unrecognised Villages'

The term of 'unrecognised villages' applies principally to those communities that existed before the establishment of the State of Israel, but have never been incorporated into designated planning provisions and so for planning and permit purposes remain unrecognised. This means that these villages (which range in size from 500 to 5000 inhabitants) lack master plans for development, and without such plans, no building permits are granted for any type of construction. These villages are perceived and seen under the Law of Planning and Building (1965) as 'illegal', scattered structures and potentially subjected to demolition. According to this law, the lands on which these villages were built were classified in the law as “agricultural,” a planning category where no residences or other structures are permitted. Currently, there are over 22,000 'illegal' and unapproved houses (including hard and light structures) in the unrecognised villages in the Negev. (see image 3) Analysis indicates that the number of people living in unrecognised villages will rise to about 200,000 inhabitants by the year 2020. Most of these villages are dispersed in the Seyag region and lack land registration documents.

Image 4 'Illegal Bedouin Village' north east of Beer Sheba

Source: assergev.com 2000

A report published by the Association of Forty (2002) indicates that in 1998, the Israeli planning authorities demolished about 370 of these houses. Approximately 1,700 cases are currently being prosecuted in court. These figures do not include those houses demolished by the owners themselves. Furthermore, such villages are not recognised as a socio-political entity and thus they lack local authorities and
representative local government. According to Article 157A of the 1965 Building and Planning Law, any unlicensed building is prohibited from being connecting to basic infrastructure such as running water, electricity or telephone networks, and road system. Furthermore, observation indicates that no high schools and no vocational secondary schools have been built in any of these villages, and only 10 of these villages have health clinics. Consequently higher education remains a substantial problem - other than in the north no such Arabic speaking institutions exist. This prohibition gave statutory grounds to deny services to the residents. It is important to mention that many of these villages exist next to recognised Jewish settlements with a complete provision of services and many of those were the former villages of the 1948 displaced villagers now 'unrecognised' (International Crisis Group ICG, 2004).

The issue of unrecognised Palestinians villages in the Negev can be seen as the product of unfair and discriminatory planning policy, which in essence is a result of Zionist ideology that encourages the establishment of new Jewish settlements throughout Israel and the judaization of the crowded Palestinian regions (see III 1,2). Planning policy towards the Bedouins in the Negev in particular and the Palestinian Society in Israel in general, however, was quite the opposite: concentration in order to reduce the areas which are inhabited by Palestinians. It can be emphasised that over the years, the Israeli government has initiated some planning versions for the problem of the Palestinian unrecognised villages, but Palestinian Bedouin residents refused these plans because they oppose and contradict their rationale on the one hand and do not consider their needs on the other. These plans aimed to intensify the means of pressure on the Bedouin community to force them leave their houses and land to the so called concentration towns for the Bedouins.

4.4.1 Planning Scenarios: Preventing Further Dispersal

In order to implement the idea of judaization of the crowded Palestinian regions, Israeli planning authorities established several official committees (such as the committee of Kubarsky in 1976 and Markovitz committee in 1985) under the pretext of examining the case of unrecognised Palestinian villages throughout the state to solve this problem. The general findings extracted from these two committees can be concluded that most of the 'illegal' and unauthorised buildings in the Palestinian locations including the buildings in the Negev are actually temporary structures, whose continued existence is permitted in mandatory outline plans. This has meant that these two committees recommended putting most of 'illegal' houses in the Palestinian location into a framework of "grey" areas and consequently they are not entitled to any services. In the same reports, it was also recommended that part of 'illegal' houses should be demolished, and the other part that is near to an existing recognised Palestinian location should be incorporated into the juridical area of adjacent Jewish settlement. To prevent further disperse of the Bedouin community on their land, in 2000, the ministerial Sub-Committee on Bedouin Affairs sought to initiate a comprehensive sub-regional plan that would have recognised 16-18 villages, based on a scheme drawn up in consultation with (and accepted by) the Regional Council for the Villages, a Negev-based advocacy group. However, this plan was not approved, and instead, the government adopted a new plan called a 'Six-Year Sharon Plan' for the Bedouins. This Plan aims to concentrate the remaining rural Bedouins into the existing seven towns and seven new towns of the same character.

The regional Council of the Unrecognised Villages (RCUV), which was established in 1988 from many local committees representing the Bedouin community, has initiated
a number of planning alternatives for the recognition of unrecognised villages in the Negev. The alternative proposals prepared by RCUV promote the establishment of new, optimally sited rural villages that are essentially service centres. The goal of these plans is to enable the Bedouins to remain on the land they claim. As a result of this struggle, recognition of eight unrecognised villages - Kassar Alsar, Moladah, Makhol, Darijat, Abu Qrenat, Um Batin, Bir Hadaj, and Tarabin - and the creation of the official Abu Basma regional council are two partial victories claimed by the Regional Council of the Unrecognised Villages. To date, this recognition has had little impact on the provision of basic services. On the other hand, the government’s intention is to transfer the inhabitants of the remaining 38 villages into the seven recognised towns mentioned previously. (The Association of the Forty, 2006)

Many of the residents of the unrecognised villages believe that there is no hope for improvement and development. An article published by Ha’aretz Newspaper (edition, of 10 February, 2004) indicates that “a number of young Bedouin have resorted to crime…the Bedouin localities have become breeding grounds for drug abuse and crime, and they suffer from social and economic retardation”. This indicates that institutional formal planning policies have neglected basic steps to improve living conditions in the unrecognised villages in the Negev. Contrary to development, plans initiated by the government such as Sharon and Six-Year’s Plans propose an arrangement for land issue through counter-claims of ownership by the government, demolition of houses, removal of squatters, and recognition of small number of unrecognised villages. In this respect, Ha’aretz Newspaper published (22, September, 2003) that the former Minister of Agriculture & Rural Development Haim Oron, described these plans as “a declaration of war against the Bedouin community”.

In July of 2007 the government appointed another commission for ‘Regulation of the Bedouin Settlements in the Negev’ headed by a retired Judge named Goldberg. The commission out of many different institutions personalities held more than 20 public meetings; however representatives of the unrecognized villages were not included in the commission. In December 2008 the Goldberg Commission presented its recommendations to the Ministry of Housing, comprising an amount of compensation, arrangements for alternative land allotment, civil enforcement, suggestions for legislation and the schedule for carrying out the arrangement. They were discussed in 2009, but so far they haven't been approved. OCHCR concluded: “Despite its recognition of several villages and its recommendation to increase the level of compensation, the Goldberg Commission report does not resolve the issue of most unrecognized Bedouin-Arab villages. Since its recommendations depend on restrictions imposed by the Be’er-Sheva ‘Metropolis Plan’, only a handful of new villages will be recognized, if any. Hence the eviction of the Bedouin population will persist, and the policy of concentration in towns will continue as before” (OCHCR 2009, p. 22).

4.4.2 Negligence of Urban Elements in the Unrecognised Villages

The Israeli approach towards the existing seven recognised urban Bedouin localities provides an indication of the current situation in the unrecognised villages in all spheres such as economic, social, cultural and educational. In this respect Abu-Saad and Lithwick (2000: 11) indicate that “Israel’s approach has ensured that the Bedouin urban experience would be a failure. It created an impoverished, undereducated, unemployed, hostile community, which has rapidly become alienated from the State
and majority population”. There is no doubt that the situation in the unrecognised villages is much worse. Ten of thousands of Bedouin citizens live in sub-standard conditions without enjoying proper and suitable services or local governments (Meir, 1999). The houses in these settlements are threatened with destruction, prevented from development and extension. This means that the level and quality of modern urban elements continues to be far inferior to those provided to the adjacent Jewish settlements.

Thus, the consequences of these policies on unrecognised villages can be summarised as follows (Yassin 2006, Abu-Saad 2003, RCUV 2004):

**Shrinkage of Land**

Support by ideological thirst for land and legislating of over thirty laws of land expropriation, such as ‘Absentees’ (Palestinian Refugees), Property Law and Emergency Defence Law, the Israeli government has expropriated most of the Bedouin land. Of the approximately 10,000-12,000 km² (10-12 million dunam), today the Bedouin community holds in total about 0.24 km² (240,000 dunam). It is important to note that the residents of the unrecognised villages, which comprise about 14.2% of the entire Negev’s population, sit on 1.3% of the land of the Negev. Land confiscation and disparity in the allocation of state land are the most serious source of conflict between Palestinian citizens and the state since the Palestinians in Israel are barred from purchasing or leasing land in roughly 80% of the state.

**Absence of Economic Base**

Statistics about the existing seven recognised urban localities reveal that 6 of them are ranked in the lowest socio-economic status of any group of Israeli citizens. Similarly, the highest rate of unemployment is consistently among the Bedouin (Ittihad, edition December, 2002). In addition, a research published by Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Abu-Saad and Lithwick, 2000) indicates that about 71% of the Bedouin community in the Negev region suffers from hunger. These figures are indicators about the socio-economic situation in the unrecognised localities. Analysis indicates that the Israeli government have been adhering a policy of disrupting and destroying the traditional economy of these localities. This has resulted in forcing the workforce of these villages to find work outside their localities. As a result, as the situation is these days, it is estimated that more than 90% of the workforce in these localities depends on labour wages. Few of them are employed in modern industrial plants, none is employed in the high tech sector, and the majority works in blue-collar jobs.

**Restrictive Planning Regulation and Housing Development**

Analysis of national and regional (districts) plans indicates that the unrecognised villages are de-legalised by the enforcement of Planning and Building Law of 1965. This law enacts as a mechanism to prevent the development of the Arab citizens in Israel in general and the unrecognised villages in particular. Currently, there are some plans in the Negev that aim to establish military zones, industrial areas, conservation areas and airports. Some of these plans ignore the existence of these villages and part of these development projects will be located over the existing unrecognised villages intending to transfer this segment of population into permanent townships. The key tool used by the Israeli planning authorities for these villages is demolition policy. Moreover, planning offices maintain a policy of checking-up the inhabitants to prevent repairs or additions of new construction through aerial photographs and visits.
**Absence of Infrastructure Networks**

Field observations show that most of these villages lack basic infrastructure networks such as running water, electricity, proper education and health services, and access to roads. Some villages have no electricity at all, and some run private generators that provide sufficient electricity for lighting only, while very few are connected to national electricity network. With respect to road network, observation of many villages indicates that none of these localities are connected to the main road network. Internal local roads are not well developed; cars go through puddles of sewage, and over dangerous slopes. In contrary, some of these villages have fences placed around them for preventing their inhabitants from having access to their traditional land.

**Conclusion**

This section provided some major concerns about the current urban conditions of the Bedouins in the Negev in general and in the unrecognised villages in particular. This community is the most disadvantaged among all ethnic groups in Israel in terms of urban and rural aspects such as housing development, settlement expansion, employment, level of infrastructure and services in their communities. The provocation against the Bedouins in the Negev and their image as spontaneous and unrecognised settlements on state land encouraged planning authorities to establish new Jewish settlements in order to preserve the country’s land for Jews only. It can be argued that these localities have been caught in a geo-political trap built and set by the Israeli institutions. The geo-political project that calls for Jewish State for Jews only bears inherent discrimination towards the non-Jewish population. These parameters constitute obstacles to the creation of a status that would allow the Palestinian population to enjoy full citizenship in Israel and to become fully integrated in the Israeli society. The unfair and unjust planning policies prevent improvement of the urban situation of the Palestinian Bedouin citizens in their localities.

Based on the analysis of the current urban situation, it can be concluded that the problem is complex and not easy to be solved in a way to grant the Bedouins civil right that they deserve as citizens. However the author believes that a framework that is constituted upon understanding the concepts of ethnicity, citizenship and nationalism would be the first step of solving not only the problem of Bedouins, but also the entire Palestinian population in Israel. The second step would be to understand the relationship between Bedouins and land because it is the major element that ties and anchors their lives. The third step is to convince the Bedouin community that the state does not treat them as a threat, but the state sees them as equal counterparts to the Jewish community. These steps can be achieved via:

- Giving recognition to the existing unrecognised Bedouin localities that are not yet recognised, and provide all basic urban services and public amenities.
- Ending the policy of relocating the Bedouins from their unrecognised localities into existing and new townships as well as the demolition of houses built without building permits.
- Starting to put development (master/outline) plans – for both urban and agricultural activities - and ensuring the representation of the Bedouin
community within the decision making bodies of the municipal borders to which they belong.

- Distributing the national resources (land, social facilities) of the state according to the urban needs of the beneficiaries, and forbidding all bodies in charge of managing state land to use discriminative policies based on ethnicity, religion or nationalism to give the right to free choice of place of residence to all citizens inside the state.

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Final comment

The year of 1948, the foundation of the Jewish State of Israel in new frontlines did not set an end to usurpation of the Palestinian land - it was but a starting point for more and more expropriation and expulsion. After all - with British and finally international support - the Zionist leaders succeeded in having a state in Palestine and even a larger area than the UN had proposed to them.

The state was founded on a dangerous Jewish nationalism, a racist ideology which backed a fateful ethnic cleansing of the Non Jewish Palestinians and expulsion of half of the indigenous people.

However, more than 150.000 Palestinians remained in the country, at that time still forming one quarter of all inhabitants. The usurpation of Palestine was not complete in terms of property and ownership; and finally in terms of land use it was not even Jewish: the majority of the Jewish immigrants concentrated living in the cities of the coast. Consequently, the Zionist leadership pulled out all steps useful for judaising the land: extreme expropriation by laws and regulations; systematic Jewish immigration and distribution of Jewish people; imposing all kinds of restrictions and discrimination to the Palestinians. Spatial planning played a crucial role. Beside a framework of expropriation and annexation instruments national, regional, district and local plans became essential tools for judaising and colonising the land of the Palestinians in a very short time.

In fact Palestine in borders of 1948 has become Jewish; this part of Palestine by force changed its face to the unrecognisable. New cities and villages in European style are dominant at the coast, the emptied Palestinian villages and small cities like Yaffa (Jafa) or Taberia (Tiberias) are turned into Jewish, and some of them like Safad are hosting extreme orthodox Jews obliterating Palestinian memory as far as possible. The Palestinians, treated as the 'Arab Sector' and despite massive Jewish immigration, still forming nearly one quarter of the people were and are still under extreme pressure in terms of land property, land use, infrastructure and housing. They do not benefit from Israeli planning system; on the contrary, they are victims of the regulations. Their land was grabbed ‘by law’, they miss infrastructure supply, financing of housing and their needs are neglected. In general they are discriminated against and in a threatened position: hundreds of thousands Bedouins lost their basic living condition, hundreds of thousands homes are condemned 'illegal' and therefore to demolish.

Looking back on 60 years of planning under Zionism and Jewish nationalism the most important steps killing the Palestinian existence in Israel to the utmost were done in the first decade with the implementation of the national plan for the distribution of Jewish immigrants, the program of 30 new cities and the immediate expropriation of the so called absenteees, the Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian land property shrank from 93-94 percent in 1948 to less than 3 percent of the total to date. Today expropriation does not stop, some instruments are different. Planning for the Jewish sector, roads, new colonies, cities and villages on the one hand and refuse of such plans for the Palestinians on the other hand lead to the desired effects of reducing Palestinian existence and basics for development. Hence Palestinians are suffering from lack of land and infrastructure and overcrowding, and they miss
economic opportunities. They have become a marginal minority in terms of political power, economic importance and social influence. Israel is the Jewish State.

So far the 'dream' of the fathers of the Zionist project has been fulfilled and the architects and planners of the Jewish State might have been satisfied. However this Israel was not the land that Lord Balfour had promised to realise and what the Zionist movement had envisioned under the British Mandate. Still about 22 percent are missing and in them strategic parts of Palestine: East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and the West Bank with the most important water resources as well as Gaza, rich in agriculture and a bridge to Africa.

Consequently, to grab the remaining areas of Palestine and cleanse those from Palestinian presence as far as possible came into view when the State of Israel had reached stability and international (western) recognition. The war of 1967 and the occupation of the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip was the initial step for further colonization; military aggression again became an initiative tool for conquering remaining parts of Palestine. Exploiting the natural and land resources and shifting the country into a new geographic and demographic reality was the logic follow up of Zionist architecture and planning.

The following section will investigate how Zionist ideology and strategic planning, was implemented within the new frontiers – also war might become a regular tool within further colonization.
IV

Further Devastation and Destruction - Judaising the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after the Occupation 1967, an overview

At the end of the sixties, Israel had finished main issues of colonisation within the 48 borders: the Palestinians were a minority under control and more than 90% of their land was judaised. However, ‘Israel in Palestine’ was not complete and the Jewish State an amputee in sense of before 48 Mandate borders and the ‘promised’ land by the British. Furthermore, the important water resources, the northern and the southern aquifer were still under Palestinian control.

It was shown in the previous sectors that the military conquest of the West Bank and the Gaza Region was the logic consequence of Zionist policy from its very beginning. Most important aim of the 67 war was to reach control over the Jordan valley, the water resources (see section IV5) and finally East Jerusalem with the Old City including the ‘Wailing Wall’. The occupation made the Zionist vision of a complete Jewish country in Mandate borders possible. Only ‘obstacle’ was the Palestinian people on that land.

Planning tools were already approved: ‘waving a net of colonies, acquiring wide stretches of land, stretching strong ropes between the pegs’ and so on was the already used colonial ‘planning kit’. The same expropriation practice and land robbing like in Israel after 1948 was carried out. The destruction and colonisation process started again with a census. The Zionist movement, in form of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) became again the driving force behind the usurpation process. How this happened is the matter of the following section.

Waltz will begin with an overview and summary of the main usurpation steps and special planning tactics, Jordan planning law had to be added. Isaac will follow up with details after Oslo and investigate the effects of the segregation wall. Gaza, what has been left by Israel in 2005 will be reviewed (Isaac/Waltz) as an example for Israel's high ambitions on the one hand and pragmatic retreat from the battle field on the other hand if necessary. Finally two aspects will be touched: transportation (Awadallah/Atrash) and water (Isaac/Waltz).

The following section aims to give an overview. Main steps are presented; method again is the review of results and interpretation of the driving forces, hence planning methods and instruments.
IV

Viktoria Waltz

1. General Planning Strategies and Executed Policies after Usurping West Bank and Gaza Region - Short Overview

West Bank and Gaza were pure Palestinian areas before 1967 under Jordanian and Egyptian governance. The population living in villages, cities and refugee camps earned more or less sufficiently their living with farming. The West Bank was serving Jordan with vegetables, fruits and crops; the ‘Jerusalem stone’ a favourite building material was exported to the Arab neighboured countries.

Jordan as well as Egypt had not done much for developing infrastructure. Roads, water pipes and electricity net were in poor condition. Social services, hospitals, schools, kindergarten were developed on a small level. Who could afford used private institutions – a tradition in Palestine? Who wanted a better and safe living for the family went out of the country to work or study in neighbouring states, the US or Europe. Thousands of Palestinians earned their living in the Gulf States and elsewhere, inspiring novels and poems about being exiled (Kanafani 1984).

When Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, life, especially mobility deteriorated again and Palestinians faced immediately what happened to many of them in 47-49 during the first ethnic cleansing: expulsion, census, expropriation, restrictions of life in many directions. Same regulations and laws as before were used to expropriate land and extend Jewish colonies (see IV.1). A census declared people on their land as inhabitants and those, who had left their properties even only for a while were defined ‘absentees’ and their land fell for expropriation. Consequently, until the beginning of the so called peace process Israel authorities had already confiscated in the West Bank 79% of the land. From this

- 44% was taken for ‘military purposes’,
- 20% for ‘safety reasons’,
- 12% for ‘public purposes’ (e.g. green and recreation areas according to town planning acts), as well as
- 12% as land of the ‘absentees’.

(Como, 1992)

In addition to the Israeli law the Jordanian Planning Law of 1966 was usurped and ‘integrated’ into Israel’s military order system and managed to serve Israeli interest of changing the map. Al Haq revealed 1986 about Israeli planning strategies in the West Bank in detail the crucial mechanism of this new strategy (Al Haq 1986). Through military order 418 e.g., the ‘Order Concerning Town, Village and Building Planning’ of 1971, transferred the planning task of the Higher Planning Council under Jordanian Minister of Interior simply to the Israeli Military Administration. The person in charge was then an Israeli officer managing ‘interior affairs’.

Since 1985 the tasks went over to the ‘Infrastructure Branch’ of the then called ‘Civil Administration’, replacing the former Jordanian ‘Central Planning Department’. This branch became also responsible for the confiscation of land – eventually for the establishment of new Jewish colonies. Declaring specific areas as planning zones, approving planning schemes and amending and cancelling building licenses granted by lower planning levels etc. were according to the Jordanian law the responsibility of the Higher Planning Council, including the head of the Engineer’s Union, the Attorney
General, the head of the Housing Institute and other individuals representing the various interests of the local population. Under the implementation of Military Order 418 these rights especially Palestinian participation were eliminated. (Rishmawi 1986, Shehade 1985)

The investigation of Rishmawi (1986) about the consequences of this order revealed, that as an example, Kiryat Arba, a most hostile colonial community to the Palestinians in direct neighbourhood to Hebron/Khalil was established under Military Order 418 and according to Plan No. 510 became a 'special planning zone', covering almost 30,000 dunam of expropriated Palestinian land. Benvenisti concluded in his analysis of this plan "The purpose of the Kiryat Arab master plan is three-fold: to impose a freeze on Palestinian land in the vicinity of Jewish housing estates; to expropriate all Palestinian land needed to connect and serve the pockets of Jewish settlements; and to ensure that Jewish areas will be used extensively for Housing." (Benvenisti 1986)

Furthermore, District and Local Planning Committees were abolished. Duties of these committees were approving detail plans in the respected area, serving also as an appeal committee in local planning zones. In some local cases these responsibilities were according to the Jordanian law transferred to the elected municipal councils. However, in 1982 they were dismissed and replaced by Israeli appointed officials. In the Hebron/Kiryat Arba case the Hebron Mayor before dismissed had taken proceedings before the Supreme Court of Justice against the master plan for Kiryat Arba. The Israeli appointed mayor after Natshe's dismissal withdrew the case from the court. These mechanisms were to ease the judaizing process slowly and step by step.

The WZO became again a main actor in this process, funding the colonisation and supporting immigration from outside to settle the newcomers in new West Bank, Gaza or East Jerusalem colonies. Whether Allon, Begin or Sharon, Likud or Labour plans - strategies were worked out before by politicians and engineers of the WZO. The WZO all over the world and especially in the US invited from abroad Jewish and Zionist groups to have visits to 'Samaria and Judea' to convince them to immigrate and to occupy buildings and land in the planned strategic locations. The Israeli governmental institutions, army, Electricity Company etc., followed more or less these plans and supplied such illegal colonisation with infrastructure and eventually using military force. (Benvenisti, 1984, 1988)

Likewise the policy in Israel, the Palestinians in the 1967 occupied territories were threatened by refuse of building licenses, 'illegalising' building activities within zoning and mapping restricted areas. Reasons for refusing a permit to build a house are again several. Reasons actually were given the following:

(1) Agricultural Area S15/RJ5;
(2) Plot too narrow / separation between building and edge of plot too small / density too high;
(3) More than one building on a plot;
(4) Insufficient evidence of ownership;
(5) Land needed for road.

Reason (1) is given in almost every case; this and (2) refer to the provisions of plans S15 and RJ5. So also does (4) - though neither the plans nor the law in fact provide grounds for denying a permit for ownership reasons. Reason (4) arises from non-recognition of Palestinian ownership documents. Reason (5) has been used extensively only since Oslo II accord. (AI 1999)
Plan *S15 and RJ5*, together covering a large part of Palestine and almost all land of the West Bank were drawn up in the early 1940s under the British Mandate and zoned green areas as explained in section III. They were then filed and seemed more or less forgotten. According to Amnesty International there is no evidence of a regular use under either the Mandate or Jordanian rule or even in Israel between 1948 and 1967. Their still binding existence came to public notice in 1980 (RJ5) and 1985 (S15), when used as a justification to refuse building permits in the West Bank. First case was Bil'in, when RJ5 was used to justify the establishing of nature reserves on Bil'in land - even though it was revealed in the court that RJ5 is vague and not at all a clear plan (Rishmawi 1987). However, the Jewish colonies are all in land designated as 'agricultural areas' according to S15 and RJ5. Adopting these laws and plans Israel claim, that new master plans in these areas are not part of the planning zones according to Jordanian Law, hence participation of local institutions and persons not conditional. And plans for colonies and new roads, unlike plans for Palestinian houses, are simply labelled as 'amendments' to S15 / RJ5. Likewise, though hundreds of Palestinian houses have been bulldozed, none of the extensive development without permit within the colonies (whether built before or after approval of the settlement plan) has been demolished because conflicting with these Mandate plans. (AI 1999)

Also *master plans* were used in two directions and made a spatial expansion in legal frame impossible for the Palestinians: to refuse licenses if there is no master plan as a normative prerequisite to get a building license; or to limit areas for expansion, defining plan borders as a restricting borders of developing. Until the so called peace process master plans most of all did not exist for the Palestinian areas under the Israeli military or later civil administration. Therefore, Palestinian communities were incapable to develop their building areas under conditions of master plans and forced to unlicensed housing construction.

However, shortly before the negotiations with the Palestinians started, the Israeli government issued about 300 Master plans, covering most of the already built up Palestinian areas, ‘limiting’ building to the area within the plan borders, which was already built up. Extension outside these borders became impossible. In addition, these plans served as borders for the division of the West Bank into *A, B and C zones* even more restricting Palestinian urban growth and imposing restrictions of development. (Ministry of Local Government 2000)

In Zone A under full Palestinian control, building became restricted by these new master plans. Villages and towns were not allowed to build on their fallow land outside these borders as long as these master plans were fact. In Zone B neither a road, nor new buildings or commercial areas could be established without an agreement of the Israeli administration, what never happens, simply because of the permanently given 'safety' argument. Zone C, under full Israeli control and covering the largest part of the West Bank, is still out of any negotiation. In many cases villages or city quarters are even surrounded by C, what means the Palestinian administration cannot even get a permission to build a new electrical line or a road to be connected to other areas and finally no new houses. The case of Al Jeeb village shows the irrational situation created by this zoning: the village is in area A, surrounded by C, and the red marked area shows the already built up area outside the master plan borders, hence ‘illega’ according to Israel’s logic (Waltz, 2000; Irshalem, 1998) (see map 1,2).
As shown, the transformation of Palestinian land into Israeli and Jewish did not come to an end after Madrid and Oslo. In addition, the construction of the separation wall can be understood as part of a refining plan within the same goals. The next paragraph will go deeper into facts on the ground.

References
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IV

Jad Isaac

2. After Oslo: The Judaising of the West Bank – Follow up of the Geographic Holocaust on the Palestinian Land Since 1993

1993 was a turning point in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. An interim peace agreement ‘Oslo Accord’ was signed by both parties to initiate political solution for the conflict. But the crucial issues such as Jerusalem, borders, water, refugees and Israeli settlements were left to be determined in the final status talks to be held in 1996. It was agreed that "Neither side shall take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip..." (Article XXXI, Oslo II, 1995.)

According to the ‘Oslo II’ agreement of September 1995, the West Bank was classified into Areas A, B, and C, with varying levels of control. The Israeli military withdrew from area A, and complete control was assumed by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). This marked the first time that a Palestinian Government retained sovereignty over any Palestinian land. In area B, the Palestinians were supposed to have full control over civil matters but Israel continues to have overriding responsibility for security, which consequently excluded factual Palestinian sovereignty.

In area C, Israel retains full control over land, security, and natural resources. According to the agreement, the Palestinians should have regained control over 95% of the West Bank and Gaza by July 1998. However, on the ground, this did not happen, not even 20% of West Bank and Gaza area came under Palestinian control and East Jerusalem is still excluded.

By March 2000, area A comprised only 18% of the West Bank total area (1,004 km²) and a further 254.2 km² of the Gaza Strip, (which was occupied by Israeli Settlements but was later evacuated in August 2005), while area B comprised 18.3% of the total West Bank Area (1,035 km²), while the remaining area falls under the full Israeli control in area C and comprises 61% of the total West Bank Area (3,452 km²). (see table 1)

Table 1 The Redeployment Percentages according to the Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreements</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oslo II (May - 1994)</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wye I (October 1998)</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wye II &amp; III (not implemented)</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharm I (September 1999)</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharm II (Delay in Implementation) (January 2000)</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharm III (Delay in Implementation) (Situation March 2000)</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Situation (2007), divided areas through more than 600 devices</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: ARIJ GIS Database/ OCHA maps 2008)
On September 28, 2000, the second Intifada, known as Al Aqsa Intifada, erupted, following the provocative entry of Ariel Sharon into the sacred space of the Al Aqsa mosque on the Dome of the Rock. This was not only the reaction to Sharon’s aggression, but to the whole failure of the peace process so far, visible in the increasing settlements, closures, and house demolitions and so on. Israel intensified its ‘internal closure’ policy (restriction of movement within the West Bank, even between nearby communities) in addition to the already present ‘external closure’ (restriction of movement from the West Bank to Jerusalem, Israel or Gaza). On April 2002 Israel again invaded the Palestinian authority areas, destroyed and besieged cities and villages and re-established an occupation situation by means of permanent control, checkpoints, closed areas … etc.

2.1 Expropriation Tools as Before

Following 1967, Israel immediately started the process of expropriation and judaizing in the West Bank; that is erasing any prospect for a future viable Palestinian state and reinforcing the Jewish presence in the Palestinian areas. It unilaterally undertook a series of geopolitical actions that undermined the Palestinian presence and imposed facts on the ground, which included the annexation of East Jerusalem, the demolition of Palestinian houses, the confiscation of Palestinian lands, the establishment of Israeli settlements, the construction of bypass roads, and final but not last the construction of the segregation wall. The following sections will investigate the impacts of the undertaken actions on the Palestinian landscape.

Land confiscation

Immediately after 1967 war, Israel commenced the policy of land confiscation. It declared vast areas of the West Bank as “State Land.” Soon after, this land was zoned as military closed areas and Nature Reserves which were later designated for the establishment of Israeli settlements. The land property and land use laws that the Israelis used in order to grab more lands are again the following, where some of them were already used in Israel as explained before:

- **The absentee property law:** As a result 2910 km² of the West Bank’s Land was classified as abandoned property or State Land
- **Freezing of land registration:** In 1968, Israel froze the land registration process and cancelled incomplete registrations, alienating land from the Palestinians, defending it against Palestinian use, and ensuring through such processes as registration and leasing that Palestinians are disqualified from having any future benefit from that land.
- **Security military orders:** certain areas were declared as security zones and land was confiscated for security and military reasons. Most of the eastern slopes of the Jordan Valley were put under military zone.
- **Restrictions on Palestinian use:** Palestinians are restricted to use areas that were declared as combat zones, Nature Reserves and buffer zones that are created around the settlements, bypass roads and military camps.
- **Land expropiation for public purposes:** According to military Order number 321 lands can be expropriated for public purposes. However, the word public in this case meant “for Jews only.” Legal power and authority were given to the military commander to evacuate by force
land owners who refuse to abide the evacuation orders. Other orders were also used in this context:

- The **Ottoman Law of 1885**: if a land is not cultivated for three consecutive years, it is declared as a “State Land.”
- The **British Planning Scheme RS15 and RJ 5** of before 1947 zone: nearly the entire West Bank as ‘agricultural land’ and assign the District Commission (today the Israeli Civil Administration) the right to give relaxation.

Such policy allowed Israel to control, until the negotiations, more than 60% of the occupied West Bank and Gaza territory (Benvenisti 1988) and built meanwhile 199 Israeli settlements including the settlements in Jerusalem and are accommodating nearly 530,000 Israeli settlers along with a serving 875 Km network of bypass roads. Such a devious Israeli policy has led to a further usurpation of Palestine and reshaped its geophysical structure to a situation, which no longer connects it as a single entity but isolated islands by the Israeli settlements and bypass roads.

### 2.2 The Ongoing Process of Judaising Palestine with Plans and Planning Tools

The Israeli governments, whether led by Likud or Labour, never deviated from further usurping the land of Palestine. While negotiating, Israel promoted and developed Israeli settlements and related infrastructure with even more speed - in contradiction with the peace agreements and the aspirations of the international community to resolve the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis (see figure 1).

**Figure 1 Establishment of Israeli Settlements in the West Bank during the different Israeli Governments**

![Figure 1 Establishment of Israeli Settlements in the West Bank during the different Israeli Governments](Image)

Source: ARIJ Database 2007

Additionally, all colonial activities in the Palestinian Territory are illegal according to international law and the Fourth Geneva Conventions which state that the occupying power is not allowed to transfer a part of its population into the territories it occupies.
nor change the geography, (Geneva Convention 1949). Today the Israeli settlements are scattered all over the West Bank. The focus has been on the following areas:

- **The Jerusalem area:** to encircle Jerusalem city with a belt of settlements and walls and cut it from the rest of the West Bank Governorates and change the demographic composition of the city planting Jewish population to the utmost into the area and thus to pre-empt the outcome of final status negotiations over the city.

- **Along the West Bank's western edges:** to make the return to the 1967 borders practically impossible, and to make the settlements appealing to settlers, who commute to work inside Israel.

- **The Jordan valley:** for its presumed importance to Israel's security as well as for its valuable agricultural and water resources.

- **Along horizontal corridors:** to ensure the contiguity between Israeli settlements in the eastern part of the West Bank and the settlements in the western part of the West Bank. (see maps 1-3)

### 2.2.1 Allon / Gush Imunim/Drobless/Sharon - Architects of the Judaising Process

Different phases and different governments were strengthening on different areas and aspects. Some Israeli governments have encouraged the development of specific blocks more than others, but the colonisation and usurpation has never been halted, as explained in the following part according to phases and governments.


The first wave of Israeli settlements were strategically located along the Jordan valley in compliance with the Allon Plan which aimed to segregate the Occupied Palestinian Territory from the Jordan Valley, with an intention to turn the Jordan River into the political and security boundary for Israel. The plan called for the construction of a bloc of Israeli settlements at a width of approximately 20 kilometres as a first step towards their formal annexation to the state of Israel. The settlements were concentrated around East Jerusalem, the Gush Etzion settlement Block to the south of Bethlehem, most of the Jordan Valley, and a strip of Palestinian lands south of Hebron. (see Benvenisti .1984, see map 1)

During the late seventies and until mid eighties, an Israeli right wing religious movement called "Gush Imunim ('Bloc of the faithful')", rose and aimed at the establishment of “Greater Israel” from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. The group's plan different from that of Allon Plan by focusing settlement construction along the central mountain ridge of the West Bank in areas containing most of the Palestinian population. The Gush Imunim movement has constructed more than 80 Israeli settlements in the West Bank and is still a key factor in creating new settlements and influencing Israeli governmental policy. The Gush Imunim Plan was also backed up by the Drobless plan which was set by the head of the World Zionist Organisation Settlement Division. Drobless prepared a comprehensive plan for the establishment of settlements around Palestinian population centres. (see Benvenisti .1984, see map 2).

#### 1977-1981 Sharon Plan

The former Israeli Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon (1977-1981) (the late Prime
Minister of Israel) modified and expanded the Drobless Plan and Gush Imunim by intensifying colonization along the 1949 Armistice Line (Green Line) to secure the borders between the West Bank and Israel (Green Line), in order to secure the borders between the West Bank and Israel. Sharon’s Plan also called for an increased colonisation along the central mountain ridge. The ultimate aim of Sharon’s plan was the full annexation of the West Bank, excluding small densely populated Palestinian enclaves. (see Benvenisti, see map 3)

Map 1 Allon Plan 1970
Map 2 Drobless WZO Plan 1978
Map 3 Sharon Plan 1981

Source: Benvenisti 1984: 99pp

The further growth of settlements is mainly geared to the formation of blocks; i.e. they grow outwards and towards each other. The following time can be understood as a refining area of blocks, belts and new big cities according to Drobless’ program. The Block System of 16 blocks got a more clear form. Those in the west were linking Israeli areas, others were built up as strategic new industrial centres like the Ariel Block, south-west of Nablus, and others were supposed to threaten the main cities like Beit El close to Ramallah, Gush Etzion south-west of Jerusalem (AlQuds) and Bethlehem and Kiryat Arba’ controlling Hebron (Al Khalil). In Jerusalem Israel intends to create ‘Metropolitan Jerusalem’ or ‘Greater Jerusalem’ by expanding Jerusalem borders to include the major settlements’ blocs such as Ma’ale Adumin, Giv’at Ze’ev and Gush Etzion.

In addition, some of these urban settlements got the status of an Israeli city with extra funding and master plans. Some of these settlements host more than 30,000 Israeli settlers and more like Ma’ale Adumin and Betar Illit. All of them were built on expropriated Palestinian lands either for extending the settlements, for ‘security’ reasons, or road systems and restricted areas. (see map 4, 5)
In an interview by the Israeli daily newspaper Ha’aretz correspondent on April 12, 2001, the late Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared that he would relinquish only 42% of the West Bank for the future Palestinian state. He also declared a complete unwillingness to evacuate any Israeli settlement, what he called “the centrepiece of Israeli claims to the land”. Sharon stated: “It’s not by accident that the settlements are located where they are. They safeguard the cradle of the Jewish people’s birth and also provide strategic depth, which is vital to our existence. The settlements were established according to the conception that, come what may, we have to hold the western security area, which is adjacent to the Green Line, and the eastern security area along the Jordan River and the roads linking the two, and Jerusalem of course, and the hill aquifer.”

The route of the segregation wall manifests what Sharon had envisioned years ago and what all Israeli governments have been working extensively to accomplish.

**2.2.2 Colonies and Master Plans**

There are different strategies for colonies’ expansion some of which are: the confiscation of Palestinian lands located in the vicinity of an existing colony, increasing the number of housing units of an existing settlement, erecting new outposts in close parameters of an exiting Israeli settlement or outside the settlement's master plan with the possibility of developing such outposts into new settlements as in the case of Modi'in Illit settlement west of Ramallah city, a partner-town of Hagen in Germany. (see map 6). These outposts are connected with the nearby Israeli colonies with a network of bypass roads. The outposts extend colonies' lands deeper into the Palestinian territory, placing more areas under direct military control and contributing to the fragmentation of the OPT.
Map 6 (a-b-c-d) Strategies for Israeli Colony Expansion within or outside Master Plans

a. Expanding the colony; b. Expansion at the periphery of a colony within its master plan; c. Expansions outside the master plan of a colony; d. Construction of satellite (‘outpost’)

All colonies' activities increased since the beginning of the seventies of the last century (see figure 2).

**Figure 2 Colonies’ development since the occupation until 2006**

![Graph showing the number of Israeli settlements established since 1967 until 2006]

Source: ARIJ GIS Database 2007

Source: ARIJ 2003,
The following section will investigate the process of constructing 'outpost'.

### 2.2.3 The Role of Israeli ‘Outposts’

There are different strategies for the expansion of Israeli colonies, some of which are: vertical expansion by increasing the number of housing units in existing Israeli colonies and horizontal expansion by increasing the area of existing Israeli colonies on the expense of the neighbouring Palestinian communities, or constructing outposts few kilometres away from 'mother colony's or outside their master plans and connecting these outposts with a network of bypass roads and securing the land between them and the colonies.

**Definition of Israeli Outposts**

Outposts are relatively new technique improvised by Israeli ‘settlers’ in 1996 along with the indirect government concession to usurp more Palestinian lands and build new colonies. The practice involves grabbing land on Palestinian hilltops or in-close perimeter of existing colonies (identified as ‘Mother Colony’) 1 mile to 4 miles away and setting-up mobile caravans, declaring the site as a 'new colony' or a 'new neighbourhood' of adjacent colonies, in order to reinforce the Israeli Jewish territorial presence over surrounding Palestinian lands and to usurp more land. Israel former PM Ariel Sharon, the utmost supporter of colonies and outposts and a pioneer in his calling for ‘settlers’ to take control of hilltops in the West Bank before “losing them to Palestinians in negotiations”9

The government provided the outposts with military protection and infrastructure services, in addition to occasional financial support. Moreover, as years passed by; many existing outposts has grown into colonies and the number of these outposts kept growing to a record high 175 outpost in 2004 and 220 in 2007, even with the over-debated dismantle of these outposts in different areas of the West Bank.

According to the Israeli government, one third of outposts are classified as illegal, the second third is classified with “uncertain status” while the remaining one-third is politically propped. The Israeli Knesset took a decision on July 22, 2003 to dismantle all "unauthorised" outposts, while in reality no real action was taken by the Israeli army to dismantle those illegal colony outposts. On the other hand, if there is an Israeli military order to demolish a Palestinian house, the Israeli bulldozers rush to the site, raze and demolish that house and any sign of its existence. (see map 7)

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Map 7 Israeli Outposts (in brown) established during the period of 1996 and 2001, the others are established during the period of 2001 & 2007

Source: ARIJ 2003

**Function of Israeli Outposts**

The Israeli outposts phenomena came to serve the Israeli colonies expansion plans; accordingly, the outposts established within existing colonies master plans constituted new neighbourhoods while others established outside the master plan of Israeli colonies formed buds for new colonies. Analysis of satellite images showed that 102 Israeli outposts are located inside Israeli colonies' Master Plans are considered as New Neighbourhoods; while the remaining 118 Israeli outposts which were constructed outside colonies' Master Plan are considered as New Settlements.

**2.2.4 The role of Israeli by-pass roads and further fragmentation**

The term "Bypass Roads" did not come into use until the signing of Oslo agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians in 1993 to indicate designated roads for the Israeli Army and settlers use, to bypass Palestinian towns and communities in the context of the Israeli Army redeployment. From that point on, Israel intensified its efforts to increase the magnitude of the bypass roads in the occupied Palestinian territory as a part of its policy to coerce facts on the ground; ultimately affecting the
outcome of negotiation with the Palestinians; including the establishment of a viable contiguous Palestinian State. The majority of the West Bank area is Area "C"\textsuperscript{10}, which hold all Israeli colonies and consequently the Israeli bypass roads that pierce at many classified "A" and "B" areas establishing a physical obstruction between two controlled Palestinian areas.

Along with launching a vigorous colonies program following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, back in 1967, the consecutive governments of the state of Israel adopted a separation concept based on the creation of an Israeli controlled road grid system, which will work to facilitate the construction of Israeli colonies and the Israeli settlers movement between occupied territory colonies and Israel and eventually incorporate the Israeli created and controlled road grid system in the occupied territory with the road grid system in Israel. The Israelis built these roads under the pretext of "security needs"; a term that presented the Israeli Army with legitimate excuse to expropriate Palestinian lands; a procedure that proved its efficiency before when the Israeli Army would expropriate Palestinian lands under the "security needs" pretext to establish an Army base, which later on is turned to Israeli settlers control who would turn it on their part into a civilian inhabitant area. For Israel, that was the only available option or the only loop to bypass the international law, which considers, expropriating land for any purpose other than military use a "grave breach". Israel also argued the military role of the colonies and the bypass roads to its security, which allowed the Army to expropriate private Palestinian lands to build colonies and its roads; Israel also argued that the roads it is building will also benefit the local Palestinian population who would be allowed to travel on these roads. Furthermore, the Israeli built roads on confiscated Palestinian lands contributed immensely to stimulate the habitation of the Israeli colonies, which encouraged the Israeli settlers to take initiative and construct roads on their own, but would later on be endorsed and adopted by the Israeli Army to cast a shadow of legitimacy on these roads. In addition to its role in connecting colonies, the Israeli built roads worked to restrain the development of the Palestinian communities in the West Bank by creating de-facto obstructions to areas designated for development.

Prior to the outbreak of the September 2000 Intifada, Palestinians had almost complete access to these bypass roads, except at time when the Israeli Army is on security alerts that Palestinians are no longer allowed to travel on the bypass roads or would have to undergo a through security check conducted by the Israeli Army border patrols, which would take hours at times. However, following the 2000 Intifada, Palestinians accesses to virtually all bypass roads became forbidden; unless they are in possession of a special permit issued by the Israeli civil administration. Later on, the Israeli Army would refer to bypass roads were Palestinian are no longer allowed to travel on as "sterile" roads; meaning that these are Palestinians free roads.

Today, there are 875 km of Israeli bypass roads inside the West Bank. The construction of which required the confiscation and destruction of approximately 100 km\textsuperscript{2} of Palestinian land, most of which is originally agricultural and were constructed through a $3.2 billion grant from the USA government in order to “help” Israel ‘comply with the Oslo agreements’ and avoid friction between Israeli settlers and Palestinians.

\textsuperscript{10} The Oslo accord classified the West Bank territory into three jurisdictions: Area "A"; where the Palestinians have full control over the land; security and administrative wise, and Area "B"; where Palestinians have only an administrative control, while security is for the Israeli, and Area "C"; where Palestinians has complete control and the Palestinians has none.
In addition, the IOF enforce a 50 to 75 meter buffer zone on each side of the road in which no Palestinian construction is allowed.

In October 2004, Israel announced about a plan to maintain its control over 500 Km of roads distributed systematically in a way that segregates the West Bank into dozen of cantons with no physical contiguity. An additional 18 tunnels and under ground passages to be constructed to buttress the scheme which according to Israel’s hopes will be financially adopted by the guardians of the peace process; the European Union and the United States of America who renounced this Israeli plan some time ago, but apparently may have a change of heart at this time.

The roads to be rehabilitated in addition to the proposed new roads and the planned tunnels attempt to create two networks of roads, one Israeli and one Palestinian. However, the Israeli network is a continuous road network that links together all Israeli colonies located in the Palestinian Territories, while the Palestinian network is fractured and unsustainable. New roads and tunnels result in segregating the Palestinian communities into Ghettos with only limited access through the proposed 18 tunnels. The estimated financial budget required for the Israeli plan is $ 1581 Million. (see map 8)

Map 8 Network of Israeli Bypass Roads in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Source: ARIJ GIS Unit 2007
2.2.5 The role of ‘checkpoints’ and further restriction of movement

Checkpoints have always been standard procedures of the Israeli Occupation Army since the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory. However, it was not until the Palestinian Intifada of September 2000 that the Israeli Army increased the number of operating checkpoint in the West Bank and Gaza to unprecedented levels next to restrictions imposed on the Palestinian populace attempting to cross these checkpoints.

Furthermore, over the past few years, the behaviours of the Israeli soldiers stationed at these checkpoints has taken a turn beyond the usual hassle treatment to more acts that falls within manners of vicious and sadistic behaviours; as many Palestinians of different segments of the Palestinian society; students, teachers, patients, medical staff and employees were subjected to various forms of Israeli cruelty, which involved beating, humiliation (striping of cloths and sitting on a dirt mud), held for hours under the burning sun or the cold whether before they are allowed to cross a certain checkpoint. The fallout of the Israeli soldiers' acts at checkpoints had it tormenting affect on the Palestinian society; causing social ties cut off, economic separation between districts, rise in the unemployment level, and disruption to daily life activities and internal emigration. In addition to that, medical services became dramatic as medical staff, doctors and patients were denied access through checkpoints; including medical emergencies and at many occasions patients were carried on wheel chairs or animals (donkeys) as even ambulances were not allowed to cross; causing patients death in many cases. Today, there are 518 Israeli checkpoints dissecting the Occupied Palestinian Territory into small cantons and are vary in kind as listed in table 2 below:

Table 2 Israeli Checkpoints in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 2007 (type and number)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Checkpoint Type</th>
<th>No. of Checkpoints</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Checkpoint</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth Mound</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Watch Tower</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying Checkpoint</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Gate</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnel</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Tunnel</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement Bloc</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Gate</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>592</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ARIJ GIS DATABASE 2007

OCHA reports in March 2010 509 numbers of obstacles of mobility – a decrease from 626 in 2009, however states that mobility between cities and villages has not improved through that. See the following figure about the different types and their percentages, as well as the images. (see figure 3, images 1-8)
Figure 3 Distribution of Obstacles by Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earth Mound</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Block</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkpoint</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Gate</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial Checkpoint</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth Wall</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Barrier</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN OCHA June 2010: 3

Images 1-6 Types of Obstacles

1. Earth Mound

2. Road Block

3. Trench or Ditch

4. Road Gate
These checkpoints, in addition to the closures and curfews, have major effect on the economic and agricultural sectors of the Palestinian community, causing the unemployment rate and number of those living in poverty to increase. Checkpoints enforce segregation, canonizing and impoverishment of Palestinian communities and contribute much to Israeli domination over the territory and the economic strangulation of the Palestinian economy.

In addition all planning tools intend to deprive Palestinians from their right of freedom of movement, their right to work, to health care and to education. The ‘Segregation Wall’ is the latest attack on the Palestinian life in this context.

**2.3 The Segregation Wall and its Impact on the Occupied Palestinian Territory**

To complete its long term land grab, the Israeli government launched in June 2002, its policy of unilateral segregation between Israel and the Palestinian territory by establishing a Segregation Zone along the western terrain of the occupied West Bank territory.

The Israeli Segregation Zone covers substantial sizeable and significant land areas, rich with natural resources (water aquifers) as it runs along and through the western part of the West Bank from north to south grabbing the most fertile agricultural lands, isolating Palestinian communities in enclaves, undermining the territorial contiguity.
between the Palestinian villages and cities, controlling the natural resources and encapsulating most of the Israeli colonies.

Israeli authorities justify the project under the pretext of ‘security concerns’ (Israeli Government in: AI 2007). It is worth mentioning that Vladimir Jabotinsky (1923), early Zionist, had already mentioned the need to erect an 'Iron Wall which the native population cannot break through'; metaphorically speaking this would guarantee the colonisation project. If the intention is security, the Segregation Wall should have been erected at the 1949 Armistice Line (Green Line), which separates the Occupied Palestinian Territories from Israel on the borders recognised by the International Community after the occupation of the West Bank in 1967. Therefore, the Israeli attempts to annex any occupied Palestinian territory or change the 1967 borders are illegal according to United Nations resolutions 242 / 478 / 497, and contradict with International Laws, the basis of Madrid conference for Peace and the Road Map designed by the Quartet.

### 2.3.1 Changes on the Segregation Wall Route

The route of the Segregation Wall in the West Bank has been subjected to many changes since the Israeli Government sanctioned its construction in June 2002, the last of which was in September 2007. Each change in Wall route showed an increase in wall's length and the segregated area. At no time, has any of these changes made considered the Palestinian populace interest; despite the hundreds of petitions filed by Palestinians to the Israeli Supreme court to protest the dramatic losses that came along with the construction of the Wall. (see table 3)

**Table 3: Changes on the Segregation Wall Route between June 2004 and April 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of change</th>
<th>Wall length in km</th>
<th>Areas isolated in qkm</th>
<th>% of West Bank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2005</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ARIJ GIS Database 2007

### 2.3.2 The September 2007 Wall Change

In September 2007, the Israeli Ministry of Defence (IDF) published on its web-site an updated version of the Segregation Wall map in the West Bank that shows changes of large magnitude in the Segregation Wall's length and land more areas isolated in the West Bank than which was last published in April 2006. The new map that was published on the IDF's website in September 2007 was actually sanctioned back to April 2007, but was only published on the web-site until now.

The latest revised plan of April 2007 showed that the Wall will be 770 km in length in the West Bank where only 80 km (10.4% of its total length) to be built on the 1949 Armistice Line (Green Line). When completed, it will isolate 713 km$^2$ of the West Bank's total area (12.6 percent of the total area – 5,661 km$^2$) in what has come to be known as the Western Segregation Zone. In addition, the Wall will enclose 107 Israeli colonies (including those in East Jerusalem) accommodating 425,000 settlers (over
80 percent of the total Israeli settlers' population in the West Bank (530,000)) within its path.

The changes accrued in the length of the Segregation Wall and the area increased behind it where distinct in two specific areas, the first of which is at the south-east terrain south of the Jordan Valley area along the nature reserve areas east of Bethlehem and Hebron Districts. The new addition to the route of the Wall starts off the southern part of Hebron Governorate and continues towards the north-eastern; an increase in the wall's section length in that area of 53.5 km, which in turn caused the isolation of an additional area of 153.8 km\(^2\) (153,780 thousand dunam). An additional consequence that occurred as a result to the new section added to the Segregation Wall length there is the fact that Israel stand to deprive the Palestinians of 71 Km\(^2\) (37%) of the 194-km\(^2\) area designated to them in the Dead Sea area. (see map 9)

The second change in the Segregation Wall route took place north-west of Ramallah city. It showed an increase in the Wall length by 13.5 km and an area isolated of 4140 dunam. The new alteration there aimed to include the Israeli colonies of Nili and Na'ale. (see table 4)

Table 4: Status of the Segregation Wall as of February 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wall Status</th>
<th>Wall Length in km</th>
<th>% of the total Wall length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existing Wall</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Construction</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Wall</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OCHA 2010, ARIJ GIS Database 2010

Map 9: Route of the Israeli Segregation Wall
In the Occupied Territories in 2008

Source: UNOCHA July 2008: 2
The dots show Palestinian locations excluded from their surrounding; blue: between barrier and the Green Line; green: surrounded by the barrier on 3 sides, yellow: on 4 sides; in total approximately 170,000 people are affected.

2.3.3 Components of the Segregation Wall in the West Bank

At this time, an explanation of the term “Segregation Wall” should be made obvious as it reflects two shapes of structures used by the Israeli Army to complete their territorial separation mission in the occupied Palestinian territory, it is either concrete partition of 8-12 meters in height or in the other case, and multi-line fences are used. In both cases the term Segregation Wall applies. Based on the characteristic nature of the area where the Segregation Wall runs, the type of the structure is determined as to say in areas where the Segregation Wall cuts through vast agriculture lands, the Segregation Wall is a fence, which is more devastating to the land as it takes an area of 40-100 meters in width to complete; where double layered fences, reinforced with barbed wires, trenches, military roads and footprint detection tracks as well as 4-5 meters high electrified metal fence supplied with security surveillance cameras. In the other case, in areas with sizeable population and/or in-close perimeter with the Green Line, the Segregation Wall consists of 8-12 meters high concrete partitions appendage with military watchtowers lined-up 250 meters apart. (see images 9-10, figure 3)

Images 9 - 10: Components of the Segregation Wall:  
Concrete Panels, Barbed Wires,

Source: ARIJ Photo Archive Database

Figure 4: Cross section of a fence between Israel and the West Bank

Source: ARIJ Photo Archive 2007
2.4 Closure of the Jordan Valley, the "The Eastern Segregation Zone"

The Israeli Army has consolidated its control over the eastern terrain of the West Bank in what is known as the Eastern Segregation Zone (1,555 km² – 27.5 percent of the West Bank) through 28 military-controlled checkpoints along 200 km stretching from north to south. This control has been perceived by the late Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on April 5, 2004 when asked if the eastern fence or wall will still take place, his answer was: "I don't see a fence being built there today, unless we need to. Here and there we will block access points to the Jordan Valley."

After the 1967 War, Israel classified some 925 km² as part of a “closed military area.” Furthermore, Israel has illegally classified an additional 632 km² of the Eastern Segregation Zone as “State Land,” which includes the area of the colonies, the military bases, and some parts of the closed military areas.

The Eastern Segregation zone effectively isolates 45 Palestinian communities with population exceeding 43000 Palestinians who were and still systematically subjected to all kinds of coercion (house demolition, confinement, land confiscation, denial of basic medical services or proper educational facilities, hygienic drinking water, etc) exercised by the Israeli Army to push them to abandon their lands. The Palestinian communities are spread over areas classified A (69 Km²) and B (2 Km²) (according to Oslo agreement of September 1993) and are no where connected to the West Bank except through Israeli controlled areas and via Israeli checkpoints.

The Eastern Segregation Zone also includes 39 Israeli colonies with a combined population of 12550 settlers. Today, the colonies stand on an area of 38 km², about 2.4 percent of the total area of the Eastern Segregation Zone. (see map 10)

Map 10: The Eastern Segregation Zone

Source: ARIJ GIS Database 2007

2.5 Impacts of the Israeli Segregation Wall

Vast areas of Palestinian lands have been confiscated, thousands of trees uprooted, hundreds of dunam of agricultural lands razed, and tens of wells appropriated or demolished. Significant portions of the Palestinian areas cut-off by the Wall have also been declared closed military areas and off-limits to Palestinians. As a result of these drastic affects, thousands of residents inside the West Bank (and Gaza Strip) have been severely affected socially, economically and politically. See the following.

Impact on the Palestinian Agriculture
The Israeli Segregation Wall affects all Palestinian lands near the 1949 Armistice Line (Green Line) and many lands deeper inside the West Bank where the Wall cuts well inside Palestinian territory. By virtue of its winding route, the Wall will confiscate 713 km$^2$ of Palestinian land, much of it is cultivated. At least, 29 Palestinian villages’ boundaries with a total area of 216.7 Km$^2$ will become trapped in enclaves; in addition to that, 138 Palestinian villages’ boundaries are largely affected, some 554.4 Km$^2$ will be lost behind the Segregation Wall.

Impact on Social Life
The Israeli Segregation Wall cuts off many Palestinian communities and villages from neighbouring towns and cities. Individuals living in Segregation Zones or better ethnic ghettos are separated from friends and relatives living in nearby villages. Residents of the ‘ghettos’ are required to obtain permits from Israeli occupation authorities simply to access their homes. Non-residents are restricted from entering these areas. The Israeli Segregation Wall will also affect the educational system in the West Bank; according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistic (PCBS) 26% of Palestinian students will lose their rights and access to proper education and 81% of Palestinians in regions affected by the Wall will be forced to find alternative routes to their schools and universities as a result of the Wall. An additional 350 schools will be isolated outside the Wall. (PENGON 2004)

Impact on Economy
The Wall has had certain, significant and highly destructive impacts on the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the unemployment rate in the Palestinian Territories has climbed to nearly 33%. The World Bank clarifies that some 47% of Palestinians live below the poverty line. Many of the effects are due to harsh Israeli restrictions on trade and humanitarian aid. The Segregation Wall has also had a significant impact, however, mostly in the agricultural sector. Many Palestinians depend on agriculture for their livelihood. In addition to the destruction and appropriation of agricultural land, Palestinian industry has also been greatly damaged as a result of the Segregation Wall. This assault on the Palestinian economy has accelerated an already desperate situation in the OPT. (PENGON 2004)

Impact on Healthcare
The Segregation Wall has significant and harsh health impacts for Palestinians in the OPT. The isolation and disintegration wrought by the Wall, together with the discriminatory Israeli checkpoint and permit systems, pose a systemic challenge to local and national health care services in the OPT. When complete, the Wall will make it much more difficult for Palestinians to reach hospitals and medical centres situated in nearby cities. Access will be controlled by Israeli occupying forces and
based on the Israeli permit system. Moreover, according to the International Press Centre, 30.6% of medical staff is unable to reach the health centres and hospitals in which they work as a result of the Wall (UPMRC 2004).

Conclusion

Since Oslo of September 1993 to Camp David summit of July 2000, Israel has added more than 17,000 new housing units to the body of the colonies; thus constituting a major blow to the peace process and revealing Israel’s intentions toward fulfilling its obligations to carry out any significant withdrawal from the illegal colonies in the occupied territories. Furthermore, Israel confiscated in the following 5 years of the “interim period” more than 36,000 dunam in and around Jerusalem city and even after the Why River Memorandum of 1998 which stressed that neither party takes any measures that might alter the final status negotiations; Israel went and advocated 27 illegal Israeli outposts in that period.

In the year 2007, the number of colonies in the West Bank reached 199 colonies hosting nearly 530,000 Israeli settlers, of which 230,000 settlers lived in 14 colonies in the East Jerusalem area. These colonies concentrate on hilltops overlooking and surrounding Palestinian populated areas, areas that block the merging of Palestinian populated areas while facilitating the merging of colonies, areas that may be easily annexed to Israel in the future, or areas that secure economic resources, militarily advantage or negotiating leverage. Furthermore, Israel is using the Wall to usurp nearly 50% of the West Bank.

The systematic long term planning to judaize the West Bank represented in the establishment of colonies, bypass roads, closed military areas, nature reserves and security zones describe this anticipated situation that Israel is trying to impose on Palestinians a final status situation without negotiations or consideration of unalienable Palestinian rights. Consequently, by creating what they believe to be "irreversible facts on the ground" to dictate their own terms to any potential peace agreement with the Palestinians, Israel aims to put an end to any prospect of a viable Palestinian State over occupied territories of 1967.

The result of such plans is the grouping of Palestinian towns and villages into many separate cantons. Indeed, the Israeli intention is to make the contiguity of any Palestinian state in the future practically unattainable and eventually to reach control and even a new Israeli map over 100% of the once promised Palestine of Balfour Declaration.

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IV

Jad Isaac, Viktoria Waltz

3. Gaza - the ‘Hawaii of Israel’ – a Short Story

Gaza - a nightmare for Israel rather than ‘Hawaii’? Controlling Gaza Region was never easy, over-crowding, poverty, frustration and a highly politicised population made it always difficult. Gaza created the core cell of the liberation movement, the PLO after 1948. From here Yassir Arafat started the armed liberation fight. However Gaza was more to Israel than a left over part of Mandate Palestine, hence a border area to the Sinai, the Suez Canal and an entrance to Africa. Napoleon’s army once sacked the area, also looking for a promised land of historical meaning; they came the other way round, however his campaign was a big failure. Thousands of Palestinians were plundered and killed, but also his soldiers went back defeated. Israel tried the same. In the 90th the colonists had to leave Sinai, in the beginning of the 21st century Israel’s army and colonists had to leave the Gaza colonies. But does that mean that Gaza is liberated and taken off from Israel's secret map?

3.1 Gaza Region under British Mandate until 1948

Gaza Region, before the establishment of the State of Israel was a low populated agricultural and fertile region. At the end of British Mandate there lived nearly 70.000 people, from them around 35.000 living in Gaza City and around 12.000 people in Khan Yunis, beside some 15 small villages, producing vegetables, fruits, especially famous kinds of dates. Strong economic relations existed to the other coastal commercial centres and to Sinai, hence Egypt. At the end of the war 1947-49 Gaza Region’s tranquil life changed dramatically. Since then the ‘Gaza Strip’ became the synonym of the biggest refugee camp on earth. In the ethnic cleansing program of Ben Gurions military consultancy the Negev and the south coast was not excluded. In the last phase of the butchering end of 1948 Umm Rashrash, now Eilat, Gaza ad Rafah were bombed, thousands of Bedouins from the Negev were expelled to Gaza Region as well as the total population of Isdud (today Ashdod) and Majdal (today Ashkelon) by force (Pappe 2006: 193pp). At the end of 1948 the population of the Gaza Region had doubled. Until the 'Sinai War' in 1956, Gaza Region suffered several Israeli military attacks, people were killed, during the war new refugees came up. In 1956 the population figure increased to 400.000.

In 1967, when Israel occupied the Gaza Region and Sinai, nearly half a million people was recorded, half of them living in camps, in poverty and highly depending on UNWRA support. (Efra 1976, Moeller 1981) Today, Gaza Region hosts nearly 1.5 million people, one third of them still living in camps. Main cities (from north to south) are: Beit Hanun, Beit Lahia, Gaza, Deir el Balah, Khan Yunis and Rafah. With 4.054 persons per sqkm Gaza today is one of the most densely populated small regions in the world. (PACE 1999; see map 1)
Map 1 Gaza Region, Density according to Districts 2009

Source: UN OCHA Population Density Map 5.1.2009

3.2 Gaza Region after 1967: Destruction, Dividing and Usurping the Fertile Land

Judaising Gaza Region was a special challenge to the Zionist architects. On a very small area of some 370 sqkm nearly a million people in high density, highly political and under very inhuman living conditions were not at all easy to control and suppress. The social and economic situation of a big majority of the inhabitants presented enough explosive political material and problems to the occupying power. Hence, Gaza Region was suffering the highest pressure and military threat since the occupation.

Since 1967 Gaza Region was under strict military rule, Sharon as the military governor until the 70th first of all became famous for his rude ‘cleansing’ of the refugee camps, bulldozing living quarters and implementing a new kind of ‘Hausmanization’, pulling down houses for new wide streets, ready for the tanks, controlling the areas day and night.

Besides this brutal policy colonising followed as usual strategic aims, here the dividing into four sectors by excluding military roads between Rafah, Khan Yunis, Deir el Balah and Gaza city (see map 2). These roads were leading to coastal colonies, blocking part of the sea side for the Palestinians. In addition the borders in the north to Israel (Erez) and the south to Egypt (Rafiah) came under control and Erez converted to a commercial area, not only border control. The most fertile southern coast was the main object of colonisation: 11 agricultural colonies were established, the Gush Katif block with huge date palm plantations came under Jewish control. One of the Gush Katif colonies, ‘Gadid’ had the status of an Israeli city. (Benvenisti 1988: 109pp) The colony of Netzarim, close to the sea side, served as a
swimming area for the Jewish colonists and Jewish Israelis. The Gush Katif Bloc usurped nearly 50sqkm with a length of about 10 km from the Palestinians. This beautiful and fertile area 'promoted' the WZO to Jewish American immigrants in the following outrageous way:

“The sandy, palm-tree beaches of Gaza are the “Hawaii” of Israel. The ten communities stretching from the Erez Checkpoint in the north to Rafiah in the south share the infinitely-stretching view of the Mediterranean. This area, despite its tropical climate and physical beauty, was never heavily populated, and this is what the Gaza Regional Council would like to see changes in the near future...” (IAD WZO 1984: 19).

Map 2 Gaza Region Colonies 2000

![Map of Gaza Region Colonies 2000](source: Arij 2000)

3.3 Colonization after Oslo

Before the negotiations started there was no ‘border’ in the meaning of closed areas; mobility between the Gaza Region, the West Bank and Jerusalem was not limited, economic and social relations existed. After Oslo this changed dramatically, Gaza Region was the first area to be handed over to the Palestinian Authority in May 1994.

The agreements between the Israeli and the Palestinians gave Israeli the right to remain in special areas within the Gaza Region with special access and entrance on the one hand and also the control over the sea side on the other hand where Palestinian fisherman were restricted to fish in a very small distance of ca. 60 km from the coast only. (see maps 3,4)
When Arafat established the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, the Israeli government closed the Gaza Region. Permits from Israeli military were necessary to leave and to come. There were three ‘entrances’, one, ‘Beit Hanun’ or ‘Erez’ at the northern border, for those coming from the West Bank or Israel, another, ‘Rafiah or Rafah’, the entrance from Egypt for Palestinians and foreigners, and a third one, ‘Ash Shuja’ia or ‘Nahal Oz’, only for the Israeli ‘settlers’. Furthermore, with Oslo the Gaza Region became more and more strictly divided into different zones, on the one hand the Palestinian built up areas, and on the other hand pure Israeli zones, the ‘Yellow Zones’, mostly established on “State Land”, what was Palestinian property, like the
fertile palm tree forests at the coast. These Yellow Zones and the access to them were restricted areas until the withdrawal, comprising in a wide range the Israeli colonies, prohibited to Palestinians. The Jews moved between Israel and the colonies only with military patrols. The northern restricted area, Erez, became a special commercial zone along the border and annexed to Israel.

In the Gaza Strip, most Palestinian agricultural lands were located adjacent to colonies or colonies' bypass roads network and were under threat of confiscation by the Israeli Occupation forces. The IOF often alluded to a variety of justifications mainly for security reasons, seeking the protection of colonists in the Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip like in the West Bank.

The Intifada of 2000 was also an answer to the fragmentation of the Gaza Region and the frustration about a peace process that never brought more sovereignty or independence. (see map 5)

Map 5 Fragmentation of Gaza Region into 3 cantons until 2000

The City of Gaza became the official residence of President Arafat, followed by ministries and the parliament.

However, the same in the West Bank, usurpation did not halt after Oslo, colony activities accelerated. In 2003 some 6,000 Jewish colonists were living in 19 colonies and a built up area of about 26.66 km². Analysis of land use classification in the colonies of the Gaza Region revealed a pattern of colony expansion. These land use classifications included new outposts as well as residential, agricultural, industrial and security areas. The total area controlled by Israel in the Gaza Region until the withdrawal in 2004, was 165.04 km², which is 45.7% of Gaza Region's total area. The land under Israeli control included Israeli colony areas, security zones, military installations, buffer zones and the yellow areas. Along the border to Egypt Israel imposed another 100 m buffer zone, separating again south from north Rafah, the ‘Egyptian’ Rafah to the ‘Palestinian’ Rafah. (Arij 2003)
3.4 The ‘Disengagement’ - The Geopolitical Situation in the Gaza Strip

Contrary to what was promoted systematically in the media, the Israelis did not disengage from Gaza and they never had the intention to do so as it was constantly palpable by their tangible actions; the security belt zone along the Gaza eastern borders and its analogous north of Gaza.

One month following the evacuation of Israeli colonies from the Gaza Strip (August 2005), Israel announced that it has completed the construction of an underwater barrier that starts off at the Gaza’ shore north-west of the strip towards the sea. The sea barrier extends for 950 meters; the first 150 meters are visible to the eyes, as for the remaining 800 meters, it went 1.8-meters-deep below the surface with floating fence. 12

Later in December 2005, the former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered the Israeli Army to establish a no-go zone for Palestinians along Gaza’s northern border, where Palestinians are not allowed to access without Israeli authorisation. The no-go zone was established across 6 kilometres long stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to Erez Border crossing and a width ranging from 2-3 km. The security zone also included the locations of three of the 21 evacuated Israeli colonies, Dugit, Nisanit and Eli Sinai. By the end of 2005, the Israeli Army secured a security buffer zone around Gaza’s northern and eastern borders of 61 square kilometres; some 17% of Gaza area came under full Israeli Control.

On February 14, 2007, the Israeli government declared the four Gaza Terminals (Karni, Erez, Sufa and Kerm Shalom) linking the Gaza Strip with the West Bank and Israel as International terminals and that the Gaza Strip is a ‘Foreign land’. This Israeli announcement may be interpreted as the Israeli approach to consolidate its occupation over the 17% (61 Km²) of Gaza it still occupies. The Israeli Interior Minister Ofer Pens officially signed the order on February 14, 2007, alleging that the Gaza Strip is no longer under the Israeli occupation since the unilateral Israeli withdrawal (redeployment) in August 2005.

The Israeli decision to turn four of Gaza terminals to international border points serves Israel's scheme to politically detach its responsibility from the Gaza Strip after 40 years of occupation; even though Israel has not totally relinquished its occupation in Gaza as with 17% of the land still under occupation. Upon the new Israeli considerations, citizens of Israel and the foreign nationals will need a passport to enter Gaza from Israel using the four terminals without any obstacles. On the other hand, this is not a vice-versa status where Palestinians may enter Israel using their passports, instead, they have to acquire a special Israeli permits from the 'Israeli Civil Administration', were they most likely will not receive. In other words, the Palestinians will need to get a permit from the Israeli authorities in order to move between the West Bank and Gaza since they will be crossing Israeli controlled territory. 13

Later on June 28, 2007, Israeli sources revealed that the Israeli Army would mark the security zone to 1.5 km width on the Palestinian side along Gaza’s northern and eastern borders. The security zone stretches from the Mediterranean Sea shores at Gaza’s north-west to Rafah crossing border at the south-east of Gaza. The new

adjustment to the security buffer zone would consume yet an additional 26 km² along
the northern and eastern border of the Gaza Strip where the entire security buffer
zone area is to be cleared of any Palestinian structure. Accordingly, the newly
defined security buffer zone, occupy an area of 87 Km² (24%) of the Gaza Strip area.
(see table 1, map 6)

Table 1 Timeline of Israeli Security Buffer Zone around Gaza's Border

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status in years</th>
<th>Buffer Zone width along 58 km</th>
<th>Area in qkm</th>
<th>Percentage of total Gaza's Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994*</td>
<td>500 m</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005** (Sept.-Dec)</td>
<td>800-1300</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007** (June)</td>
<td>1500 m</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Agreed upon in Oslo 1994  ** Unilaterally carried out by Israel

Source: ARIJ GIS Database 2007

Map 6 Israeli 'Security Buffer Zone' around Gaza's Border

The 'security buffer zone' along Gaza’s northern and eastern border came as a part-
clause of the 1994 Oslo Accord, under which, the Israelis were to maintain a 0.5 Km
wide security zone across the northern and eastern Gaza’s 58 Km border. This 0.5
km security zone occupied 29 Km² (8%) of Gaza’s area to remain under the Israeli
Army’s control. When the Palestinian second Intifada broke out in September 2000,
the Israeli Army expanded the area of the security zone unilaterally by few hundred
meters (width ranges between 0.8 and 1.30 km). The area became off limit to
Palestinians to build, cultivate, or just be there. By the time the Israeli Army
completed their redeployment in Gaza by the end of 2005, the security buffer zone
area stood at 61 Km² (17%) of the Gaza Strip area under the Israeli Army
occupation.
3.4.1 Israel still in-control - occupying Gaza

On the ground, Israel is still occupying the Gaza Strip, especially which it remains in control of:

- **Gaza’s seashores and territorial water**: the Israeli Army keeps part of its navy fleet on guard along the Gaza shores around the clock and around the year. Palestinian fish boats are almost entirely denied access to the open sea except when they receive a permit from the Israeli authority of concern. Some 3000 Palestinians in the fishing business has their livelihood threaten because of the Israeli practices, many of whom were fired on, on different occasions. In addition to that, Israel still denies Palestinians their right to construct or establish their own seaport under the pretext of security.

- **Gaza’s lands**: one of the reasons that the Israeli questionable withdrawal from the Gaza Strip is being identified as redeployment is that Israel maintain what they call a security belt around Gaza's eastern border with Israel, some 87 Km2 or 24% of Gaza's district remains under Israeli occupation, where every access in and out of Gaza is controlled by the Israeli Army (IOF Israeli Occupation Army).

- **Gaza’s Airspace**: even though at one time the Palestinians had their own airport, the Israelis went on, destroyed the runways of the airport, and restricted all flying activities. Even more than that, Israel still refuse the Palestinian demand to reconstruct the ruined airport runways or that the Palestinian use it at any time, also under the pretext of security.

- **Gaza’s Population Records**: Israel still regard the population senses of Gaza its responsibility, as it still pursue any population classification and status and who lives in the Strip and who is not.

- **Gaza’s commercial crossings**: like the people, Israel still in control of every and/ or any commodities that enters and leaves Gaza in addition to controlling the customs and taxes.

Furthermore, the construction of the surrounding ‘Wall’ – before the destruction December 2008/January 2009 - had already demolished of more than 900 houses, 13.000 people were left homeless. As big part of the agricultural land is located adjacent to the western part, hence close to the Israeli border, more than 20% of the agricultural land has been already razed, in order to cleanse areas for the construction of the Wall and for the "buffer zones". The Egyptian border area has a width of 100 meters and was previously constructed by the Israeli forces after expropriation and destruction of land and private properties such as uprooting of 750 thousand of fruitful trees mainly citrus and banana and the destruction of a number of plastic green houses which resulted in complete destruction of the agriculture sector in the Gaza Strip. This Segregation wall will completely separate the northern parts of Rafah city from its southern ones, along the Israeli controlled border; thus dividing Rafah city again into two parts (the Palestinian Rafah and the Egyptian Rafah) (Arij 2005) (see map 7).
In military operations carried out by the IOF October 2006 and under the pretext of searching for and shutting down what Israelis refer to as "arms-smuggling tunnels", claiming the existence of 13 secret tunnels along the Egyptian border area, the IOF incurred into the Palestinian areas of Rafah city from several directions, mainly through Rafah crossing point and Moraj colony to reach Tal Al Sultan and Zourob areas in the west. The IOF based in Tal Zourob military base shelled with tanks Palestinian houses in both areas. The house of Shede Zourob for example was completely burnt due to the shelling and all his properties were destroyed. In addition, the IOF (Israeli Occupation Forces) razed 160 dunam, of which 100 dunam of green houses planted with vegetables, citrus, Palm and fruit trees and destroyed a water well and a number of irrigation networks and agricultural pools in the area.

The IOF then spread through different parts of Rafah city escalating their violations against Palestinians living in the neighbourhoods of Al Barazil, Tal Al Sultan and Yebna refugee camp. Twenty Palestinian homes were hit by tank shells and heavy machine gunfire on the first day of the military operation and were completely destroyed. About 50 families who lived in the houses were left homeless. In addition, the Israeli army destroyed the infrastructure of the city including sewage pipes, electric and telephone lines, and razed vast areas of agricultural lands estimated at 400 dunam. (Arij 2003)

These were again reasons for the uprising and especially the frustration of the people of the Gaza region and first of all of Rafah area.

When Israel started its military offensive at 28.12.2008 the Gaza population suffered already since 18 months from a strict blockade imposed on them. The blockade comprised restrictions on goods imported to Gaza, closure of border crossing between the different cities in the Gaza Strip for people, goods and services, sometimes for days, including cuts in the provision of fuel and electricity. Goldstone reported to the UN Human Rights Council (Goldstone 2009): “The economy, employment opportunities and family livelihoods were already severely affected by the blockade when the Israeli offensive began. Insufficient supply of fuel for electricity generation had a negative impact on industrial activity, on the operation of hospitals, on water supply to households and on sewage treatment. Import restrictions and the ban on all exports from Gaza affected the industrial sector and agricultural production. Unemployment levels and the percentage of the population living in poverty and deep poverty were rising.” (§ 65)

Furthermore, Israel’s military operation destroyed a substantial part of the industrial infrastructure, food production, water installations such as the Namar wells, sewage treatment and housing. Israeli forces also carried out a strike against a wall of one of the raw sewage lagoons of the Gaza Waste Water Treatment Plant, which caused the outflow of more than 200,000 cubic meters of raw sewage into neighboring farmland (§§ 50/52). Already before the military operations, 80 percent of the water supplied in Gaza did not meet the WHO’s standards for drinking water. The discharge of untreated or partially treated waste water into the sea was a further health hazard worsened by the military operations. (§ 67) Food insecurity followed as a result of razing farmland and destruction of greenhouses. (see map 8)

Map 8 Damaged Agricultural Land after Israeli Military Operation 2008/09

In addition UNDP reported 3,354 houses completely destroyed and 11,112 houses partially damaged displacing thousands of people, mainly civilians, particularly
women and children. Moreover, more than 1,000 people, again nearly half of them children and women, lost their life. Statistics about Palestinians who lost their life during the military operations vary. Based on extensive field research, non-governmental organizations place the overall number of persons killed between 1,387 and 1,417. The Gaza authorities report 1,444 fatal casualties. The Government of Israel provides a figure of 1,166. (§ 18)

This was due to a massive use of bombing in urban areas and wide spreading life ammunitions and of certain weapons such as white phosphorous and flechette missiles. The Goldstone mission was not in a position to state with certainty that so-called dense inert metal explosive (DIME) munitions were used by the Israeli armed forces, however reports from Palestinian and foreign doctors who operated in Gaza during the military operations proved a high percentage of patients with injuries compatible with their impact. (§§ 48/49)

The Goldstone report claimed that “... that Israel continues to be duty-bound under the Fourth Geneva Convention and to the full extent of the means available to it to ensure the supply of foodstuff, medical and hospital items and others to meet the humanitarian needs of the population of the Gaza Strip without qualification (§.28). The Mission concluded: “The conditions of life in Gaza, resulting from deliberate actions of the Israeli forces and the declared policies of the Government of Israel – as they were presented by its authorized and legitimate representatives - with regard to the Gaza Strip before, during and after the military operation, cumulatively indicate the intention to inflict collective punishment on the people of the Gaza Strip in violation of international humanitarian law”. (§ 74)

Image 1 The only supply: more than 5.000 tunnels

Source: The Guardians 2009

Conclusion

It is obvious, that Israel’s last attack on Gaza is not the end. The ‘disengagement’ was an interim step and one has to realise, that the ‘settlers’ of Gaza were only transferred to the West Bank in order to fill in the Jerusalem illegal colonies.

Moreover, Gaza is not at all a 'liberated' area from occupation. Still parts of the region in north, west and south Gaza the ‘buffer zones’ are occupied and grabbed land. The Israeli military is entering the region from where and when ever wanting: by planes,
helicopters, bulldozers, tanks and even with missiles from the sea side. The seldom rackets from the Palestinian side are always a reason for military attacks. Illegal killing of supposedly terrorists with civil 'casualties' is part of a still ongoing threat, pressure.

We have to conclude that the question of Gaza Region is not finished. Will it be part of a future 'Palestinian State'? Will the total usurpation of 'Israel’s Hawaii' only be postponed?

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4. Transportation and Mobility in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

The current Arab-Israeli conflict is more than a century old; namely since the start of the establishment of Jewish colonies in Palestine in the late 19th century. Some claim that the conflict goes back millenniums ago; however, historical evidence indicates no significant conflict between Arab or Muslims and Jews in Palestine ever occurred before the beginning of the 20th century.

UN resolutions, diplomatic missions, wars, and ethno-national violence were not able to figure-out this high profile conflict; albeit, it is a longstanding necessity where no one could disagree or argue on the importance to solve this conflict for the sake of Middle East and international peace and security. Walls of segregation have fallen throughout history; bridges, mobility, and coexistence are the key to harmony and peace. However, experiences from post-conflicts areas have proven that it is more problematic and challenging when dealing with the associated infrastructure of segregation artefacts, namely roads. This section will elaborate on this doctrine of *de facto* immobility and further investigate the existing mal-distribution of services, as well as spatial segregation along nationality.

The West Bank and Gaza Strip were occupied in 1967 by Israel. The West Bank has a mass area of 5,661 square kilometres (about twice the area of Luxembourg), about 130 km in the north-south direction and 30 to 60 km in east-west direction. Its shortest width is from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea. The Gaza Strip has an area of 362 square kilometres (about the area of the island of Malta), 40 km along the Mediterranean Sea and 6 to 12 km in the east-west direction.

Jerusalem is a divided city as a consequence of the 1948 war. The old city (East Jerusalem) remained under Arab control until 1967. Israel occupied the old city of Jerusalem in 1967 and annexed it in 1968. Just prior to the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994, Israel restricted travel for the Palestinians in the West Bank to Jerusalem. Jerusalem is a major transportation link between the north and south portions of the West Bank, and certainly holy to Christians, Muslims and Jews.

Between 1948 and 1967, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem was under the Jordanian authority, while the Gaza Strip was under the Egyptian authority. There were no transportation links connecting the 40 km Israeli territories separating the West Bank from the Gaza Strip. After the 1967 war the transportation links between the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT; the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem) and the neighbouring Arab countries were virtually cut off, except for Israel authorised passage to Jordan and after 1979 to Egypt. On the other hand, travel between the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel were permitted after the 1967 war. However, there were on and off restrictions of travel from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The restrictions of travel by the Israelis after the establishment of the PNA have been most severe, especially after Al-Aqsa uprising in the fall of 2000.
4.1 The Palestinian Transportation Network

Currently there is no railroad network, a functional airport or a seaport in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Before the 1948 war there was a railroad passing through the Gaza Strip connecting to Egypt in the south, and to Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey in the north, in addition to minor lines connecting some West Bank towns such as Jaffa, Jerusalem, Nablus and Tulkarem (see map 1, image 1). Before the 1967 war, there were two functioning airports one north of Jerusalem, Qalendiya air port, and the other one, basically an affiliated UN’s runway strip, in the Gaza Strip, as well as a small seaport in Gaza. Therefore, transportation’s facilities were not only neglected in the past 40+ years in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but even were underdeveloped. This in contrast to the region and the world; where transportation had substantial advancements.

The only transportation mode currently in operation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is highways/streets, which also is subject to neglect and poor maintenance. According to the World Bank (2004) about half of the OPT paved roads in 2003 were classified by the World Bank to be in poor condition and below acceptable service levels, up by 40 percent from its 1993. The rest of the network was a combination of fair (25 %) and good (25 %). This declination of local roads quality is due to the Israeli physical attacks and breakings on the Palestinian infrastructure including the road network. Paradoxically, there is a high standard highway network connecting the Israeli colonies together and with the activity centres within Israel. These highways were planned and designed to serve the colonies and bypass the Palestinian communities, thus many of such highways were more of barriers between Arab towns and villages, rather than a facilitator between them.

The public transit conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip also suffered devastating setbacks since the 1967 Israeli occupation. A relatively regulated and efficient bus transport was in operation in 1967 with about 700 buses. Currently very
limited numbers of buses are in operation and shared-taxis and jitneys (private vehicles used for hire) are providing a poor service. The closure of roads and use of unpaved and poor alignment roads are the main reasons for use of such vehicles for public transit.

4.1.1 Palestinian Road Network

The current Palestinian road network in the West Bank runs at 11,889 km in length, connecting 667 residential communities spread on 5661 km² patch of land. More than 90 % of this network is classified as main, main urban and secondary roads, 53.2 % of which are suited in Areas A and B that fall under the PNA jurisdiction regarding transport sector management. In the Gaza Strip, the road network is 3,219 Km in length, where 77 % of the road network are unimproved dirt tracks; some are merely graded and surfaced with gravel or sand. 12 % of the road network of Gaza Strip e.g. is off-limits for Palestinians as they are within the Israeli Security Zone (ARIJ GIS-Database 2007) (see map 2).

Map 2 Road network in Gaza Strip

Source: ARIJ GIS-Database 2007

The West Bank and Gaza Strip main road network connecting major cities and providing access to nearby village's runs at 1,738 km and 185 km in total length, respectively. This shows an increase of about 38.5 % compared to the year 1993 in the West Bank and an increase of 76 % through the period (1996-2001) in Gaza Strip. What makes significance in the analysis of the West Bank aerial photo of the year 2004, is the high increase in the secondary roads length that calculated 9,076 km; representing an increase of 3.6 times of that in the year 1993. Also the data show that about 6.8% of the total road network length in the West Bank is for bypass roads (see figure 1).
Most of the West Bank current man roads are 10-12 m in width; they were constructed during the British mandate and the Jordanian administration periods (1917-1967), to link Palestinian urban areas of the West Bank. Secondary roads are typically 4-8 m in width; they are densely constructed in the Palestinians urban peripheries. Most of the secondary roads are in a state of despair, as they host more than their designed operational capacities. Unfortunately, the volatile political situation in the West Bank reflected its negative impacts on every facet of the Palestinian life. Since the out break of the second Intifada, Palestinian cities were besieged and access inter-cities were denied by the Israeli army. For that, a considerable number of secondary roads became primary travel arterials.

4.2 Current Mobility Conditions in the Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip has borders from the north and east with Israel and it has a Mediterranean coast of about 40 km from the west, which is controlled and blocked by Israel. Egypt borders the Gaza Strip from the south-west with a 12 km long border. Before the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005; Israeli colonies and military outposts controlled about 37% of the Gaza Strip. The roads connecting Israeli colonies in the Gaza Strip with Israel has split the Gaza Strip into four areas. Currently (after the Israeli redeployment from the Gaza Strip in 2005), the mobility within Gaza Strip is unimpeded. However, the trip by car from the seacoast in the west to Israel border in the east (from most parts of the Gaza Strip seacoast) is only about six kilometres or under free flow traffic conditions, the trip is only six minutes. The trip from the north border to the south border of the Gaza Strip, which has the longest distance, is about 45 minutes in case of free flow traffic conditions. There are no railroads in the Gaza Strip, and public transit is mostly taxis and shared taxis with no scheduled public transit service. The border between the Gaza Strip and Israel is virtually closed. Free travel from the Gaza Strip to Israel or via Israel to the West Bank or Jordan and vice-versa is not allowed by Israel. However, very limited permits have been given during 2001-2006 for medical or special conditions, which ranged only in the tens or may be in the hundreds per year.
Goods movements to and from the Gaza Strip is completely controlled by Israel. Closure of all goods movements in and out of Gaza Strip is common for extended duration. Thus shortages of many goods in the Gaza Strip is an often occurrence. In addition, export of agricultural products from Gaza Strip is often delayed while hauling in trucks; thus the products are wasted. All travel from and to Gaza Strip through the Mediterranean Sea is barred and the Israeli navy blockades the Gaza Strip coast. Only fishing boats from Gaza are allowed to fish at a maximum distance of three miles from the coast, but often fishing boats are not allowed to leave shore at all. No goods movement from Egypt to and from the Gaza Strip is allowed. Goods between Gaza Strip and Egypt are only allowed via Israel. Since the military attack in December 2008/January 2009 the blockade imposed on Gaza since 2007 continued and all the 7 crossing points are generally closed (see map 3).

Map 3 Gaza Strip and the West Bank border crossings

![Map of Gaza Strip and the West Bank border crossings](image)

Source: ARIJ GIS-Database, 2010

The 12 kilometre border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip is highly fortified and sealed, which was constructed during Israel occupation of the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, Palestinian houses and portions of refugee camps adjacent to the border with Egypt have been demolished in order to have a so called “security strip” with a width of about 500 meters along the length of the border between Gaza Strip and Egypt. Concurrently, Israel has created a *de facto* “security zone” along the eastern borders of the Gaza Strip with Israeli that extends at 25% of the total mass area of the Strip. Before the blockade there was only one border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, the Rafah crossing, which was monitored by EU representatives stationed on the crossing based on the principles of the Agreement on Movement and Access signed in 2005. It was also monitored by close circuit televisions and through border control databases at real time processing by Israel.
No goods were allowed through this crossing; goods from/to Egypt must pass via Israel, more specifically through Karm Abu-Salem crossing point. Also, only Palestinians from the Gaza Strip are allowed to use this border crossing. All visitors to Gaza Strip regardless of nationality can only enter (or exit) the Gaza Strip through Israel border crossings with the Gaza Strip. Even though, the Rafah border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt is the only access for the Palestinians from/to the Gaza Strip to/from the world; it often has been closed by order of the Israeli Army and is still since the attack in 2008/09. During the year of 2006, the Rafah border crossing has been closed often and some times for weeks; leaving the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip without access to worldwide. Thus, the Gaza Strip became a large prison, with most people can not drive more than half an hour in any direction by car. Images 2 and 3 present pictures of Palestinians stranded at the Egyptian side of the Rafah crossing in August 2006.

Image 2
Return to Gaza Strip (shuttle buses) after weeks stranded at Rafah

Image 3
Passport Control at Rafah

Source: Awadallah 2006

An airport was built in the extreme south-east area of the Gaza Strip and it became operational at the end of 1998. Regular air carrier flights were scheduled from this airport (1st named Gaza Airport, and later Arafat Airport) for about three years (1998 - 2000). The airport flights and passengers departing/arriving needed Israeli permission. Travellers on the scheduled flights had to go to the Rafah border crossing in a bus before entering the aeroplane or when leaving an aeroplane after arriving. The Rafah border control is about one kilometre from the airport and it was then under full Israeli control. At the Rafah border control the passengers and their luggage were processed by Israeli border control personnel. The airport was closed since the end of year 2000 until now, 2010. The Palestinian Airlines owned and operated three aircrafts, two Fokkers 50, and one Boeing 727, which were operated on few routes and mostly flights were either to Cairo or Amman.

Since the blockade people organised transportation through hundreds of tunnels – the only way to enter needed goods, medical equipment, nutrition, spare parts and others.

4.3 Current Mobility Conditions in the West Bank

Unlike the Gaza Strip, the West Bank is still occupied by hundreds of Israeli colonies throughout the West Bank. Even though the area of the West Bank is more than 15
times the size of the Gaza Strip (the West Bank is about one fourth the area of Israel); the mobility is currently worst than that of the Gaza Strip. The West Bank unlike Gaza Strip has mostly mountainous terrain. It is surrounded by all sides by Israel, except from the east; it borders the Jordan River. The Jordan River is in a land depression called ‘al-ghor’ and pours into the Dead Sea, which is the lowest land point on earth. Thus steep terrain and roadways exist throughout the West Bank. There are no railroads in the West Bank and public transit is very poor. Very few scheduled bus service exit on limited routes in the West Bank, but most of the public transit is handled via shared taxis and jitneys (private vehicles used for hire).

Travel within the West Bank by motor vehicles may have the longest trip of about three hours for travel of about 180 km of mountainous winding roads. Also, since the occupation of West Bank by Israel in 1967, the borders with Israel were mostly open and uncontrolled. The long border is located in inhabited areas and mountainous areas, which is difficult to establish or enforce. In addition, East Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank that was occupied in 1967, illegally annexed and unified with West Jerusalem in 1968; thus there were no restrictions on travel for Palestinians from Jerusalem or the West Bank to West Jerusalem and any part of Israel. The building of the Segregation Wall since 2002 (almost 57% of the 774 km long Wall is completed, whereas a further 7% is under construction and 36 is planned) has barred Palestinian from the West Bank to travel to Israel or even to East Jerusalem. The Wall does not only separate the West Bank from Israel, but also separates the West Bank into many enclaves, in many cases separating Palestinians from Palestinians (see previous section). The Israeli imposed Separation Plan expropriates about 40% of the total West Bank area (i.e. 5,661 km²). Almost one-third of expropriated area is located between the Wall and Green Line “Western Segregation Zone.” The other two-thirds of the confiscated area are the de facto created “Eastern Segregation Zone” on the eastern side of the West Bank, which was created without walls or fences, but through its control of access points along the Jordan Valley and the shores of the Dead Sea (ARIJ GIS-Database, 2009). In addition, to settler roads (by-pass roads, POICA 2008), hundreds of checkpoint and roads closure exist in the West Bank. Roads are closed with embankments, concrete blocks, iron gates or trenched road sections (see map 4). Pictures for an example of the closed section of Ramallah - Birzeit road are shown images 4-7 in October 2002.

Image 4 Wall Splitting the Palestinian Community of Abu Dees, East of the Old City of Jerusalem

Source: UN OCHA June 2009
Map 4: West Bank closure: colonies, barriers and road blocks 2009

Source: UN OCHA 2005

Image 5 Birzeit – Ramallah Road Trenched and Closed with Embankment

Source: Awadallah 2002
The mobility restrictions in the West Bank are beyond comprehension and unparalleled anywhere in the world today, even though they were more severe since 2002. Any Palestinian in the West Bank can not travel an hour by a motor vehicle without a check point or road closure. It is not possible to reach many areas in the West Bank with any vehicle. A person travelling from Bethlehem south of Jerusalem to Nablus north of Jerusalem, a distance of about 70 km, can not use his/her private vehicle. Also, such a trip is only possible via shared taxis, taxis, or jitneys and at least three to four different separate trips using different vehicles is needed, and is also costly. There are many enclosed area in the West Bank, which have only one or two entrances/exits including major cities such as Nablus. Some enclaves are so limited in area that a person can not travel more than one kilometre in any direction. Furthermore, some enclaves have only one entrance/exit and it is opened and closed via a gate. This gate is opened few hours in the morning and afternoon to allow the school children to go to their schools and every one living in such areas must accustom his/her work and errands to coincide with the schedule of the opening and closing of the gate. Thus, the mobility within the West Bank for the Palestinians is a nightmare and it is beyond facilitating mobility for Israeli colonists or security reasons. The by-pass road system for Israeli mobility is the other system of restriction already shown in the previous section (see figure 2).

Figure 2 Total Length of Bypass Roads in the West Bank

Source: ARIJ GIS-Database, 2009

An Israeli plan of 2004 shows the absurdity of a small country divided in many pieces through Israeli bypass roads, under and over passes for Palestinians and a dense Israeli highway network (see map 5). This system will easy even more the mobility in east-west direction, between Israel and the Jordan Valley, linking the colonies with
Israel, and an integral part of Israeli transportation network from Israel to the West Bank. While the main direction historically and still for the Palestinian goes south-north - the Israeli network breaks this flow and marginalise it if not destroy it. The closure of Jerusalem in addition forces Palestinians to dangerous detours through 'Wadi Nar' and check points all around.

**Map 5 Israel’s Road Plan 2004**

Source: Stop the Wall 2005

The West Bank has an airport north of Jerusalem but it has been closed since 1967. The Palestinians in the West Bank can only travel outside the West Bank to anywhere in the world through the Jordan River Crossing to Jordan. This crossing point is controlled by the Israeli army and it is subjected to the Israeli’s customs, and it is also closed on Israeli holidays. The only crossing point for the Palestinians in the West Bank has limited capacity, especially with the limited times of operation; thus overcrowding on the crossing point is a common phenomenon, especially in the summer months. In past years, some Palestinian travellers leaving or returning to the West Bank had to sleep on the Jordan River crossing point for two or more days.

**4.4 Transportation Sector Impacts on Environment**

The existing transport sector causes severe negative impacts on the Palestinian environment. Transport sector is the responsible for increased noise levels, habitat loss, water pollution, and waste generation. Natural resource depletion and negative direct, indirect and cumulative effects are other consequences of transport related activities that may influence people's health and safety.

Road transport is responsible for the majority of negative impacts of the transport sector on the Palestinian environment. Road transport accounts for more than 60% of the overall energy consumed in the Palestinian Territory (El Ghussein 2004), which makes the transport sector a target field for future energy and environmental...
research. However, Palestinian society has indicated a willingness to accept some risks and some changes of the natural environment to gain the benefits of a more efficient and sustainable use of transport systems.

It is estimated that transport infrastructure (mainly roads) consumes 7.42 percent of the built up area, and about 3.73 percent of the total land of the West Bank. Increased land use for transport infrastructure increases pressures on environment that may lead to irreversible impacts on land and its resources. An unfortunate fact, that the suitable land for building transport infrastructure is the suitable one for agriculture as they are stable and flat.

In addition, the current road network reveals some serious alarming facts concerning the impacts on the local environment. According to spot analysis of the available aerial photos at ARIJ database for the year 2004, there is 2.10 kilometers of roads per square kilometers in the West Bank, as compared to 0.80 kilometers per square kilometers in Israel at the same year. The West Bank has 5.17 kilometers of roads per thousand of inhabitants as compared to 2.55 kilometers of roads inside Israel. These trends show the size of pressure being exerted on the local Palestinian environment, noting that though the figures indicate better influences for the Palestinians in favour of the Israelis road network they not really are, as the population density in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is seven times greater than that of the Israelis. Where, the West Bank has on average a population density of approximately 432 capita/km² of the total area, while in the Gaza Strip the population density is equal to 3,981 capita/km² of the total area, in Israel the average population density is equals 300 capita /km². Moreover, the urban areas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip suffer from higher population densities: there is a density of 6,842 capita /km² in the total built-up area in the West Bank (ARIJ Database, 2002), while the population density is 7,485 capita /km² in the total built-up area in the Gaza Strip (ARIJ Database, 2004).

Other types of transport sector pressure on the Palestinian environment include the negative effects on biodiversity, landscape and cultural heritage. But unfortunately, there is not enough data collected at the local level that traces these effects and document them.

Conclusion

Segregation based on race, ethnic origin and also religion surely does not ensure security and peace. However, when segregation is coupled with severe travel restrictions on a particular people and their goods this definitely breeds mistrust, alienation, and more instability and hostility. It is definitely a violation of human rights and international conventions. Walls of concrete, hate, and/or discrimination can not protect nor be a solution. Mobility needs roads and bridges, which inevitably pave the roads of peace.

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5. Water – Another Story of Exploitation of Palestinian and Arab Resources

The Zionist slogan of a state ‘from the river of Egypt to Euphrates’ (Herzl, 9.10.1888) as quoted in sector II, must also be understood as a demand for water resources from Egypt to Iraq. From the beginning of the project, Zionist planners realised the importance of water to maintain the viability of the Jewish state (Sabbagh 1994:505). Already at the end of the 19th century the Zionist Congress mentioned the importance of water while making the first geographic plans for the Jewish State. Many scientists and politicians assert that the next ‘casus belli’ in the Middle East will be control and use of water (Amery 1993). If so, the Middle East region carries the potential for conflicts between all the riparian states of the Jordan, Nile, Euphrates and adjacent rivers. The several occupations of south Lebanon can be understood as part of corresponding Israeli strategies. The first part of this section is mainly based on Amery (1993), Eickelpasch (2001), Moss (2006), Dolatyar/Gray (2000).

5.1 Israel’s Usurpation Interest on the Arab Water Resources until Today

Besides the coastal aquifer, the main regional water resources are: the Litani River of Lebanon, the Jordan River, the Lake Taberiya, the Yarmouk River of Jordan, the Golan Heights of Syria and the northern, eastern and western aquifer of the West Bank. (see map 1, map 2)

"Almost half of the water currently used in Israel is captured, diverted or pre-empted from its neighbours." (Stauffer 1996:11) Israel understands water as "Israel's vulnerable and fragile source of life" (Amery 1993: 232) showing no respect for the needs, demands and plans of others. Control of the Litani River has long-since been a vision of Zionist planners for establishing a Jewish state "from Sinai to ancient Babylon" (Stauffer 1996: 11). The Zionists first proposed diverting the Litani southward in 1905, because they assumed "the waters of the Jordan basin would be insufficient for the future needs of Palestine." (Amery 1993: 233) Because of its water, it was suggested that the Litani becomes part of the "national Jewish entity" in 1919, but this was rejected by the League of Nations. In 1919, Weizmann, head of the World Zionist Organisation at that time, wrote to the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George that Lebanon was "well-watered" and that the Litani waters were "valueless to the territory north of the proposed frontiers. They can be used beneficially in the country much further south." He concluded the Litani was "essential to the future of the Jewish national home." (Weisgal 1977: 267) However, the Litani became part of Lebanon (Soffer 1994: 966-7).

The 1920 San Remo accord, which decided on the former territories of the Ottoman Turkish Empire and designed the 'new map' of the region, did not respect the Zionist demands on water. The northern border especially was not satisfying to Jewish strategists. Hence, Weizman - later president of Israel - commented to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon: “the draft accord France proposed not only separates Palestine from the Litani River, but also deprives Palestine from the Jordan River sources, the east coast of the Lake Taberiya and all the Yarmouk valley north of the Sykes-Picot line. I am quite sure you are aware of the expected bad future the Jewish national home would face when that proposal is carried out. You also know
the great importance of the Litani River, the Jordan River with its tributaries, and the Yarmouk River for Palestine.' (Dolatyar 1993)

Strong Jewish interests in the Litani were also expressed at the time of the Second World War. Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister suggested the inclusion of the Litani into the Jewish state. The 1941 international commission to whom this was suggested recommended that seven-eighths of the Litani be "leased to Israel." (Amery 1996: 233) However, on this occasion as well Israel could not achieve its objectives. Hence, access to water remained a fundamental object of crisis between the Arab neighbours and the state of Israel after 1948.

**Map 1 Regional Water Resources**

**Map 2 The Jordan River Basin**

Several plans for sharing or controlling parts of the different water resources, mainly the Litani River, were disputed. Of these plans the 'Lowdermilk'- plan of 1944 was considered the "water constitution" by the Zionists. Lowdermilk proposed to use the Dan, Zarqa, Baniyas, Yarmouk in Jordan and the Hasbani Rivers in Lebanon as contributors to irrigate the Jordan Valley. Furthermore, the Litani should feed an artificial lake in northern Palestine from where water should be pumped to the Negev Desert in Southern Palestine. However, the US under Eisenhower did not agree to Israel's use of half or more of the flow of the Litani (Amery 1993). Nonetheless, the Lebanese waters in the south remained of interest to the Zionists and Israelis for their purity and quantity (Kolars/Naff, 1993: 4). The diaries of Moshe Sharett, an Israeli prime minister during the 1950s, reveal that Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan, defence minister at that time, were strongly advocating military occupation of southern Lebanon up to the Litani River (Rabinovich 1985). However, aiming 'to make the desert bloom' (Dolatyar 1993), Israel began to develop national water resources and used the Hula waters to 'irrigate the desert' (see section III).
Between 1948 and 1967 Israel confiscated and usurped not only most of the Palestinian lands but also the water resources. In 1951, Israel drained the Huleh Swamp (north of Lake Taberiya) infringing on its demilitarised zone with Syria and provoking military clashes. Shamir, Prime Minister of Israel in 1990, summarised this policy in the sentence: "Great Aliya (immigration) needs great Israel". This is to understand that further immigration would also require the future appropriation and exploitation of all water resources in the region. On the same principle: "Aliya in the future needs new water resources and new lands; otherwise Israel will be in a water crisis!" (Sabbagh 1994: 513) Consequently, water was supposedly a main reason for the occupation of the West Bank. (Lee/Brooks 1996) In fact, in the 1967 war, water resources were "perhaps the prominent factor in Israeli strategic calculations." (Amery 1993: 233) After the 1967 war, Moshe Dayan, defence minister, stated, that Israel achieved “provisionally satisfying frontiers, with the exception of those with Lebanon” (Hof 1985, 36). Also Bargouthi (1986) and Saleh (1988) argue that lack of water resources supposedly is one of the motives for the 1967 war. Water supplies from the West Bank constitute as much as 40 percent of the water consumed in Israel. As a result of the 1967 war, Israel took also the Golan Heights. Since then, negotiations and fights between Syria and Israel were mainly about the water-rich Golan Heights and the surrounding region of South Lebanon (see Israeli view map 3).

Map 3 Israel Lobby’s View: ‘Israel’s Water Supply’ from the occupied territories

Nevertheless, the Litani was targeted again. In 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon. The "Litani Operation" was done under the pretext to end the activities of Palestinian ‘guerillas’ (Hiro 1996: 127). In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again. Dolatyar describes that "many view Israel’s retention of southern Lebanon as an extension of its persistent efforts to secure the Litani waters." (Dolatyar 1993)

Alongside and after the occupation of the West Bank, new strategies were attempted proposing contracts on water use and inserting water in ‘peace’ negotiations with neighbouring countries. In the late 1970s, a water pipeline from the Nile River to the
Israeli Negev desert was proposed by Egyptian President Sadat, but was rejected in Egypt, Israel, Ethiopia, and Sudan, due to security reasons and some national interests on the same water source for others (Gerti 1979). Conflicts also developed around the Euphrates River. The source of the Euphrates is in Turkey, and it crosses both Syria and Iraq, all countries which – to some extent – depend on the river for economic development. Large damming projects by Syria (the 1974 Al-Thawrah Dam) and Turkey (the Ataturk Dam in the early 1990s and currently the GAP project) have already led to considerable tension between neighbours (Isaac/Saafar 2005). Substantial future water deficits could seriously worsen these relations and intensify domestic conflicts. Only Turkey and Israel signed a contract in 2002 to enhance Israel’s water supply from Turkey’s share of the Euphrates. This agreement, however, was more significant in political – i.e. in allowing Israel to intensify its relations with the “only other democratic state” in the Middle East – than in material terms. In fact, the supply volume would at best replace the water which Israel agreed to supply to Jordan as part of the 1994 peace agreement (50MCM billion gallons of water (million cubic meters), Brooks/Mehmet, 2000). Furthermore, the water provided would be extremely costly: twice as high as desalinated water and three times that of waste-water recycling (JNF 2007).

5.2 Israeli Water Shortage - Home Made and Dangerous

Israel draws water from several sources in addition to those shared with the Palestinians. Total Israeli utilisation from fresh water resources currently stands at approximately 1.472 MCM/yr, and total water utilisation at around 2.199 MCM/yr, including desalination and wastewater reuse (see figure 1).

**Figure 1 Israeli water availability**

![Diagram showing water availability](source: Israeli Water Authority, IWA, 2010)

Note: * Source: World Bank, 2009

With an annual deficit of 629 million m$^3$ of water, Israel is over-consuming its water resources by 25 percent. According to findings of a 2007 Jewish National Fund (JNF) report there are “two major reasons that Israel's water shortage has reached such extreme proportions 1) over-consumption, 2) drought ,and each problem exacerbates the other” (JNF 2007). It should be noted that the most significant consumer of water in Israel is the agriculture sector, total of 1.070 MCM per year although at least 640 MCM of this is from reuse of wastewater (Water Authority, 2010).
Over the last ten years, Israel has experienced a drought cycle which is seriously straining the country’s fresh water supply. In the year 2008-2009 the natural enrichment is estimated at 891 MCM, where the average natural enrichment is 1.175 MCM. Currently, the lake Taberiya water level is below the red line. According to the Israeli water authority 2010, the Lake Taberiya water level reached - 213.22 m which is 0.22 centimeters under the lower red line.

In fact, the meagreness of this year’s rainfall, only 65% of annual average for the winter season is such that Israel will most probably face a total national water deficit for the winter of 300 million cubic meters (Haaretz 27.01.07). Moreover, experts predict that the global warming trend coupled with the region’s natural aridity will persist to the extent that even two dry years will be sufficient to take Israel back to a crisis-level water shortage.

Reality is that Israel already depends highly on the usurped water from its neighbours and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) (see table 1). Isaac and Zarour (1993) record the following composition of Israeli water sources for the year 1991. From ‘greening the desert’ Israel’s over-exploitation of an essential vital regional resources for this aim today includes the danger of ‘creating more desert’.

### Table 1 Israel water supply 1990/91

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Source</th>
<th>million cubic meters</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>745</td>
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<tr>
<td>Golan Heights</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libanone/Syria/Jordan</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.655</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Isaac/Zarour 1993

**Palestinian are deprived from access to water**

Following the 1967 war, Israel strengthened its control over the water resources in the region through its occupation of the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In the Palestinian Territory, Israel imposed restrictions on water use by Palestinians and declared the lands located alongside the Jordan River as closed military area. In addition, soon after the Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territory in 1967, Israel imposed a number of Military Orders to control Palestinian water resources:

- Military order No. 2 of 1967 declared all water resources in OPT to be ”Israeli state property”;
- Military order No. 92 of 1967, granted complete authority over all water related issues in the OPT to the Israeli army;
- Military order No. 158 of 1967, imposed, that it is not permissible for any person to set up or to assemble or to possess or to operate a water installation unless a license has been obtained from the area commander. This order applies to all wells and irrigation installations.

These orders were followed by numerous military orders. Military order No. 291, No. 457, No 484, No. 494, No. 715 and No. 1376, to achieve complete control over Palestinian water resources. It should be noted that these Military orders remain in force today in the OPT, and apply only to Palestinians. Under this military regime
imposed in the OPT, Palestinian access to the water resources of the area became extremely limited. (ARIJ 2007)

By the 1990s, Israel was utilising approximately 80% of the water of the West Bank Aquifer System to supply approximately 25% of the country’s water use, leaving only 20% to meet all Palestinian water needs; a situation that persists to this day (ARIJ, 2007). Thus, Israel controls nearly 483 million cubic meters (almost 70% of Israel's actual deficit) of Palestinian water (ARIJ 2007). On the other hand, the Palestinian people in the OPT are denied their right to utilise their own water resources from the Jordan-River System, which they were utilising partially until 1967. This regime, in clear violation of international law, deprives Palestinians of access to the Jordan River which has led to a dwindling Palestinian share of drinking and agriculture water.

Furthermore, restrictions imposed by Israeli authorities on Palestinian movement and access including the segregation wall, checkpoints, and closed military areas introduce real obstacles to Palestinian management and development of their water resources. Since 2002, Israel has been implementing its unilateral segregation plan. The construction of the segregation wall has resulted in the complete annexation of 13 % of the total area of the west Bank. This includes the isolation of 29 groundwater wells with an annual discharge of 5.5 MCM. While, the eastern segregation zone which runs along the Jordan Valley and the shores of the Dead Sea, isolates 165 Palestinian wells and 53 springs with an annual discharge of 55 million cubic meters. The Israeli policy and practices including the Israeli civil administration rules, the role of the JWC (Joint Water Committee, see later) and the Israeli military and security directives have collectively resulted in cutting the Palestinians off from their water supply wells or at least imposing more restrictions on the use of such wells and exacerbating the water problem in the Palestinian Localities. (World Bank 2009: 40)

In 1998, the –then- Minister Sharon was quoted saying: “My view of Judea and Samaria is well known, the absolute necessity of protecting our water in this region is central to our security. It is a non-negotiable item” (Boston Sunday Globe 1998 in: Shuval/Dweick 2007: 48, see map 4)

Map 4 Israel’s Pumping of the West Bank /Gaza aquifers

Source: SUSMAQ 2001

Despite the rapid increase in population and demand on water, Israel, has granted Palestinians of the West Bank only few permits for new water wells. All were to be used exclusively for domestic purposes. Between 1967 and 1990 only 23 permits
were conferred to Palestinians for digging new wells in the West Bank, of which only 20 were for domestic use (Nasser 2003). At the same time, Israel continued to develop water abstraction from the West Bank’s Aquifer, constructing more than 32 deep wells in the Western Aquifer to supply Israeli colonies (Trottier 1999 in ARIJ 2007). It is important to mention that, new water wells for agricultural purposes in the West Bank were also restricted to three permits. The Israeli policy of metering all Palestinian wells was another means of restricting quotas on Palestinian water utilisation.

In 2008, of the total 88,58 MCM of domestic water supplied to the West Bank Governorates, approximately 53% were purchased from the Israeli water company-Mekorot (Palestinian Water Authority, PWA 2009). Based on the WHO recommendations that each person should receive 150 litres of fresh water per day, the total real deficit in domestic water supply for 2008 was 62,4 MCM for the whole of the West Bank (PWA 2009). Thus, on average; domestic water supply covered only 73% of demand. This deficit is expected to worsen as the population grows. As a matter of fact, the discrimination in utilisation of the water resources shared, unwillingly, by Israelis and Palestinians is clearly seen in the figures of the water consumption by the two populations.

As a result of the Israeli water policy and practices in the OPT, approximately 2.4 million Palestinian inhabitants in the West Bank utilised only about 105.9 MCM of their water resources, with their domestic, industrial and agricultural needs. For comparison, the total amount of water available to approximately 7.1 million Israelis is 1,408.6 MCM. In addition, Israel had the use of further 277 MCM of brackish water and storm water and 450 MCM from non-conventional water from wastewater treatment and desalination (World Bank 2009). On a per-capita basis, water consumption by Palestinians is approximately 73 litres per capita per day (l/c/d) compared to about 300 l/c/d for Israelis. In other words, the per-capita consumption in Israel is 4 to 5 times higher than the Palestinian per-capita consumption in the OPT. It should be added that the 580,000 Jewish settlers consume on average 369 l/c/d, While Palestinians are struggling to connect the remaining 26% of the Palestinian communities to the water network. Jewish settlers receive continuous water supply, largely from groundwater wells in the West Bank. It is worth mentioning that the Palestinians in the rural communities in the West Bank survive on far less than even the average 70 litres; in some cases the per capita water use may not exceed 20 litres per day. (see figure 2).

Figure 2 Inequitable consumption of water between Palestinians and Israelis

Regarding the water availability, the overall Palestinian water extraction from the West Bank aquifer system in the 2007 was 113 MCM. It should be noted that the Palestinian abstraction have declined over the last ten years. It was dropped from 138 MCM in 1999 to 113 MCM in the year 2007 (World Bank, 2009, see figure 3).

Figure 3 Palestinian withdrawal for the West Bank Aquifer Systems 1999 and 2007

Source: World Bank 2009

Palestinian water rights include the groundwater of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the rightful shares of the Jordan River System, including Lake of Taberiya. Even Israel recognised Palestinian water rights when it signed the Oslo Accords, but to-date no negotiations on the details of these rights have been held. Moreover, Palestinian Water specialists criticized the agreement because it did not deal with the Palestinian water share in the Jordan River, and the shared Western and North-eastern Basins of the West Bank Aquifer System, as well as a reduction in the Israeli water consumption from the Palestinian water resources or the quantities provided to the illegal Israeli settlers in the OPT. In addition, the agreement ignores the issue of equitable and reasonable distribution of the available water resources. Accordingly, the inequitable division of the shared aquifer systems was maintained, with the same 80% allocated to Israel and 20% allocated to the Palestinian.

The agreement states that the future needs of the Palestinians in the West Bank are estimated to be between 70-80 MCM/yr. This statement is ambiguous and may be interpreted differently by different people. In reality, this amount merely expresses the immediate needs of the Palestinians to satisfy domestic demand during the interim agreement period, without considering future development of other sectors such as agriculture, industry or tourism. Moreover, the agreement indicates that the Palestinians can increase their water supply from the Eastern Aquifer Basin of which an additional 78 MCM of water can be exploited. Most experts agree that the Eastern Basin could not yield this additional amount claimed by Israeli experts. It is believed that there are serious doubts that Palestinians can extract the water quantities specified in the agreement form the Eastern Basin as there is an average annual drop of more that 25 meters in the water table level that is raising alarm about the sustainable yield of this basin. Although 16 year have passed since the signing of the Oslo accords the goals which were laid out in the agreements have not been realized. In fact, most of the provisions of the Agreements have become irrelevant and the water crisis in the OPT has continued to worsen.
While the recognition of Israel to the Palestinian water rights in the Oslo II agreement is a very important step forward, the agreement attempts to undermine the significance of this issue by talking about maintaining existing utilization and recognizing the necessity to develop new resources, tacitly accepting that more water is needed to satisfy the needs of both populations.

In the Joint Water Committee, regarding the water resources development and management, it was intended that the Oslo agreement would provide greater access for Palestinians to the water resources. Unfortunately under the prevailing conditions the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) is not able to manage and develop their own water resources. In accordance with article 40 of the Oslo Accords, any proposed management measures, investments or infrastructure projects pertaining to the development of the water or sanitation sectors within the OPT are subject to the approval of the Joint Water Committee (JWC). The Israeli Civil Administration has veto power over the JWC. A high proportion of Palestinian projects has been rejected or long delayed in the JWC. Records show that out of the 417 projects presented to the JWC during the period 1996-2008, only 57% were approved. 143 water projects are still waiting JWC approval and 22 projects were rejected.

Regarding the well drilling projects (water supply projects), out of 202 projects, 65 were approved by the JWC. Of those, only 38 were implemented, after receiving the additional approval of the Israeli civil administration. (World Bank, 2009) In contrast, any water projects for the Israeli settlements (which have been illegally constructed on Palestinian Land) do not require the approval of the JWC. Additionally, Israel is conditioning approval for waste treatment plants with linking of settlements. By that Israel wants the Palestinians to legitimize the settlements, which is not acceptable. Moreover, Israel claims that there is a memorandum of understanding that sets the standards for waste water treatment to be 10:10 BOD:COD ((biochemical oxygen demand: chemical oxygen demand). Such a high standard is not reasonable. Israel is obviously using this tactic to justify its control over waste water treatments plants in the OPT and to divert Palestinian waste water to be treated and used inside Israel. Not only had that, but Israel charges Palestinians 25 cents for every cubic meter of waste water diverted (Isaac 2009).

In addition to the above mentioned issues, there are still other issues which were meant to be realized as an outcome of the Oslo accords. However, due to Israel's continued obstinacy in opposition to international resolutions regarding Palestinian people's sovereignty over their water resources they remain unfulfilled. The most pressing of these issues are:

a. **Transfer of Authority**: *After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration in the West Bank will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government shall be withdrawn.* Israel should have transferred the West Bank Water Department (WBWD) to the PWA but, until now, it is under the so-called "civil administration". Moreover, The Civil Administration in the West Bank was to be dissolved, and the Israeli military government withdrawn. But until now, the so-called Civil Administration is still operational.

b. **Making available all relevant data**: Palestinians are still waiting for the data.

c. The Oslo agreement is an Interim Agreement, which was supposed to be revised in permanent status negotiations within five years of its signing.
However, 16 years later this did not happen consequently the water sector still remains under Israeli control.

d. **Water Rights**: In the preparatory talks about the final status negotiations, Israel refused to discuss Palestinian water rights and insisted on dealing with some additional water quantities that may be granted to Palestinians from other non-conventional sources such as desalination or imports from the region i.e. needs and not rights. Lately, it was reported that Israel is building a desalination plant near Khadera for the benefit of the Palestinians. The PWA wholeheartedly denied this.

e. *The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.* However, Israel has segregated the West Bank from Gaza and East Jerusalem from the rest of the OPT.

(Interim Agreement, Annex III, Appendix 1, Article 40)

5.3 Israel's Water Grab between Jordan River and Litani River, with or without a Palestinian State

The migration of East European and former Soviet citizens to Israel has resulted in a vast increase of its population. An advertisement of the Ministry of Agriculture in the Israeli Newspaper Jerusalem Post (1990) argued that a Palestinian state on the West Bank would draw on the water resources that are vital to Israel. 'Relinquishing' the land to a potential Palestinian state would likely result in the repatriation of Palestinian refugees, whom the advertisement referred to as 'poverty-stricken humanity', from surrounding Arab countries. That in-migration "would generate an impossible strain on the already over-extended water supply and inadequate sewerage system, endangering even further Israel's vulnerable and fragile source of life." The commentary concluded by asserting that "it is difficult to conceive of any political solution consistent with Israel's survival that does not involve complete, continued Israeli control of water and sewerage systems, and of the associated infrastructure, including power supply and road network, essential to their operation, maintenance and accessibility" (JP 1990 10 August, intern. edition).

The only alternatives are recycling water and desalination, which is also included in future programmes. But as fresh potable water remains an asset, it is easy to conclude that before reaching any final solution, Israel's governments will create facts on the ground concerning the Litani and Jordan rivers.

*Litani River*

The main attraction of the Litani River is the high quality of its water. The salinity level is only 20 parts per million, whereas that of the Lake Taberiya is 250 to 350 parts per million. Israel's aquifers are stressed, especially along the coast, and the water in them is increasingly brackish. The water of the Litani would lower the saline level of the Lake Taberiya, from which the National Water Carrier channels water to much of the country. "It is this purity that makes the Litani very attractive to the Israelis, who have developed their National Water Carrier System with a view towards potable (as opposed to irrigation quality) water". (Naff/Matson 1984, 65)

Turkey proposed a peace pipeline to meet the needs of numerous southern waterdeficient countries, including Israel, but importation over hundreds of kilometres of
'unfriendly territory' is seen in Israel as untenable and easily subverted, thus a threat to national security. It is therefore becoming increasingly evident that the only feasible solution - in terms of water quality, volume, and proximity of the resource - to Israel's growing water problem is to tap a nearby source, namely the Litani River.

When Israel occupied south Lebanon, creating a special zone under military control, the Israeli army prohibited drilling of wells there (Bargouthi 1986). Moreover, after the 1982 invasion, Israeli army engineers carried out seismic soundings and surveys near the westward bend of the river, probably to determine the optimum place for a diversion tunnel, and confiscated hydrographical charts and technical documents of the river and its installations from the Litani water. Over the years, there have been reports of water siphoning from the Litani into the Jordan River basin, a distance of less than ten kilometres (Cooley 1984; Bargouthi 1986; Saleh 1988; Abu Fadil and Harrison 1992; Gemayel 1992). Independent water analysts, however, have reported that Israel has been diverting some water from the Litani River into the Jordan River (Collelo 1989, 117) by tapping the massive underground water resources. Hence the measured flow of the Litani visibly seems not affected (Cooley 1984, 22-23).

**Jordan River**

The Jordan Rift Valley is a distinct geological and geographical part of the Great Rift Valley which extends from Syria to the Red Sea. The Jordan River is an essential water catchment with the largest water yield in the region, running down from the main springs in the southern mountains of Lebanon through the lake Taberiya to the Dead Sea.

As the only significant source of surface water in the region, the Jordan River has been the source of conflict between the countries that share it (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Palestine). The closest thing to a regional agreement on water utilisation between the riparians is the Johnston Plan (1955), which was approved by technical committees from Israel and the Arab League, but has never been ratified and the waters of the Jordan River have been exploited by unilateral projects without any compliance to the water allocations that were identified (see table 2).

**Table 2 Johnston Plan (1955) Quotas for Water Share of the Jordan River Water by Riparian States in mcm/yr**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>First Johnston Plan</th>
<th>Revised Johnston Plan</th>
<th>Percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine (WB)</td>
<td>part of Jordan</td>
<td>257*</td>
<td>20,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>10,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>1305</td>
<td>1,287</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: in 1955 the WB was ruled by Jordan, the share together was set 720 mcm/yr. Some literature estimated the Palestinian share as 257, others 215 mcm/yr Sources: Abu Ju‘ub 2002, Sherman 1999, Raguer 1993
An important point to note is that when the Johnston Plan was drawn up, the West Bank was under the Jordanian Administration and, hence, the water rights of the Palestinian people in the West Bank were never explicitly defined. However, a canal was planned on the western side of the River (the West Ghor Canal) as part of the greater Yarmouk Project, which was to supply 240 MCM of water to irrigate lands in the Jordan Valley (Murakami, 1995; Naff and Matson, 1984). This canal was never built, and following the 1967-war and the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank, 140 Palestinian pumping stations on the Jordan River were destroyed or confiscated.

Since that time, Palestinians have had no access to the Jordan River's waters (ARIJ 2001) The most significant project carried out in the Jordan River Basin is the Israeli National Water Carrier through which Israel diverts approximately 650 MCM of water per year from Lake Taberiya to Negev desert and the Jordanian East Ghor Canal. It is worth mentioning that the Jordan River Basin satisfies around 50% of Israel's and Jordan's respective water demands, supplying around 33% of the Israeli fresh water use (Netanyahu, 2006), while it only meets 5% of Lebanon and Syria combined water demands. These projects have reduced the annual water flow of the Jordan River from 1,320 MCM in the early 1950's to 50 MCM of high salinity and deteriorated quality water (Dead Sea Project 2004; see table 3).

Table 3 Utilization of Jordan River Water in 2005 in mcm/yr

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Water quantity</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occ. Palest. Territory</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>17,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>65,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>12,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flow ended in the Dead Sea</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Flow</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.320 mcm</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PWA Palestinian Water Authority 2005

The Dead Sea as well as the Jordan River are loosing enormously, endangering the survival of a unique ecosystem and historical landscape, attractive for its bio-diversity and subtropical climate (Anani 2007, see map 5, figure 4).

Map 5: Dead Sea shrinking size beginning last century and 1997

Figure 4: Ded Sea shrinking water between between 1976 and 2003

Source: Gavrieli 2000

Lipchin 2004, Data from IL Hydrological Service
Water quality in the Lower Jordan River is much poorer than in the Upper Jordan River, due to input from saline springs and contamination from irrigation return flows as well as the diversion of much of the river upstream. There is much concern that the level of the Dead Sea is dropping, due to the reduced input from the Jordan River and increased use of other sources. The surface area of the Dead Sea has shrunk by around 30% in the past 20 years; a drop in water level that translates to the rate of approximately 1 m per year (Lipchin 2004, Gavrieli 2000, IMFA 2002).

According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999), there is an actual plan to change the map, which will completely modify the Jordan valley and river: the Jordan Rift Valley Project. The project was initiated between the United States, Israel and Jordan. It aims to encourage tourism, transportation, trade and industry, agriculture, aquaculture, environment, telecommunication and energy generation. While the role of the Palestinian Authority was marginalised, one can say that the Jordan Rift Valley Project comes as the biggest and most profitable integral part of Israel's recent national development plans. (Anani 2007: 2pp) (see section VI). Furthermore, and as the issue of fresh water is especially acute in Israel, agreements with Jordan and the joint use of the valley - of which the majority is located in the occupied West Bank - was an important step for Israel's water grab. Consequently Israel aims to completely exclude Palestinians from this source in the long run - the segregation wall has already been built and will be extended to the east side 'when it is time' as Sharon mentioned (Isaac/Zarour 1993).

Conclusion

Israel's land grab is flanked by water grab. The 'greening of the desert' is a false story. Greening the desert would look different and if so, such a project is regional and cannot be done without agreement of the neighbours who depend on the same resource. The opposite has been happening since the beginning of the Zionist project. The usurpation not only of land but also of important water resources was envisaged by all Zionist planners, and after the repeated occupations of south Lebanon this is even more evident. Immigration programmes, modern life style and an extensive use of fresh water sources have become an evil instead of a dream. Huge irrigation projects in the Golan Heights - where sprinkler systems water the apple plants during summer days and nights - the assurance of a luxurious life-style in the colonies with facilities such as swimming pools for the settlers, and planting cotton in an areas that never tolerated this water consuming crop is only one side of a wrong dream. The suffering of water shortage and lack of basic sources for the Palestinian society is the other side. Water-wars are home-made, and consequently not a result of general shortage. Alternative policies could be developed in an optic of responsibility for a sustainable future of the region and in harmony with the neighbours. But this requires a different conception of the State of Israel.

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IV

Final Comment

Israel claimed the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Region (beside Golan Heights and the Sinai) as a defence against Arab aggression, a question of survival - however after having revealed the facts it might be clear, that this occupation was nothing less but a further step in the Zionist fight for an Israel in wider borders, the Mandate borders at least. The strategies are so much similar to what happened from 1948 on in Israel and part of the Judaising process. That was judaising through usurping as much as possible of landscape, agricultural land, villages, historical sides, water resources to establish Jewish presence and eliminate Palestinian existence as far as possible.

Changing the map, changing geographical landmarks, creating exclusive Jewish communication strings, roads and infrastructure networks, thus disconnecting the existing Palestinian society and its living areas from each other - was one part of that ongoing usurpation. Expropriation of Palestinian property was basic for that second criminal part of the usurpation of Palestine. A bunch of fantastic 'laws', faked reasons, always labelled 'security demands', was used fuelling the self made crucial circle: create a problem, ask for soldiers to protect 'our' people, and if protest against occur it gives reason for more pressure, family punishment, finally expropriation and so forth.

Less than 20 percent of a former Palestinian unity was left – and this not even under real Palestinian control. Instead we find a handicapped and scattered mosaic of pieces of a cake that Israel is eventually going on to swallow.

Nothing happened plan less, each step had a purpose, and each measure had an aim. Architects were planners implementing Zionist programs for achieving eventually the complete judaising of Palestine ‘from the coast to the Jordan River’. The Zionist Movement, the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) is still a forcing power, developing outlines for further occupation, land and water grab.

Most shocking is the fact that the international community, having established a United Nation, a Geneva Convention and declared the principles of Human Rights as universal is watching, knowing and not interfering at all. The United Nations in 1947 decided against such principles to divide Palestine, and also promised to guarantee a Palestinian State. This responsibility still exists. And it will be still a challenge to prove creditability of those organisations, principles and decisions and should be taken seriously.

Given the UN decision is a fact to be accepted, given Israel is a reality based on this international agreement, given this is to be accepted by the powerless and defeated Palestinians, the question is still to rise why Israel is not forced to go back to the borders that UN once proposed. Why no international body can or will force Israel to leaving East Jerusalem, the occupied territories of the West Bank, all Gaza region and Syrian Golan?

Furthermore, Israel too has to fulfil its responsibility and proving what it claims to be: a democratic state that respects other nations and the civic rights of their own citizens. However, Israel is even hurrying up to grab more Palestinian land, to divide more what rests and to enter pure Palestinian living areas, creating a hell for the inhabitants. Intending to make Palestinians moving out and to judaising entire cities in the West Bank like Jaffa, Akka in Israel, or East Jerusalem and Hebron in the West
Bank is still fact. Breaking Palestinian identity par force and fabricating instead an image of an 'ancient Israel' is going on, a political entity that in reality only played a small role during a small period in the area of ancient geographical Palestine. How this is going to happen in pure and historic Palestinian cities is a question of the next section.
V

Killing the Cities - the Example of Jerusalem/Al Quds, Hebron/Al Khalil and Jaffa in Israel

Religion and ancient history gave according to Herzl an important impulse for colonising and judaising the land of Palestine. In this context the occupation of Jerusalem and Hebron had first priority after 1967. Hence, both cities, Jerusalem, the 'City of Salomon and David' and Hebron the 'City of Abraham', became delicate targets of planners and were suffering and undergoing a deep change in social, cultural and demographic sense.

While Jerusalem is against international law seen as the Israeli Capital and officially usurped into Israel via Knesset decisions, Hebron is conquered in another mode. Hebron had lost its Jewish community since revolts in the end of the 20ties. After occupation Israel started planting the colony Kiryat Arba beside Hebron (Arabic Al Khalil) and fundamentalist Zionist groups entered from there step by step into this Palestinian city by means of demography, history, culture and social life. The gradual usurpation progressed slowly until the division of the centre of Hebron by the 'agreements' after Oslo in 1993.

Jaffa is another case in Israel itself, a victim of the first phase of Israeli governance over Palestine and the ongoing ethnic cleansing from 1948 until now. At 1948 a historic Palestinian community that existed since centuries was completely chased out and European Jews came in. Some of the Palestinian refugees, who were chased out, settled in parts of the new town, remaining in an unsecure situation until today. Hundreds of them are threatened to be thrown out again during the years of 2009/2010. In Israelis new interpretation of history Jaffa is called the 'Old City of Tel Aviv', which is absurd.

The following chapters will reveal the story of this judaising process - again with methods of planning. The story of Jerusalem will be told in 2 steps, at first a general overview about the meaning and phases of the judaising of Jerusalem in terms of planning and legal frames will be presented (Waltz), followed by an actual view and an approach for justice (Amro).

The story of Hebron follows with a description of the ongoing judaising steps since the occupation. Jaffa's story will be told through the changing process since 1950 when it was declared part of Tel Aviv and tackle the actual battle.
Viktoria Waltz

1. Jerusalem within the Zionist Project

Results after one century of Zionist planning in Jerusalem: 'judaising through 'hebronising'

Sharon’s ‘visit’ in October 2000 to the Haram al Sharif, the ‘Holy Place’ in the Old City of Jerusalem, was the trigger point for the outbreak of the second Intifada.

Sharon’s visit to Jerusalem’s holy place did not only symbolise the Israeli claim of the city, but also planned as a starting point for the ongoing central offensive to the city, regarding citizenship, economy, borders and land properties. This process culminated in the isolation of Jerusalem after Oslo, the construction of the wall at 2003 and the government decision in July 2004 to apply the absentee property land law from 1950 and the Mandate Plan RJ/5 to the Jerusalem case (see section III). Step after step, during the last ten years the Israeli government restricted Palestinian presence and life in the eastern, Palestinian City of Jerusalem with its historical centre, the Old City. It began after Oslo, when Jerusalem was excluded from the decisions and (in a unilateral procedure) segregated from the West-Bank and Gaza Region. From that time, only Palestinians who have a special permission from the Israeli Army are allowed to enter the city. From that time on, the historical passage from south to north of Palestine and the West Bank which ran through Jerusalem is blocked.

Judaising Jerusalem began already in the first days after the occupation in 1967. More than 200,000 illegal settlers were meanwhile transferred into large housing estates forming a ring, ‘suffocating’ the Palestinian and Arab Jerusalem and the historical Old City. Moreover small satellites of Israeli colonies were implanted amidst the Palestinian residential areas, in Sheikh Jerah, the Kidron Valley, Abu Dees, Souwane, Silwan, Tur, Essawiyye or Ezzariye and particularly in the different Palestinian quarters of the Old City. This ongoing process is neglecting the historical shape and value of architecture, society and atmosphere. With the segregation wall rings around Jerusalem will become denser and more strangling Palestinian development.

Through a sophisticated strategy of setting facts by planning, also the historic map of the city has been turned upside down in terms of religion and ethnicity. The western Gate of the Old City for example, the Jaffa or Hebron Gate, has all means of convenience for the Jewish believers; an area equipped with close-by huge bus parking lots on the historic Mamilla ground, access for cars and taxis. Accordingly, on Friday evening and Sabbath, thousands of religious Jews enter smoothly through the Jaffa or Hebron Gate to the wailing wall from the western New City of Jerusalem. Subsequently, this area and the Citadel has become a complete Israeli Jewish terrain, along with the Jewish Quarter, which lies on the southern part of the Old City and is also hosting a huge traffic hub. In contrary to that the entrance to the ‘Via Dolorosa’ from Lion’s gate, which is of main interest for Christian believers, remain neglected, has difficult access, no parking space, however police control all over.

One century of Zionist planning has changed fundamentally the whole fabric and spatial use of the city. Particularly, and since 1967, the Israeli government has followed rigorous spatial policy in the city to judaize its quarters, changing its Arab identity through planning and building. Since the beginning of the so-called peace
process in 1993 these efforts multiplied to suppress depriving the Palestinian side more and more, reducing their presence and controlling and hindering social and economic life of the Palestinian inhabitants.

Tools were similar and even more sophisticated than what was implemented after 48 on the Israeli side:

- Land confiscation and occupation of land and buildings, water and nature resources,
- Destruction of Palestinian habitat, areas and buildings,
- Establishment of new Israeli presence in occupied buildings in the Old City,
- Creation of an Israeli Jewish majority by implanting thousands of settlers in new colonies,
- Establishment of new roads, bypass roads and road networks,
- Destruction of Palestinian cultural, economic and social infrastructure,
- Arbitrary fixing of (new) boundaries on the basis of strategic criteria.

This was most of all done with the already described spatial planning instruments, through master plans, definition of land use and refuse of building licenses.

The purpose of this policy is obvious. Jerusalem should become a Jewish city, the capital of Israel, the Jewish State. The Palestinian existence in the city should be reduced to a minimum (plans say still maximal 30%) – if not completely cleaned off.

Let speak two important strategists of the Zionist project, to understand it.

“If we ever get Jerusalem and I then still will be able to do something, I would begin to clean the city from everything that is not holy” (Herzl in his diary, 31.10.1897)

“The question of Jerusalem is not a question of arguments or policy, it has first priority and is an issue of possession and power. Do we have the military power a. in order to take the Old City, b. to secure a broad passage from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, not only for better access, but also to establish a space for settlements, which will connect Jerusalem firmly to the Jewish State, and c. to destroy the spatial continuity of the Arab communities in the Triangle? If we do not reach, we cannot say, that we, Israel, have liberated Jerusalem.” (Ben Gurion 1951: 164)

For Palestinians, Jerusalem is the crucial question, whether there will be a state of Palestine with its capital Jerusalem (East Jerusalem, including the Old City in the borders after 1947) - or whether Palestine will remain a patched carpet of partly autonomous areas, controlled inside and outside and surrounded by Israeli areas, with an administrative centre in Gaza Strip, Ramallah, or Abu Dees – while Jerusalem will be in turn the capital of Israel, ‘liberated’ or better ‘cleaned’ as much as possible from Palestinians.

Looking back to the last century, the Zionist planning under British Mandate since the end of the 30ies had already converted Jerusalem from an aspiring internationally oriented and world-open metropolis into an ethnical segregated ‘front city’ with the most aggressive and fierce battles to influence and overtake each meter of Arabic Palestinian land.
1.1 Jerusalem Before and During the British Mandate: a Time of Changes

Until the middle of the 19th century, Jerusalem constitutes the Old City in the boundaries of the medieval walls, surrounded by many related villages. This changed since the fifties, and building outside the walls developed rapidly. The main motor of expansion at that time was a handful of wealthy Palestinian Jerusalem families, who left the crowded Old City quarters in order to build their villas outside the walls on their family lands, leading in a later stage to the founding of new urban residential districts and commercial areas, the ‘New City’.

The earliest documented newly populated Palestinian areas developed in the south of the Old City like Baq’a, and Beit Jala, Qatamon and Talbiya, Mal’ha in the south-west as well as Bab al Sahra, Mamlila, Musrara, Sheikh Jerah in the north of the Old City. (see general view images 1,2)

**Image 1 Jerusalem at the end of the 19th century**

**Image 2 Today view from Mount of Olive**

Source. www.palestineremembered

From the end of the 19th centuries Jerusalem had become a symbol of modern lifestyle: Luxurious buildings with European ‘Bauhaus’ elements ‘Art Deco’ style, columns, balconies, verandas and European roofs with red bricks expressing the openness to the international world that the wealthy Palestinians enjoyed. (see images 3,4,5,6)

**Image 3 Palestinian House in Qatamon, looted 48**

**Image 4 The Orient House of Husseini Family**
Jerusalem had become the centre of large trading ventures, banks and small factories. Clubs, international schools, book and newspaper publishers enjoyed national endorsement and were representatives of a new cosmopolitan and open climate. Finally the 'New City' consisted of a multi-cultural mosaic of ethnical and different religious social groups.

The overlapping edges of all the various neighbourhoods and communities formed a basis for peaceful inter-religious and internationally mixed areas in the city and the further urban development, in which coexistence developed as well as common social, cultural and economic dependence and relations. (Davis 1999).

The ‘sneak in’ of the international community

Furthermore the changes in the Ottoman land and property laws of the late fifties, allowing non Muslims to purchase land and to build on it, pushed the increasing expansion of the city of Jerusalem outside the Old City walls (see sector II). Consequently, for instance the Christian monasteries, German ‘Templer’ and Jewish communities began to establish residential districts in the suburbs, buildings of simple forms and mainly on the western hills outside the Old City. They were not at all architecturally comparable with the generous style of the summerhouses and mansions of the Palestinian extended families.

In a further wave of suburban settling, and around 1900, the imperialistic interest in the ‘Orient’, especially in the fading Ottoman Empire, and in the ‘Holy Land’ took the form of missionary activities, claiming to provide the “unattended ethnic minorities” in Jerusalem with schools, workshops, hospitals and on the other hand filling the new residential areas with all kinds of Europeans, from Roman catholic to Greek orthodox and Lutheran. Many of their projects can still be seen nowadays within the city fabric: the German ‘Schmitt School’, the ‘Auguste Victoria-Hospital’, the Russian complex in Musrara, Talbiya and Qatamon as well. (see images 7-11). (Elan 1984, Mejcher/Schoelch 1981, Lagerloef 1901/1902/1950)
Image 7 French Notre Dame Pilgrims Hotel founded 1885

Image 8 First houses of the Templers 1898 close to the later railway station

Source: P/25 2004

Source: Elan 1984: 27

Image 9 The Palestine Museum built 1933-1936 by Rockefeller

Image 10 German Schmidt’s Girls School founded 1886

Source: www.Palestineremenbered.com

Image 11 Musrara neighbourhood, one of the first Palestinian urban housing projects outside the Old City

Source: Tamari 1999: 31, fotografer unknown
The entering of the Zionists, first colonies

The first Jewish Zionist housing project outside the Old City walls was the windmill quarter sponsored by an English philanthropist. Sir Moses Montefiore around 1880 designed this quarter to settle poor immigrants (Mishkenot Sha'ananim) on the hill opposite the mountain Zion. Today it had become an artist quarter and belongs to those ’historic Jewish places’ renovated and modernises according to a new masterplan. The windmill quarter is a touristic place with souvenir shops and galleries (see image 12).

Image 12 Windmill Quarter today, renovated, - view to the western new city

Source: www.e.jerusalemshot.com 15.09.07

Since the 1st World Zionist Congress 1897 in Basle, the Zionist 'Palestine Exploration Fund' became responsible for the construction of Jewish housing projects in the New City, however the construction remained as small patches within the expanding city fabric.

The slowly increasing presence of Jewish neighbourhoods was due to the fact, that the Zionist movement had not given its first attention to colonise Jerusalem. The Jewish community of Jerusalem consisted at the end of the Ottoman period around 25% of the inhabitants; however they were not considered Zionists. While in 1910 the original Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem composed half of all the Jewish population of Palestine, in 1944 they formed only one fifth, because most Jewish migrants were settling preferentially in the coastal towns, particularly in the new European city of Tel Aviv. (Davis 1999)

“During the first Aliya (immigration phase 1882-1903) Jerusalem served more as a symbol than as a colonisation goal contrary to the second Aliya (1904-1914) where the status of Jerusalem was seen as the most important centre for the Jews, although few activities happened” (Kellermann 1996:153)

At the end of the 30's, and after the first UN partition plan for Palestine became public and especially in 1937 when the Peel Commission suggested a limitation of European Jews immigration, Jerusalem was seen as an area for strategic settlement. Mostly the Zionists outside of Palestine promoted Jerusalem. The political and
military fight for the city became an important issue after the revolts in 1937 (Rempel 1999:191).

**Expansion of land and change in properties at the end of the British Mandate in 1947**

The population of the entire town increased rapidly. In 1870, there were between 14,000 to 22,000 inhabitants (Ben Arieh 1986, Schoelch 1990) registered in Jerusalem and in 1905 the population had augmented to reach approximately 32,000 (Mc Carthy 1990). In 1917 there were about 62,500 of them 35,000 - 40,000 inhabitants living in the New City, nearly half of the total Jerusalem urban population. The majority of those living outside the Old City walls was composed of about 29,000 Jews from about 34,000, 13,400 Muslims from which 2,000 - 2,400 lived in the New City, and finally around 5,000 - 6,000 of the 15,000 Christians (Ben Arieh 1986a: 241; Kark/Landmann 1980:113 – 153). In 1922 according to the 1st Census of the British Government (Mc Carthy 1990) the Jerusalem population augmented to 62,500 (Census 1922) (see table 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>62,500</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (1) Schoelch 1990; Ben Arieh 1986. (2) Mc Carthy 1990; (3) Survey of Palestine; (4) Ben Arieh 1986 a; Mc Carthy 1990

During the mandate time the city in its new form along with its surrounding villages had reached a size of approx. 20,000 dunam (10 dunam app. 1 hectar) including the Old City with 800 dunam. Around 26% of the New City land was in Jewish possession, and Palestinians owned 40% and around 14% was the property of Christian institutions, mostly waqf land (waqf means: Islamic ownership dedicated for social or religious purpose, see section II). Around 3% of the Jerusalem land belonged to the municipality and 17% were dedicated for roads and the railway-net (see The Palestinian Arab Refugee Office, 1946).

In the early forties of the 20th century, and under the English Mandate, the new Palestinian residential districts of Jerusalem had expanded towards the neighbouring villages Lifta, Malha, Deir Yaseen and ‘Ayn Karim. Under the mandate’s protection as well, small residential districts for Jewish migrants were established such as Mekor Hayim, Yemin Moshe, Mea Shearim and Rehavia, beside other migrants colonies, like the German Colony, the Greek colony etc.. (see map 1, image 13)
Map 1 Jerusalem and its suburbs 1948

Source: Survey of Palestine in: Davis 1999: 67/68

Image 13 Ayn Karim 1900, one of the western Jerusalem district villages

Source: photographer unknown, reprinted in Tamari 1999: 49
At the end of the British Mandate, Jerusalem became the second largest city in Palestine, with over 164,400 inhabitants, approx. 99,320 Jews - the majority from Europe - and 65,010 Christians and Muslims - the majority Palestinians. Most of the Jews and about half of the Christians and Muslims lived meanwhile in the New City.

The cosmopolitan flair of the city changed radically with the fight for the establishment of the state of Israel and the military occupation of the western New City by Zionist troops.

1.2 The Usurpation of West-Jerusalem after 1948

The partition resolution of the UN in November 1947 (see map 2), and the retreat of the British Mandate Power from Palestine was the start of a bitter war between 1947 and 1949, followed by the unilateral declaration of the Jewish Israeli state at 15. May 1948. This has finally set an end to the cosmopolitan character of Jerusalem and created a deep segregation until today. (see map 2,3) During 1947 and 1949 also Jerusalem and the surrounding was targeted from the 'ethnic cleansing program' planned by Ben Gurion and his military group (see section II, Pappe 2006: 86pp). The usurpation had different steps as before: exteriorisation, expropriation, further ethnic cleansing and colonisation. Most important step was the official declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel that eventually was realised after the total usurpation of the city in 1967.

Map 2 UN Partition Plan Decision 181, 29.11.1947

Map 3 The Partitioned City of Jerusalem 1948

Source: UN webservice UNSPAL 2007
Source: Sachar 1979, in: Passia 2005

Step one: The separation of the city

Most of the western New City fell under Israeli governance and became part of Israel, the Old City and the eastern living quarters of the New City came under Jordanian governance (see map 3). After the end of war and later cease-fire agreement, around 30,000 Palestinians, what was nearly half of the Palestinian population of Jerusalem,
had to leave the western New City while about 2,000 Jews had to leave the Old City. All of them lost their properties.

The Palestinian Jerusalemites who where displaced became refugees, lost their houses, business, offices, factories and all what they had established during the last period of nearly 100 years, and were deprived of their bank accounts, estates, assets and the land. The total loss was estimated as 3 million Palestinian Pounds at that time and 30 million Pounds for land and buildings. Some refugees found accommodation in the Old City, others who fled to the ‘West Bank’ during the war found themselves later in the refugee camps of the United Nations or emigrated out of the country (Davis, 1999:32 f).

**Step two: Expropriation of Palestinian properties**

When the state of Israel was established, around 16,000 dunam of land was declared as ‘abandoned’ and then passed over to ‘Jewish property’. Thirty-five percent of the West Jerusalem land had been Palestinian property. The status of 850 dunam of it was changed into so called ‘no man’s land’ or to UN-area, including the Jewish Hadassah University compound between the fire lines and remained as such till the occupation in 1967 (The Palestinian Arab Refugee Office 1946, see map 3).

Immediately after the Israeli usurpation, those Palestinians who had left and were not registered as Israeli citizens were declared as ‘absentees’ and their properties became ‘absentees’ property in accordance with the ‘Absentees Property Law’ of 1950 (see section III). Subsequently, the Israeli authority backed with the already used property laws had managed to transfer the ownership of Palestinian expropriated lands and buildings into Jewish Israeli property. This land was later used for settling new Jewish immigrants into new colonies. Furthermore, the expropriation process was executed for 10,000 dwellings, beside the commercial buildings, factories and workshops. After negotiations and intervention of the UN, the Palestinian properties besides up to 10,000 at that time Israeli Pounds - were nor compensated neither given back (Rempel, 1999, 201ff).

The partition of the city along with driving out the Palestinian population from the New City and its surrounding villages was the result of a systematic plan later known as ‘Plan Dalet’ (see section II). According to this plan the whole area in and around Jerusalem was ‘cleaned from Arab villages and hostile or potentially hostile inhabitants for ever’ (Morris 1987:111; Waltz/Zschiesche 1998:97 pp).

**Step three: ‘Cleansing’ the surrounding of the ‘New City’**

The 1948 boundaries of Jerusalem were not at all satisfying for the Zionist politicians. It consisted only of the western part of the New City, and was connected with the rest of the country only by a narrow passage, surrounded by Palestinian villages and the eastern city. (see map 4,5) In addition its position was in direct proximity of the two large Palestinian cities Ramallah and Bethlehem. The Israeli part of Jerusalem was considered to be in an ‘isolated’ position. Hence what Zionist military groups according to plan D had began during the war, the new government continued: 38 Palestinian villages in the west of Jerusalem vicinity were depopulated, moreover, about 28,000 Palestinians were driven out if not killed like in Deir Yassin and over 50% of the directly bordering villages were destroyed completely like Beit Durik or Biddu (Pappe 2006: 90p, www.palestineremembered and see maps 4,5). On the ruins of some villages new colonies were erected – no Palestinian was allowed to return. The right of return was refused - against UN-intervention. (Tamari 1999:77; Krystall 1992; Khalidi1992: 265 pp)
Another policy to wipe out Palestinian presence was declaring the ‘cleansed’ areas as parks and natural reserves. The Jewish National Fond (JNF) was and is the institution which is responsible for such planning. (see section III). The ‘Lions International Israeli Reservation’ on the lands of Bayt Mahsir is one example, and the national ‘Two Hundred Year Park’ with the ‘Hubert Humphrey Walk’ on the remnants of Deir El Hawa is another and also the military base ‘Kanaf Staim’, located on the land of former Al Burayj. They where somehow intentionally established in order to dust off the left traces of Palestinian existence around Jerusalem (Khalidi 1992:275 - 286). However, an attentive visitor can still discover the remains in form of dwells, ruins and the famous sabra cactus, which typically embraced Palestinian farm houses. Also, the remaining Palestinian quarters and buildings in and around West Jerusalem, which escaped demolishing, were quickly occupied and dwelled with Jewish immigrants. (see images 14,15)

Map 4 Operation Plans 1948

Map 5 Jerusalem District Villages destroyed in 1948


Image 14 Zionist forces attack Qatamon home 1. May 1948

Source: Tamari 1999:149, photographer unknown
Most important step: Claiming Jerusalem as the capital of Israel

From the beginning Israeli Zionist politicians and planners began to prepare Jerusalem to be the capital of Israel. In 1950, the Knesset has declared Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by law. After that the government systematically transferred most ministries and government offices from the coastal towns (Tel Aviv as an interim location) into the New City. In addition, the development of roads and motorways, the building of central institutions and the enlargement of the Jewish Israeli neighbourhoods, the urbanisation in general underlined the national importance of the city for Israel as the ‘Capital’.

1.3 East Jerusalem and the Old City – Development under Jordan Governance

The east city expanded likewise under Jordan governance. Suburbs and quarters like the Salaheddin Street and the Bab al Zahra quarter that had been part of the New City outside the Old City Walls eventually developed as the new shopping and commercial areas because of the disconnection of Jaffa Street, that belonged to Israel after 1948. The Old City within the walls remained the heart of the city and was still the important historical shopping centre for the ‘West Bank’ inhabitants with its markets and business institutions, banks, chamber of commerce etc. The refugees who came from the West (new) City and the villages made the Old City dense and crowded. The historical buildings and ‘hosh’s’ (historic family living ensemble) where not at all appropriate to accommodate new and large families. Under the Jordanian administration, the city suffered from lack of modern services and infrastructure and from negligence. Due to the density and poor housing conditions, the missing jobs and training possibilities further emigration waves followed consequently. Many families were depending on work in the Arab countries. However, the natural population growth led to more urbanisation and new habitat in the eastern suburbs of the Old City.
Besides, Jerusalem and especially the Old City remained a central attraction for foreign visitors, tourists, Muslim and Christian pilgrims as well. In times of holy religious seasons like Easter, Christmas, Ramadan or the Holy Sacrifice Jerusalem doubled its inhabitants and shop keepers and business men in general had a good income.

East and West Jerusalem expanded their built up areas inevitably. The Jerusalem City Scheme of 1959 and 1964 under Jordan Law reveal an extended outline border, including Abu Dis, Anata until Kalandia in the north into the city scheme. (see map 6, 7)

Map 6 Jerusalem City Borders and built up areas 1947, 1949 and 1967

Map 7 City Scheme borders 1964

Borders and built up areas 1947, 1949 and 1967

Source: fmep.org 2007

1.4 Jerusalem after 1967: Unification by Force - Further Ethnic Transformation

The State of Israel was already experienced in judaizing Palestinian lands and sources. Again, with the military conquer of the city in 1967; all kinds of measures were taken immediately to occupy the area, to throw out Palestinian population and to settle Israeli in the emptied places as soon a possible. Existing services and the political and administrative structure of the Palestinian capital were destroyed. Jerusalem came under full Israeli control, in somehow extended borders of the drafted in 1964. (see maps 8,9)
1.4.1 The Expropriation Process in the First Year after the Military Conquest of East Jerusalem

The year of 1967 can be seen as a ‘second round’ of the Zionist fight for Jerusalem. After the occupation on 7 June 1967 the most affecting steps were as follows and realised during the first weeks of military conquest:

- the destruction of the Maghreb (Magharbeh) quarter and expulsion of its 6,000 inhabitants within few hours;
- the clearing of the Jewish quarter and eviction of about 4,000 Palestinian inhabitants;
- the demolition of all houses and shops from Jaffa Gate to the New Gate and in the Musrara quarter as well, moreover, the flattening of the plastic goods factory at the Armenian quarter. They all were buildings partly placed in the 'no man's land'; the land was later planned to become the so-called 'green belt', for the 'David City Project' and the by-pass roads around the Old City walls;
- the total cleansing of the other parts of the 'no man's land' area since 1948: abandoned buildings like the convention of the Reparatrice Sisters, the old post-office building, the shops, which had belonged to the Greek orthodox Patriarchy, the Franciscan Terra Santa school, the Syrian-catholic church, as well as some private houses;
- the 'Census', which has started on 26.7.1967, and has forced the east city under strict curfew, only the 'present' Jerusalemites were registered as inhabitants, those who were out by accident or had fled from the clashes between Palestinians and Israelis, were not registered (like in the whole West Bank and Gaza region, see section IV); only 66,000 Palestinians were registered as Jerusalemites, among them only 22,000 of the living quarters outside the Old City, which technically did not belong to Jerusalem according to Jordanian disregard. It
was assumed, that around one third of the real Palestinian Jerusalemites had lost their status by this ‘Census’. Again the so-called 'absentees' tried later to return according to the internationally embodied ‘family unification law’ – however, this right was denied from Israel in most of the cases;

- the classification of the East Jerusalem Palestinians as 'permanent inhabitants' with only ‘residency’ right), hence not citizens like the Jewish immigrants after the Israeli 'Law of Entry' of 1952 (see section III);

- the 'formal' annexation of East Jerusalem by the Knesset Law on 27.7.1967;

- the forced 'unification' of the city’s administration on 28.7.1967 and the extension of the city’s boundaries three times of its former size, from north of Bethlehem until Kalandia in the south of Ramallah (sea maps 7/8); densely populated Palestinian suburbs such as Al-Ram, Abu Dees, AL-Ezariyya and large parts of the Kalandia refugee camp, belonging to the Jordanian Jerusalem governorate, were excluded; this fact has still an impact on Palestinian residency and identity, as the wall is cementing this exteriorisation and displacement of former Jerusalemites;

- the closure of all banks, commercial institutions and firms, followed by a forced connection to the Israeli administration, bank and commercial system.

(Tleel 1999:30 FF).

Hence the newly by Israeli occupied East Jerusalem exteriorised the Palestinian part of Jerusalem, grabbed more West Bank land under Israeli law and territory, looted houses and properties, expatriated thousands of Jerusalemites and the remained lost their citizenship, becoming from now on only 'residents' in an Israeli town, who have to prove their existence every 7 years through different documents like foreigners and immigrants.

1.5 Colonising Jerusalem and Turning it into a Jewish City, the 'Capital of Israel'

The judaising of East, Palestinian Jerusalem followed strategies and planned steps as known from Israel after 1948 and in accordance with the policies in the West Bank and the Gaza region. Furthermore, Jerusalem East, including the Old City was supposed now to become from now on the Jewish religious centre and the capital of Israel.

In official terms: “The analysis of the role of Jerusalem for the national and the meaning as the capital [...] was the first step when planning. [...] The desire to maintain a Jewish majority and the hope to secure the status of Jerusalem as the national capital – led the idea of a fast development and a fast implementation. [...] The outstanding and out of question principles for planning in Jerusalem is the implementation of the unit” (Kroyanker 1982: 2). “Since the reunification of Jerusalem in the year 1967 we created the building of two rings of new housing settlements around the city centre, a kind of new barriers, which are to work primarily as political barriers against a renewed division” (Kroyanker 1985:82.)

To follow these aims we can identify the following planning issues:

- confiscation of Palestinian land and buildings,
- building of new colonies,
- transfer of Jewish-Israeli inhabitants into the confiscated areas and buildings,
• tight restrictions on the spatial expansion of Palestinian inhabitants,
• reduction of Palestinian inhabitants within the newly created borders of Jerusalem to the minimal,
• separation of Jerusalem from the rest of the ‘West Bank’ and thus
• destruction of the traditional economic, cultural and social relations between East Jerusalem and it’s hinterland.

This is still the purpose of using planning methods and instruments, which were already approved during the Israeli colonisation policy after 1948 in the borders of 1948. To achieve this in East Jerusalem (and the West Bank and Gaza Region as well, see sections before), national and local Israeli institutions, along with Zionist organisations and settler groups acted in a wide spectrum of legal, half-legal and illegal ways, supported by the state and the military, and sponsored by many well-known and unknown sources (Silbermann 1998:31 pp). Main strategy was and is until now the construction of colonies and the settling of Jewish Israeli amidst of Palestinian neighbourhoods in order to create facts on the ground and always using power.

1.5.1 **Colony Groups Blocking the Three Accesses to the City: the North, East and South Corridors**

Jerusalem planners developed long- middle and short term plans to secure a Jewish character for the city. A "ring of settlements will provide a necessary buffer in case of any political or military pressure. The creation of satellite belts is part of a long-term plan." (Kroyanker, 1982: 27)

Since 1967 colonies were established continuously and were exclusively Jewish Israeli colony groups, which eventually surrounded East Palestinian Jerusalem following three historic corridors, the northern, western and southern, hence Jerusalem sits on a crossroad of important communication axes from Nablus, Damascus and Asia Minor in the north, to Hebron and Mecca in the south and from Jordan and the Jordan Hills to Jaffa and the Coastal Plane. The new built up Jewish colonies along these corridors and supposedly forming belts, however are separating the city in the long run from its historic rural hinterland with an additional net of new roads and motorways, connecting them to Israel and the western Jewish Israeli New City and to the Jordan:

- **'the northern corridor'**: with the largest colony of Givat Zeev and Ramot Allon, and nowadays consisting of approximately 90,000 Israeli Jews;
- **'the eastern corridor'**: with the biggest and still expanding colony Maale Adumim and satellites, with a nowadays population of about 50,000 Israeli Jews;
- **'the southern corridor'**: including the largest colonies of Gilo and Efrat, part of today Etzion Bloc, accommodating approximately 50,000 Israeli Jews.

Including them into a ‘Greater Jerusalem’ boundary was once published and discussed in the eighties. (see map 10, image 15)
(Kroyanker 1982: 2pp; The Jerusalem Institutes for Israel Studies, 1982/1985)
For the establishment of these huge colonies the land of 20 villages along with lands from Bethlehem, Beit Safafa and Beit Jala was confiscated. Furthermore hundreds of Bedouin families were driven out from their traditional pastureland and living areas (The Closure of Jerusalem 1999: 12).

### 1.5.2 Colony Groups as Belts Forming Barriers

The colony groups in the long run were aimed illegally usurping more land, creating Jewish majorities and blocking the access to Jerusalem through building wider belts. This happened in three stages:

- **The first settlement belt, 1968 - 1973**: representing the northern connection between the Hadassah University on Mount Scopus to the West (new) City and separates thereby the Old City and Sheikh Jerah from the northern quarters of East Jerusalem Shuafat and Beit Hanina.

- **The second settlement belt, 1970 - 1985**: representing the southern connection between the two parts of the city and forms a further circle around Eastern Jerusalem and the city centre between Gilo in the south and Ramot Allon in the north-west, which at the same time restricts the expansion of Bethlehem and Beit Jala.

- **The third settlement belt, 1975 until today**: covering three large colonies in the far peripheries of the East City with Bet El in the north, Maale Adumim in the east and Efrat in the south, restricting Palestinian expansion, dividing it from Abu Dees and Essawiye and forming the platform to link with Jordan.

(see map 11, map 12)
These colonies are becoming the corner pillars for building the future ‘Metropolitan Jerusalem’, a plan, published in 1980, according to which Bethlehem and Ramallah is aimed to include within the city boundaries. (see map 12) Colonies however are destroying historical landscape of Jerusalem and its surrounding, as we can see clearly at the Abu Ghneim - Har Homa project, what was a beautifully wooded hill between Jerusalem and Bethlehem before becoming a colony area placed as a barrier between Jerusalem and Bethlehem (see image 16)

**Image 17 Abu Ghneim, today Har Homa**

Source: PASSIA 2003
Source: FMEP 2007

Source Arij 2005
In the meantime large parts of the hills between these three main strategic colonies are covered with small colonies, so that the third belt will eventually be consolidated to a colony chain closing East Jerusalem completely from its surrounding – as well as from the Palestinian parts of Jordan Valley. The actual construction of the wall is making this aim complete.


Map 13 'Metropolitan Jerusalem'

Furthermore, appropriate road networks and systems supplement the concept of the division and separation of the Palestinian areas from each other. They also connect Israeli areas and colonies by new bypass roads with one another, as well as with the West (new) City. This also prepares the direct connection between Israel and the Jordan valley, which is meanwhile completely under Israeli military control. The planning for the 'Metropolitan Jerusalem' will thus become part of dividing the West Bank into Bantustans.

1.5.3 Colonies and Projects in the Surrounding Area of the Old City: the Seam Project

 Israeli officials tend to explain the development concepts in the direct periphery of the Old City as the most strategic idea for the 'unification' of the city. Especially the removal of the so called 'Seam' is seen as important, but additional projects for greenery and cultural institutions belong to that idea as follows:

- the 'green belt' around the Old City ramparts, various small parks between the Old City and the Palestinian residential areas such as Souwane and Silwan,
- the transformation of the Musrara area into a central taxi and bus service area for the West Bank,
- creation of an Israeli service area: Bus and parking lots and the project of 'David's City' with shops and hotels on the Mamilla area,
• the ‘culture mile’ with Windmill Quarter, open air theatre at the Solomom pools and the Cinematheque,
• the ‘Archaeology Park’ underneath the Maghreb quarter and Al Aqsa-mosque,
• the integration of the Silwan spring into a part of the ‘Archaeology Park’ different new buildings and the occupation and destruction of Palestinian houses belonging to that,
• the ‘Promenade’ in the south-east on land of Abu Tur,
• the area of the ‘Government House’, UN head quarter, a police centre, a hotel and buildings for congresses,
• converting large areas of the ‘Mount of Olives’ as the Jewish main cemetery near the 'Garden Gethsemane’ from Ras al Amud until El Ezzariya.

(The Jerusalem Institutes for Israel Studies, 1982/1985)

Figure 1 The Cultural Mile Project at the western entrance (Bab al Khalil/Jaffa Gate) : Promenade (1), Open Air Theatre at Sultan's Pool (6) Windmill project (7) a.o.

Furthermore, the waste water sewer in ‘the Kidron valley’, which drains waste water from Hebrew University, is demolishing parts of the historical valley.

Actual an underground metro, a ‘light railway’ is nearly finished, which will be a vital link connecting the western New City with the Israeli Jewish colonies Ramot Eshkol and French Hill. The use of this metro is expected to be confined on Israelis only, though piercing through the Palestinian areas. The project is issued as a private partnership with two French groups. Actually the project is under worldwide public critics within the BDS (boycott, devestment, sanctions) movement (Le Monde Diplomatique février 2007: 18, see map 14)
In accordance with municipality activities, Jewish groups are occupying building complexes and houses in the densely inhabited Palestinian neighbourhoods inside and close to the Old City, e.g. in Silwan, Abu Dees, Sheikh Jerah and Jibl Zeitun (Mount of Olives). This is not only disturbing daily life of the Palestinian Jerusalemites, but meant to judaising and eventually separating the Palestinian living quarters from each other and throwing the Palestinians out of the city. (Silbermann 1998:31 f; Waltz/Zschiesche 1986:350 pp; Kroyanker 1982:27)

1.5.4. Judaising the Old City

Israeli town planners of Jerusalem like to spread the impression that the official planning activities are only pursuing the upgrading of the Old City (see map 15) and strengthening the historical and cultural heritage (so done for example by the Israeli member in the assembly of the UNESCO session about Jerusalem in November 1987).

Map 14 CityPass - the Jerusalem Light-Rail Project (– – – – –)

Map 15 The Old City Quarters

Source: http://bdsmovement.net/?q=node/461

Source: Weidenfeld/Nicolson 1989
However, it is too evident that the Israeli municipality is pursuing nothing but to control the Palestinians, reduce their existence and strongly strengthen the Jewish character of the city. ‘Upgrading’ is rather a dressing or a make-up, and not even adapted to the place – like the case of the mosaics in front of the 12 stations at Via Dolorosa. In all other aspects official planning cares a little about the daily needs of the inhabitants, or the standard of housing, social infrastructure, health supply or social or cultural centres for the Palestinian population. On the contrary, building and modernisation permission are withheld or building applications are used to declare the building as outdated, to classify it as dangerous and uninhabitable so that it is advisable to refuse such permission and advise the inhabitants to leave the place. While the Jewish Quarter enjoys each support, the Palestinian quarters are dependent on family resources or help from the Islamic foundation, the Auqaf, if not foreign funds. All these means are limited. Again, to say that changes especially in the social fabric is against UN resolutions and international Law!

Changing the face and the meaning of historical places by official planning

The judaising of the Old City can be identified in the following areas or projects:

- The Jewish Quarter: apartments and houses are renewed or modernised, funded by international and Jewish donors. In large scale some parts are rebuilt or newly built; some of the new buildings are destroying the historic sites, like the Jewish Center opposite to the ‘wailing wall’, an architectural crime. The larger Palestinian part of the Old City, which is lively and vibrant, is visibly poorer. The Jewish Quarter and above all the huge place in front of the ‘wailing wall’ became a highly controlled Ghetto with barriers and presence of police and weapons, and Palestinians are hindered from entering;

- The destruction of the Maghreb Quarter, ‘cleansing’ it from homes, a school and a garden, converting it into the main Jewish religious centre in front of the ‘wailing wall’, closed by fences and check points, with a special entrance and even more restricting one of the historic accesses to the Al Aqsa Mosque (see figure 11,12)

*Image 18 Maghreb Quarter 1934  Image 19 Maghreb Quarter today*

Source: www.palestineremembered  Source: www.mosaic.lk.net/g-wall.html

- The Via Dolorosa: important route for pilgrims and a historical place; some parts and the stations are ‘renewed’ in European style pedestrian areas, such as the entrance to the Damascus Gate and the inner space of the Hebron/Jaffa Gate;

- The Citadel: the image and symbolic of the Citadel underwent a complete change, is called ‘David City’ and converted into a Museum of Jewish roots of history only;
The ‘Tunnel’: in 1998 and against international protests, the Israeli municipality opened a tunnel with an entrance starting at the Wailing Wall, with an exit emerging into the Via Dolorosa at the third station. Since then and on a daily basis, hundreds of Jewish visitor groups turn up, accompanied by body guards, policemen and soldiers, poisoning the atmosphere between Lion Gate and the Austrian Hospice in Al Ward Street.

(Waltz, 1996, Kroyanker 1985, 1982)

**Judaising the space by force of Jewish groups**

In all other respects, the planners leave the real transformation of the city to the hands of aggressive Jewish groups such as Shuvat Banim and Young Israel - groups, which co-operate with the ultra right wing settler movement Gush Emunim and pursue a concept of 'hebronising' or 'bantustanising' Jerusalem, mirroring the future of the Old City of Jerusalem with that of Hebron (see map 16). (Silberman 1998:31 f, Dumper 1992, see next section). No Palestinian quarter is excluded from these actions, whether Muslim or Christian. These groups occupying buildings threatening the Palestinian inhabitants and eventually forcing them to leave are destroying the structure and the view of the Old City. Once these groups appear, destroy, evict and occupy, police and military are following them for 'protection' and 'security'. Thus, official and unofficial planning is working 'hand in hand'. Since 2000, the millennium cameras all over are controlling the daily life hence the Palestinians day and night. (Waltz 1996; Dumper 1992:32)

**Map 16 Areas usurped by Jewish settler groups (blue stars) and area expropriated for extension of the Jewish Quarter 2007**

Source: Jan de Jong in: Passia 2007
1.6 The Role of the Planning Instruments

As before (chapter III/IV) the classical planning set of judaizing again came into action: Master plans, confiscation, refusal of building permission and demolition of already built houses (Ir Shalem 1998, see map 17):

- **Master Plans**: Master plans for the Palestinian quarters are never promoting the spatial development of the Palestinian areas, however, limiting the building zones substantially and converting large areas of Palestinian lands, approximately 40%, to green areas and extension areas for Jewish colony areas - without an official approved master plan; altogether only about 11% of the East Jerusalem master plan areas are approved for the extension of the Palestinian populated areas – which is not at all enough for the natural growth of the Palestinian population;

- **Confiscation**: Confiscation of Palestinian land and property can be identified for various urbanisation purposes, more than one third of the area of East Jerusalem was expropriated; more than half of the East Jerusalem Palestinian property was defined as ‘absentees land’ after 1967, according to the absentee law from 1950;

- **Low Building Density**: While the Jewish-Israeli populated areas are allowed 120% or 136% density, the Palestinian areas are restricted to a density of 25% to 50% (in two floor buildings); only in the northern quarters of Beit Hanina and Shuafat a density of 75% is allowed; this nevertheless allows buildings of a maximum up to four floors. Israeli planners dare to explain this with respect to 'cultural' habits (in an interview with German students in: P 25: 2004)

- **Building Licenses**: A complex of obstacles for getting licences still exist; the costs to get a building licence is extremely high, it takes years to get one, and after receiving a license Palestinians are forced by law to finish construction within a year; but most of all, building licenses are rejected for different reasons; this encourages the phenomena of building without license ('illegal building'); most of these unlicensed buildings are built regarding the current needs of the families and due to the limitation of housing areas through these master plans to an approximate number of 5,000 units;

- **Demolishing of Houses**: Demolishing of so-called ‘illegal buildings’ follows consequently; since the occupation ICAHD estimates that 24,145 houses have been demolished in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza together since 1967. In Jerusalem between 2004 and 2008 449 houses were demolished from 3,753 buildings threatened by demolition orders (ICAHD 2009, see following images);

![Image 20 Bulldozing a house](source ICAHD 2009)

![Image 21 House demolition in Abu Tur](source ICAHD 2009)

![Image 21 House demolition in Abu Tur](Foto: Amro 2006)
Zoning for Business Areas: Only 0.5% of the entire Palestinian East Jerusalem area is sited in the proposed master plans for trade, shopping, industry areas. (Ir Shalem 1998, B'Tselem 2003, 2002, The Closure of Jerusalem 1999:30)

Map 17 Master Plan and Land Use Plan as Restriction
(red expropriated for colonies, light green: unplanned, dark green: open space areas, black: built up (Palestinian) residential)

Source: Irshalem 1998: 7

The list of such discrimination by intentional different treatments through official planning can be expanded to other sectors of urban infrastructure such as supply of water, waste water and waste disposal, as well as for the social sector, such as education and health care and also regarding the job market and professional vocational training (see PASSIA 2003:305 pp, PASSIA 1999:264 f; Irshalem 1998:8).

1.7 The Results of Segregation and Discrimination of the Palestinian Jerusalemites

Comparing the developing in East (Palestinian) and West (Israeli) Jerusalem during 29 years of occupation, Brik found between 1967 and 1996 the discrimination of the Palestinian Jerusalemites evident as follows:

- In the Palestinian part of the city 2.2 housing units per dunam were established, while 6.1 in the Israeli part;
- In the Palestinian part of the city the inhabitant density amounts to about 14.6 persons per dunam, however, in the Israeli part it is 21.7;
In the Palestinian part of the city the average density amounts to 2.2 persons per room, while in the Israeli part it is 1.1;

In the Palestinian part of the city 27.8% of the population live with 3 or more than 3 persons per room, however, in the Israeli part its only 2.4%;

In the Palestinian part of the city 61.5% of the population live with 2 or more persons per room, in the Israeli part its only 13.5%;

In the Palestinian part of the city between 1967 and 1995 10,473 housing units were built in addition to the existing 12,600, however in the Israeli sector there were 70,692 buildings added to the existing 57,500 housing units, i.e. in the Palestinian sector the housing stock grew by 83%, while it grew in the same period in the Israeli sector by 123%;

Related to the growth of the population it is a fact that in the Palestinian sector one new housing unit per 9.7 inhabitant was built, while in the Israeli sector one new housing unit per 3 inhabitants.;

Related to the building permits 6,3 were given for new West Jerusalemites, but only 2,6 for new East Jerusalemites. (Brik 1996)

Besides building, taxes and loads imposed on the Palestinian inhabitants have a more catastrophic effect, which led to a level of income of one third of the western Israeli side (Ir Shalem 1998:53).

Moreover, there is a political discrimination of Palestinian Jerusalemites, as they are constantly subjected to confiscation of their identity documents. (PASSIA 2003:301 f, The Closure of Jerusalem 1999:27 f)

Conclusion

The peace process did not ease at all a solution for the so-called ‘Jerusalem Question’. On the contrary: Reality shows that the Israeli policy in East Jerusalem is part of the judaizing process in whole Palestine, nowadays concentrating on Jerusalem. Israel enforces – and each Israeli government was and is involved - by planning matters the judaizing of the Old City, the environment of the Old City and the remaining eastern, northern and southern residential areas of East Palestinian Jerusalem.

The effect of all mentioned projects and measures is an intended substantial change of the historical and the Palestinian character of Jerusalem. They also influence the economy and the future of the East Jerusalem Palestinian society, which substantially depend on tourism, since the relations to the hinterland are cut off. The different activities since the occupation destroyed the central economical basis and tourism.

While the Western (new) City has all the needed means to serve international tourism with parking space, bus connections, guides and tourist information centres, the Eastern (Palestinian) City is deprived more and more from modern tourist infrastructure. Keeping and upgrading the historical landscape, valleys, villages, and the important places for the Muslims and the Christians in the east are facing more and more difficulties and obstacles, while the Jewish defined places receive the most care and attention from the Israeli governed municipality. This is fact even more in the Old City of Jerusalem.
Since the illegal and total closure for Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza following the peace agreements in Oslo, Jerusalem has lost its existential role for the Palestinian hinterland. The provocation of Sharon and the following outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada made tourism completely dead. The political, economic, cultural and social situation of the Palestinian inhabitants of the city, declined dramatically. Moreover, the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza region are denied access to basic social institutions like hospitals and schools. The Segregation Wall will complete the total isolation of the Palestinian Jerusalemites and intends to hinder establishing East Palestinian Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital in a Palestinian State. Again the geographical, demographic and cultural usurpation of Jerusalem is part of the long time before planned cleansing program for Palestine and actual since the right wing parties came into power 2008 a 'par force' judaisation is on teh way, threatening Palestinians’ history, identity and socio-economic basics. The so called ‘unification’ is understood and cemented by facts and planning as a Jewish unification of Jerusalem, hence part of the cultural genocide already started since last century.

The next section will go deeply to the effects of planning and especially the Segregation Wall in terms of destroying the geographic and demographic continuity of Palestinian Jerusalem.

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2. Destruction of the Palestinian Urban Fabric and Landscape in East Jerusalem after 1967 and the Effects of the Segregation Wall

Jerusalem, as a lively city, has been affected by what has happened since 1967 inside and around it, and thus, its features have changed over the years. This section sheds light on the urban, demographic, and area transformations which have happened in Jerusalem since the Israeli capture of the city, especially since the erection of the Segregation Wall.

2.1 Demographic and Urban Transformations in Jerusalem after 1967

In order to create a state of geographic integrity with cities inside Israel, the boundaries of Jerusalem were extended by annexing more land from the occupied West Bank, almost a two-fold extension compared to the total area of the Jerusalem governorate prior to June 1967. Thus, the current area of occupied Jerusalem governorate amounts to 126,000 dunam based on a rule stressing the annexation of more less populated land along with complete demolition of any Palestinian communities that may threaten or obstruct the intended geographic integrity, especially in the western side of the governorate. The demolition and complete depopulation of the three Latroon villages Imwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba has been a live example on the measures Israel has been taking in this respect.

The Israeli illegal measures have not stopped at this point but rather underwent serious acceleration. Namely, the Israeli occupation authorities embarked on knotting a colony belt around Jerusalem as preventive security armour for Jerusalem to be as a first defence line of its borders. This implied the adoption of a more aggressive land confiscation policy by the Israeli government, which targeted thousands of dunam from the Palestinian land under different pretexts. This policy had other dimensions including construction of Israeli colonies on the confiscated land, coupled with a serious obstruction of Palestinian urban expansion and construction growth in nearby areas as well as domination of more land, already explained. In this way, the Israelis achieved the greatest part of their plans and intentions for long years in the future.

Geographically speaking, the boundaries of the occupied city were expanded to an extent that allows the absorption of as much Jewish settlers on colonies as possible. Demographically, less populated Palestinian communities were annexed while stressing the obstruction of any urban growth of the communities. These two urban dimensions have been worsened further by the construction of the segregation wall in 2002 and the colonies belt around Jerusalem. Thus, Israel imposed this reality which received complete Palestinian and international dismissal (Mustafa 2000).

From Israel's viewpoint, it succeeded in surrounding Jerusalem and accomplishing its historic project through illegal administrative regulations and measures, which at the end will lead to imposing its authority on the Palestinian City. This also includes the annexation and domination of the various aspects of living conditions of its Palestinian people via distortions of realities and creation of new realities on the ground. These endeavours are aimed to legitimise its illegal procedures and exclude Palestinian Jerusalem in the text of relevant UN and international resolutions. However, international resolutions and conventions at the top of which Geneva
Fourth Convention for 1949 completely reject any change in the status of occupied territories. Thus, articles III - 49 and 53 of Geneva Fourth Convention for 1949 prohibits all practices of the Israeli occupation including demolition, evacuation, depopulation, and endangering the security and lives of the Palestinian citizens under occupation. In addition, world states and UN including Security Council and other international agencies and organisations still deal with Jerusalem as part of the occupied West Bank on which relevant UN resolutions apply (Security Council Resolutions: 242, 252,253,254,267,198 and General Assembly Resolutions 2253, 2254). These Resolutions stress that the international legitimacy deems the annexation of Jerusalem and changing its urban structure illegal; abort the Israeli plans for having Jerusalem as its 'unified capital' and stress the Palestinian identity of Jerusalem which is deeply rooted in the Palestinian history.

Soon after the 1967 war the Israeli government began implementing new measures to change the physical features of the Occupied Territories including Jerusalem, imposing massive Israeli housing colonies, or "facts on the ground," that would be difficult to uproot. We observed that the most significant measures pertaining to East Jerusalem’s urban development were the following:

- The June 27, 1967 Israeli Knesset declaration of the application of Israel law, jurisdiction and administration to East Jerusalem.
- The decision, also issued June 27, that allowed the Interior Minister to increase the area of the Jerusalem municipality, broadening the borders of East Jerusalem to an area of 69,000 dunam. The decision was published in the Official Gazette the very same day. On March 10, 1985, the city's borders were expanded once again to 70,400 dunam, nearly 12 times the area under Jordanian rule. (Dunum = 1,000 m² or 1 ha).
- The destruction of the Magharbeh (Maghreb) Quarter, which was blasted with dynamite after giving local residents three hours to evacuate their homes. The move literally paved the way for the Israeli government to construct the Wailing Wall Plaza and the Israeli Quarter. The Israelis confiscated 116 dunam of Old City property, including the Magharbeh, Al- Sharaf, Nabi Daood, Al-Maidan, and parts of the Assyrian neighbourhoods. The confiscation included 700 stone buildings (437 workshops and stores, and 1,048 apartments, inhabited by more than 6,000 Palestinians). Prior to 1948, Israelis had owned only 105 of those buildings.
- The dissolution, on June 29, 1967, of the Jerusalem Municipal Council, elected in 1963, the confiscation of its records and properties, and the integration of the council's Palestinian employees with the West (Israeli) Jerusalem municipality. The Jerusalem Mayor, Mr. Rawhi Al-Khatib, was expelled to Jordan on March 7, 1968.
- Confiscation and seizure of Palestinian lands located in the extended municipality borders, as of September 1, 1968. Other areas were subject to "closure" as green areas or military zones (there are four military camps in East Jerusalem, Sheikh Jarrah, Anata, Nabi Ya'cob, Ar-Ram) to be used later for Israeli colonies. Between 1968 and 1991, a total of 23,548 dunam were confiscated in East Jerusalem, equivalent to 33 percent of the total area, to be added to nearly 37,348 dunam outside the zoned areas (green areas, streets, camps, etc.). The majority of this land was reserved for continued urban expansion of Israeli colonies. Teddy Kollek, Jerusalem mayor from 1965-1993, said: "We decided from the first session of the (expanded) Jerusalem Municipal Council to classify vast areas of lands in East Jerusalem as green zones where
construction is banned, and we refused the structural zoning maps presented by Palestinian residents“ (Benvenisti 1995). Due to this policy, Palestinians in Jerusalem were left with only 9,504 dunam on which to build and expand.

- Beginning in 1968, the Israeli government began to change the building and housing features of East Jerusalem, erecting 15 colonies inside its borders. In 1999, the 16th illegal colony began on Mount Abu Ghneim, near Bethlehem. The colonies drastically changed the Jewish-Palestinian ratio. In 1967, only a few dozen Israelis lived in East Jerusalem (at Hebrew University and Hadassah Hospital), but by 1998, the figure had reached 156,412 or 48 percent of the city's residents. The colonies were built in strategic locations to prevent the urban expansion and collusion of Palestinian areas, which could become the capital of a Palestinian state. While Israeli colonies were expanding, constraints were imposed on Palestinian construction through zoning schemes and delays in the issuing of building permits. Even when permits were granted, applicants were required to pay enormous sums, ranging from $15,000 - $20,000; such fees constituted nearly half the cost of a first-class independent building on a 200-meter area (excluding the cost of the land).

- Between 1967 and 1993, Palestinian residents could build only 10,492 housing units in East Jerusalem, compared with 44,481 units erected for Israelis. The annual ratio of Jewish-Palestinian construction during this period was 4.4:1. Another contributing factor in this disparity was the fact that Israeli construction was basically state-funded, while Palestinian construction was not.

After 1967, Israeli finance ministers began to sign confiscation orders one after the other, based on The Law of Expropriation for Public Benefit (1950). They also published them in the official newspaper (Official Gazette). Once land was confiscated, its original owners were barred from planting or building on it. New Israeli colonies were then established, preventing the land from ever being returned to its real owners and changing the Palestinian structure and identity of East Jerusalem. 71.7 percent of East Jerusalem land was confiscated from Palestinians primarily from 1968 -1970, so to quickly establish colonies and attract Israeli residents to live in them. The Israeli plans worked, and the first construction began on Ramat Eshkol, French Hill colonies and the Hebrew University (see table of East Jerusalem colonies). The following figure shows area of confiscated land in East Jerusalem and demonstrates how Palestinian lands were seized in several strategic regions for the purpose of Israeli colonies' expansion (see table1,2).

Table 1 Development of Israeli Colonies in East Jerusalem Municipality by Population and Area from 2000 to 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Israeli Colony</th>
<th>Population 2000-2005</th>
<th>Area (dunam)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Talpiot</td>
<td>12.158</td>
<td>1.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilo</td>
<td>27.258</td>
<td>2.859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giv'at Ha-Matos/Har Homa</td>
<td>4.604</td>
<td>2.833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giv'at Ha-Mivtar</td>
<td>2.912</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giv'at Shapira (French Hill)</td>
<td>7.776</td>
<td>2.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma'alot Dafna</td>
<td>3.675</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neve Ya'akov</td>
<td>20.156</td>
<td>1.759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony Name</td>
<td>Establishment Year</td>
<td>Area (by dunum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allon</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geva’ Binyamin</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giv’on Hahadashah</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giv’ at Zeev</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gev’ on</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almon</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qalia</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qidar</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kefar Adummim</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishor Adummim</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’ ale Adummim</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Har Adar</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokhav Yaaqov</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Har Shmuel</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almog*</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>52,666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2 Israeli Colonies in the East Jerusalem District by Area, Population and Year of establishment in 2000

Land was confiscated in locations where Palestinian villages and towns, if expanded, might have formed a unified Palestinian residential area. For example, land was confiscated to erect the Gilo and Har Homa colonies, so as to prevent the expansion of the Palestinian towns of Bethlehem, Beit Sahur and Beit Jalla to connect with Beit Safafa, Sharafat, Sur Bahr and Umm Tuba and also to cut them from Jerusalem. The same situation occurred when the no-man's land and Palestinian areas in Jabal...
el-Mukabber were usurped to build the Eastern Talpiot colony, thus preventing any extension between the Palestinian quarters of Es-Sawahira Gharbîyye and Sur Bahîr. At the same time, it forms the eastern extension of western Talpiot and, therefore, the continuous extension of Israeli construction against Palestinian continuity.

In the same way, Israeli colonies were built to obstruct continuity of Palestinian construction in north Jerusalem. This can be seen clearly if one looks at the Israeli Neve Ya’akov, Pisgat Ze’ev and Pisgat Omer colonies, which constitute a colony unit east of the Palestinian neighbourhoods of Ar-Ram, Dahiet al-Barid, Beit Hanina and Shua’fat, and thus prevent expansion in that area. The colonies prevent these quarters from connecting with Palestinian residential areas to the east, such as Jaba’, Hizma and Anata. The same situation applies to the Ramot, Rekhes Shufat and Giv’at Ze’ev colonies and the Giv’on group (on the north-western border of Jerusalem), which obstruct connection between the Palestinian quarters of Rafat, Qalandia, Al-Jib, Bir Nabala, Beit Hanina and Beit Ikse. Similarly, the Israeli colonies of French Hill, Giv’at Hamivtar, Ramat Eshkol, the Hebrew University and Ma’alot Dafna prevent connection between the Palestinian quarter Shua’fat and the other quarters in Al-Tur, the Mount of Olives and the Old City (see map 1) (Rassem/Rand 2003). The nearly completed Segregation Wall fixes these belts and chains of colonies (see map 1).

Map 1 Jewish Colonies (blue) between the Palestinian Residential Areas (rose) and the Wall of Annexation and Expansion surrounding East Jerusalem

Map 1

All theses planning measures and steps led to a sharp difference between Palestinian and Jewish living conditions, hence discrimination.

Table 3 for example shows clearly the resulting difference in density and housing provision between the Israeli and the Palestinian Jerusalemites.
Table 3 Distribution of Palestinian and Israeli Residents and Families in East Jerusalem by Areas 1983-1995 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th></th>
<th>Families</th>
<th></th>
<th>Average persons/unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>Beit  Hanina, Kafr ‘ Aqab, Shu’ fat</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al’ Isawiya Wadi al Joz</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sheikh Jarrah, Bab Assahire</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Silwan, Ras al Amud</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jabal al Mukkabber, Sur Bahir, Beit Safafa</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old City, Muslim, Christian, Armenian quarters</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Palestinians (1) in Palestinian areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>117.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>167.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>31.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israelis</td>
<td>Neve Ya’aqov, Pisgat Ze’ev</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>167.6</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ramot</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>218.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Hill, Ramat Eshkol</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Old City, the Jewish Quarter</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Talpiot</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gilo</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jabal Abu Ghneim – Har Homa</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Israelis</strong></td>
<td><strong>69.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>153.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>121.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.8</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total residents in East Jerusalem areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>189.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>320.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>73.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 1996

Note: Some Palestinians reside outside the defined statistical areas according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. These are not included in the overview.
2.2 The Effects of Israeli Planning on Continuity of Palestinian Population and Urban Development in East Palestinian Jerusalem

During the years 1967-2000, two important factors played a role in influencing population and construction in East Jerusalem. The first of these was the attempt by Palestinians to end the Israeli occupation of lands occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, and to work rapidly to conserve the Palestinian identity of Jerusalem and limit the changes that the Israeli authorities were undertaking. However, the Israeli administration successfully obstructed these efforts, since the Palestinians, being the occupied party, were far weaker. Second, Israel, being the occupying power, continued its systematic changes, declaring the annexation of East Jerusalem and issuing laws that served its purpose, regardless of their illegitimacy. The Israeli occupation authorities implemented a discriminatory policy against Palestinians, based on the premise that Palestinians were residents and not citizens with full rights. This sharply contradicted international law, which considered the Palestinians to be citizens of an occupied land, but it worked to the advantage of the Israeli authorities, who imposed taxes on Jerusalem's Palestinians but denied them many basic human rights. (Closure of Jerusalem 2000)

Municipal services in East Jerusalem fall far short of those offered in the areas of Israeli colonies and in West Jerusalem. In truth, this policy of discrimination is nothing new; it has been implemented for the past half century against Palestinian Israeli citizens, who still confront economic, cultural and social inequalities. However, the most decisive factors concerning discrimination in East Jerusalem that have severe impacts on urban development were land confiscation and closure, as well as the impediments placed on Palestinian construction, such as delaying the approval of zoning maps, denying Palestinians licenses to build and imposing high fees on such licenses when they were granted. The Israeli government also failed to take into consideration the differences between Palestinian and Israeli construction patterns. The Israeli municipality has been implementing a clear policy in the following areas which has its drawbacks on the urban expansion of the Palestinian citizens of the city:

- Neutralising the effect of Palestinian population growth by imposing social and economic restrictions on them and thus forcing them to leave Jerusalem.
- Continuing to confiscate the IDs of Jerusalem Palestinians, on the basis that they are in violation of residency laws that define them as temporary residents and not as centuries-old inhabitants of the city.
- Preventing the integration of Jerusalem's Palestinian neighbourhoods, so as to block a unified regional entity that could constitute the capital of a future Palestinian state. Dividing the neighbourhoods also served Israel maintain control of them.
- Imposing restrictions on Palestinian architectural activities by banning construction in certain neighbourhoods, such as Wadi El-Joz, El-Suwana, Silwan and the Nablus Road area which has forced more than 20,000 Palestinians to relocate outside Jerusalem until 2004. This has been an ongoing process since the 1970s, when the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem were forced to build in areas outside their city such as Ar-Ram, Bir Nabala and Abu Dis.

Additionally, since March 1, 1993, Jerusalem has been separated from the West Bank through the policy of closure, whereby residents of the West Bank are prohibited from entering Jerusalem without special security passes. These passes
are hard to obtain and rarely granted. Because Jerusalem is the economic, cultural, religious and social centre for its surrounding areas as well as adjacent parts of the West Bank, closure has had a devastating impact. This segregation and forced isolation has led to Jerusalem's economic decline, thus, in particular, forcing more and more Palestinians to leave the city in search of other markets. These measures have had severe impacts on urban development including construction and population growth in East Jerusalem.

Still, in mid-1994, it was revealed that a strict quota system had been applied to Palestinian urban construction in Jerusalem for more than 20 years. The goal was to limit the city's percentage of Palestinians to no more than 26 percent. The ministerial committee had clearly adopted this ceiling for Palestinian construction in 1973. This is the core Israeli position that has been imposed on the Palestinian population by force and through laws. The percentage of Palestinian residents in East and West Jerusalem combined has remained nearly the same since 1967, when Israel occupied East Jerusalem and annexed it to West Jerusalem. The percentage of Palestinian residents in "unified" Jerusalem in 1967 was 25.8 percent, rising to 27.8 percent in 1977, and 28.3 percent in 1987. By 1998, the figure had reached 30.9 percent. This percentage was maintained by two methods:

1. The construction of Israeli colonies in East Jerusalem to house around 156,000 Israeli settlers by 1998 and meanwhile nearly 200,000 or more.

2. The imposition of restrictions on Palestinian residents in the areas of construction, economics and politics, which encouraged emigration from the city.

If we compare the number of housing units with those that existed in 1967, one notices that 15,542 housing units were erected during 31 years of Israeli occupation, an average of 501 units per year. The average between 1952 and 1967 was 511 units per year. Considering the increase in the average growth of the population in East Jerusalem and the subsequent need for new housing, one notices a sharp reduction in building in East Jerusalem under Israeli occupation, as compared with previous eras. This forced Palestinian families to resort to building without permits, thus subjecting themselves to fines, court cases and house demolitions. (Mustafa 2000)

2.3 The Effects of the Israeli Measures on the Landscape and Environment

In his paper, "Transforming the Face of the Holy City: Political Messages in the Built Topography of Jerusalem," Rashid Khalidi of the University of Chicago contended that while building in Jerusalem has always been designed to meet a variety of functional needs, it has at the same time always projected religious and secular meanings and affirmed and legitimised political supremacy on the scale of the city as a whole. For Khalidi, the integration of the city organically into its environment ended in 1967 when the Israelis began their program of colony building in Palestinian Jerusalem and sacrificed the ideal of organic integration to their political agenda of urban character transformation and territorial control. In realising these goals, they have marred the surrounding skyline with fortress-like colonies exclusively inhabited by Israeli settlers that lack any organic connection to the city or the surrounding landscape. As he noted: "They are uniform in aspect, closely packed in ranks, and exude both an aggressive and a defensive aura.... Their austerity and plainness against the existing landscape and in contrast to the rest of the city's built topography reflect the very political nature of their existence; they are meant to occupy space, to cover territory, and to stake a claim to land, plainly and simply." (Khalidi 2000)
He then proceeded to give examples of the way Israeli colony activity has disregarded the relation between the city and its environment. He noted how the colonies on French Hill, for instance, have blocked the view of the city from the Palestinian city of Ramallah so that now, when one approaches from the north, the Old City no longer rises into view 'like a distant castle on a hill'. Indeed plans for new high rises in the city have obscured the Old City entirely. For example, the planned high rises in the colony of Gilo blocked the view from Bethlehem, and further cut off the two cities from each other. Moreover, the Israeli colony of Har Homa (on Jabal Abu Ghneim) has destroyed another one of the beautiful forests that once served as foils to the city. And the beautiful vistas of the Old City from Jabal Mukaber will be obstructed by the construction of high-rise hotels and towers. (Khalidi. 2000)

Similarly, as the famous writer Edward Said argued in his keynote address, "Palestine: Memory, Invention and Space," nations invent themselves in the present through the way they remember their past". (Said 1998)

Landscape is one important means by which a nation invents itself. Since Oslo, Palestinians have had greater opportunity to shape and develop their land through government-sponsored development and planning in the West Bank and Gaza. This more active relation to the land through proto-state institutions will no doubt spur Palestinian artists and writers to re-imagine landscape in a way that responds both creatively and critically to these new circumstances.

2.4 Future Schemes for Jerusalem

The Israeli schemes of expansion and seizure of Palestinian lands by Israeli occupation authorities have no limits, especially in Jerusalem. The main trend, which is gaining consensus in both the Likud and Labour parties, is to expand Jerusalem's borders to the east to reach a total area of 260 square km, more than double the area of East and West Jerusalem combined. This "Greater Jerusalem" will come at the expense of West Bank lands occupied in 1967. The colony of Maale Adumim with a total population of 22,200 in 1998 and nearly 50,000 today, would constitute Jerusalem's eastern borders. The city of Maale Adumim would be expanded so as to bring the population to 60,000, and a regional corridor of Israeli colonies would extend all the way to Virid Yeriho colony, which overlooks Jericho and further development of connecting roads will lead to Jordan. In the north, expansion is planned in the Giv'at Ze'ev colony compound and in Giv'on 1,2 and 3 to form one bloc with the largest population concentration in Ramot. In the south, bypass roads, tunnels and bridges have been erected to link Gilo with the Gush Etzion colony compound, avoiding the Palestinian towns of Bethlehem, Beit Sahur and Beit Jalla, until the borders of Greater Jerusalem reach the Israeli colony of Gush Etzion, as planned (Cohen 1993).

In contrary to that reality by planning Israel is going to tell the world that it aims to develop Jerusalem as the future open city, where all religions have a place and no discrimination for anyone. Facts on the ground and official speakers reveal that whatever is meant, this will be only under full Israeli control.

Conclusion

East Jerusalem is considered to be the capital of a Palestinian State by the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authorities. Hence, Israel under the known
geographical aims and the efforts to legitimate the judaising by constructing or fabricating Jewish history in that important place, was concentrating through planning on several aspects. For instance, the creation of something called David City, which is then the Citadel, Mamilla area and all the surrounding of the Bab Al Khalil, Jaffa Gate; upgrading and reshaping a quarter, that was inhabited by Jews in ancient times, to the New Jewish Quarter, including everything that surrounds the most holy Jewish place, the wailing wall. Also there is the concept of re-establishing Roman characteristics like the Cardo which must be understood as one part of eliminating Palestinian witness. The same interpretation can be done for the ‘Cultural Mile’, which is in parts a re-invention of a ‘modern Jewish culture’, like the windmill quarter of the end of the 19th century and the ‘green belt’ around the ancient city walls. Moreover and a crucial factor for the future of the city is the establishing of the colonies in and around the eastern part of the city usurping more land and establishing a majority of Jews in new borders. Again, planning is misused for demographic and geographic changes and reshaping the map and a country against international and human law.

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Hebron is one of the oldest cities in the world, dating back 6,000 years and known in Arabic as “Khalil Al- Rahaman”, referring to Ibrahim (Abraham): “Who can be better in religion than one who submits his whole self to Allah, does good, and follows the way of Abraham the true in faith? For Allah did take Abraham for a friend.” (Holy Quran 4:125). He is believed to have been buried in the cave under the present Ibrahimi mosque. Except for about a century during the epoch of the Crusades, Hebron has remained a predominantly Muslim city. Jews were allowed to reside in the town, always being a small minority. Only access to the 'Haram', the area around the mosque, was restricted to Muslims. At the time of the British Mandate and the planned infiltration of Zionists, the Hebron Jewish Community was attacked during the upheavals of 1929. Sixty-seven Palestinian Jews were killed and the rest of the 2,000-strong Jewish community left the city. (PACE 1999: 95pp)

Hebron today, with around 150,000 inhabitants, is the second city in terms of population and the chief town of the southern part of the West Bank. It is the commercial centre for traders from more than 100 surrounding villages and communities.

Hebron is situated 36 kilometres south of Jerusalem and some 25 km from Bethlehem (see map 1).

Map 1 South West Bank with location of Hebron City

Source: www.mcarta.msm.com

Hebron is the highest city in Palestine, with an altitude of 925 m in the Old City and 1,000 m in the New City areas. Its climate is temperate; it is also blessed with a rich water supply from natural reservoirs and springs. Its fertile soil provides it with agricultural potential and it was and is still an important agricultural town. Apples, plums, figs, almonds, grapes, melons, and a variety of vegetables are cultivated in
Hebron. The economic base for Hebron is small-scale industry producing cotton fabrics and clothes, leather products and other forms of handicrafts such as ceramics and glass. Dozens of quarries export stone and marble to the neighbouring Arab countries (PACE 1999. 101). The relatively stable and increasing prosperity of the city came to an end after the Israeli occupation in 1967 and the entrance of fanatical Jewish groups. There had no longer been a Jewish community since the thirties, and from the time of the occupation Israel started in two ways a silent and later aggressive usurpation process: a) allowing fanatical settler groups to enter the city occupying buildings in and around the Old City, and b) planting a huge colony alongside it, eventually leading to the division of the centre of Hebron by so-called agreements after 1993. In the words of the Zionist Movement, 'those who live here see the renewed vibrancy of the land as the fulfilment of the words of the Prophet Joel: “Nectar will flow from the mountains, and milk will run from the hilltops, and from all the channels water will stream ... and Judah will be established forever." (WZO 1984: 18)

3.1 Usurping Hebron through Fanatical Jewish Groups, Backed by the Israeli Government

Hebron until now is the only Palestinian city in the West Bank besides East Jerusalem in which there are Israeli settlements in the heart of the city. For this reason it was the only city in the West Bank not included in the agreement signed in 1995 and from which the Israeli 'Defence Force' (IDF) did not withdraw.

The first Jewish group entered the city already in 1967 under the famous Rabbi 'Levinger'. (Waltz/Zschiesche 1986) They moved into a city hotel, called the 'Daboja', and later occupied it, followed by further occupation of neighbouring housing including the Hadasa Building. (PACE 1999:98) Yuval Neeman, a member of the right-wing party Tekhiya, explained the occupation as follows: "Hebron has to be changed into a city with Jewish majority like Jaffa" (TAZ 12.7.1983). When the Palestinian mayor of Hebron complained to the Israeli government against these hostile acts, the following answer was given: "A small group of faithful Jews and their families spontaneously had decided to move their homes to Hebron, a city that has a long tradition of honourable Jewish life. We don't see any reason why neighbours cannot live together, friendly and peacefully in Hebron". (Israeli Government 1969)

Backed with this point of view, more fanatical settler groups were encouraged to enter even the inner Old City, occupying buildings and roofs (1979) in the Kasaba of Hebron, as well as holy places, holy to the Muslim, Christian and Jewish religions alike: the Ibrahimi Mosque itself, the 'Hadassah-Daboja' area, 'Tel Rumeida' (1984) and 'Beit Romana' along the Shuhada Bazaar street. All of these places are located close either to densely populated or to busy commercial areas (see map 2). Most of these occupied places in the inner city number less than fifty families, that is approximately 400 people. However, 'secured' by Israeli military, these hostile spots of Jewish inhabitants produced an atmosphere and a factual situation that made it intolerable to live 'peacefully together', and in fact this was not the aim of these Jewish groups. Therefore, Palestinian families who had lived in the Old City for centuries left its poorest parts (see map 2).
This 'frontline' found its supportive hinterland with the foundation of the colony of 'Kiryat Arba', started in 1986 by most racist and fanatical 'Gush Imunim' settler group. In 1972 Kiryat Arba was turned into an official Israeli colony, the state confiscated huge tracts of land as a 'military area' for further development under the familiar pretext of security. Today around 7,000 Jews live there.

3.2. The division of Hebron after Oslo

Since the signing of the 1995 Hebron Protocol as part of the interim negotiations for the 1993 Oslo Accords, the Hebron District has been divided jurisdictionally into three areas: "Area A" comprising Hebron City, in which the Palestinian Authority controls internal security and civil functions; "Area B" comprising populated villages, camps and other Palestinian built-up areas, where the Palestinian Authority controls civil functions only; and "Area C" comprising all other areas in the district, where Israel still exercises full authority (see map 3).
Instead, in 1997 a special Hebron Agreement was signed and the Old City became divided into two parts: Area H1, comprising 80% of the city under Palestinian Authority control, and H2, under full Israeli military control. H2, however, includes the Old City with the Tomb of the Patriarchs/Al-Ibrahimi Mosque and the Jewish colonies inside the Old City (see map4).

Map 4 H1/H2, Jewish settlers in the heart of the city

Source: www.flep.org; Hebron 2000, 16.09.07
Approximately 150,000 Palestinians live in Hebron, of which about 35,000 reside in the area of H2. Also living in H2 are 450 settlers, the majority of them live in occupied buildings and additional annexes close to each other in the Kasabah: the so-called ‘Avraham Avinu’ neighbourhood, ‘Beit Romano’, ‘Beit Hadassah’, and ‘Tel Rumeida’ (see map 2.4).

Tel Rumeida is an area plagued by violence. This small neighbourhood is also located in H2. Tel Rumeida colony is located on a hill, with Beit Hadasa colony at its base and the Tel Rumeida settlement at the peak. The paved roads surrounding the neighbourhood are frequently off-limits to the Palestinian families, who can be prohibited even from walking or playing in the streets. Palestinian vehicular traffic in Tel Rumeida is forbidden, forcing all the Palestinian Tel Rumeida families to park their vehicles outside the neighbourhood and walk home. (see map 5) Many Palestinian families were forced to create new routes to access their homes when their normal paths became permanently obstructed due to their proximity to the colony.

Palestinian families who live directly next to these settlers are often virtual prisoners in their homes, subject to the settlers’ violent attacks and destruction of property. (see figure 1,2)

Map 5 Strategic Location of Tel Rumeida

Source: www.telrumeidaproject.org 16.09.07

Image 1, 2 Soldiers threatening a protest demonstration at Tel Rumeida Checkpoint on 01.02.07

Source: www.artunderapartheid.ps 16.09.07
Conclusion

Hebron differs from all other colonies because the settlers are located in the densely-populated centre of a large Palestinian city, occupying land and houses that are side-by-side with Palestinian homes. There are more than 4,000 Israeli soldiers based in Hebron. The presence of these soldiers makes life miserable for Palestinian residents. Checkpoints, this permanent presence of soldiers, and aggressive settlers harassing the women and children in the houses brought international groups and institutions into those areas most in danger as witnesses, and also to secure the lives of the Palestinian families. They accompany students to their school and other activities. During the current Intifada, many residents of Hebron’s Old City moved, leaving just a few thousand Palestinian residents in H2, hence the danger of a full occupation of the Old City is increasing. Hebron is the most violent place in the usurpation war of Jews. Hebron is also an example on the hand-in-hand work of government and settlers; one does the occupation and destruction according to plans of the WZO for the Palestinian districts, the other supports by means of military power and confiscation orders. And also we can learn that any activity, even the smallest like a visit of some Jews in a hotel, has a meaning in the long-term planning project of usurping Palestine and changing it into a full Jewish area under Israeli control.

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4. The Usurpation of Ancient Jaffa – Judaised and Changed into ‘Tel Aviv’s Old City’

Galili and Nir (2000) consider the ‘mixed cities or more precisely Jewish cities with an Arab minority’ (like Acca, Haifa or Jaffa) a metaphor for the entire Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From planning point of view they see a governmental ‘desire to marginalize the Arab residents.’ Even more precisely: Jaffa’s case is ‘representing just the latest stage in a policy of ethnic cleansing which has been followed for decades’ (Washington Report on the Middle East Affairs, July 2008: 14-15). This stage includes neglecting the needs of the Palestinian communities, shaping their culture, history and existence to zero and finally evicting them out of their living quarters by means of planning and rogue laws. To speak about ‘mixed cites’ of what Jaffa was one of the first, is just a euphemism. A walk around Jaffa’s neighborhoods shows clearly, there is no mixing; moreover the run down character of streets and buildings of the ‘Arab’ side are ‘a stark contrast’ from those of Tel Aviv, an evident gap between north and south, Tel Aviv and Jaffa.

Jaffa today as most of the Arab cities has no Arab street signs anymore which have been replaced with Hebrew names and Zionist meaning like ‘Palmach’, ‘Haganah’, ‘Herzl’, etc., intending to erase the past, and setting the new facts with names of Zionist leaders and groups who were responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Palestine. Not a single Palestinian community in these cities has a cultural center or a museum representing Palestinian life, culture and history – they are ‘visible invisibles’. The NZZ (Neue Zuericher Zeitung) known for its objective comments speaks in an article on ‘Travelling’ of the Arab influence, still visible in the ‘bazaar’ area, however ‘tempi passati’. In contrast the author presents us a nice story about individual Jewish engagement to keep Old Jaffa: ‘Artists and intellectuals from Tel Aviv fell in love with Old Jaffa and reconstructed the houses on their own account. Repaying the government gave them 99 years ‘leaseholds’; what in truth belonged to Palestinians before (NZZ online 4.1.2008, Thomas Veser: Joppa, Yafo und Jonas im Fischbauch, translation form German Waltz).

Misinterpretation and neglecting history is typical for the Israeli influenced sight of the outside world on Israel’s reality especially the situation of the Palestinians inside Israel. Serious informants like e.g. the Austrian planning company SUTRA, which claims in general to look at ‘sustainable urban transformation’, informs under ‘culture and entertainment’ in exciting manner about Tel Aviv, the ‘home of the world famous Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra’, opera, theatre, museums of international art etc., however no word about Arab or Palestinian existence. Multiculturalism exist under ‘kitchen’, described as an offer thrilling to a ‘thriving and boisterous restaurant community’ and moreover: ‘Morocco, Greece, Turkey and Spain have brought Israel the Mediterranean’ - however Fallafel, Humus – origin Palestinian food since centuries - are shown as typical Israeli. (ess.co.at/SUTRA/Cities/telaviv)

Looking deeper into the Palestinian existence in the southern Palestinian parts of the city they are not provided sufficiently with schools, universities, hospitals or job opportunities. The population in general is poorer and neglected by the Israeli government in terms of provision with infrastructure, sufficient housing, job
opportunities and space (see section III). As a matter of fact the existing economic, social and cultural discrimination led to protests and clashes between Palestinian youth and Jewish neighbors in recent years.

Furthermore, a decent policy of driving the Palestinian out of their areas in favoring investment in luxury new buildings of wealthy Israelis in this attractive southern part of Tel Aviv beside the sea shore, is threatening the whole community to total eviction. It was reported recently, that also extremist Israeli settler groups from West Bank colonies are involved, transferring aggressive actions from there to inside Israel and cities like Acca or Jaffa, giving the government arguments for the interpretation, that Jewish inhabitants are endangered and hence have to be protected (The Jerusalem Fund: oct.15.2008). However clashes between the citizen of Jaffa and ‘foreign authorities’ are not something new. The process from Jaffa, the historic Palestinian city and Tel Aviv, the brand new Jewish, living beside each other until this conflict situation of today is the issue of the following paragraphs (for details about the full planning process see LeVine 2005).

4.1 Jaffa and Tel Aviv – twins of conflict until 1948

Jaffa (Arab. Yaffa, Heb. Yafo, Bible Joppa), the ‘bride of the sea’ is a Palestinian Arab city, which lies in the west central of Palestine, on the Mediterranean Sea. Jaffa has an ancient history reaching back to the Bronze Age.

In modern times, until 1948 the city was probably one of the most prosperous and cosmopolitan Palestinian city, famous for its oranges, its port and a flourishing industry, (cigarettes, cotton, leather, textile, wood boxes). It had an international school system, higher education institutes and a lively cultural life; dozens of newspapers (15) and journals (4) were published in Jaffa, many famous Arab artists like the singer Oum Kulthum and others performed in its beautiful atmosphere.

Image 1: Coast line of Jaffa in the 20th century

Source: palestineremembered.com

Since the 19th century and because of its growing economy and cultural life Jaffa became attractive for migration of many Arabs in the surrounding countries and was also a gateway for incoming Jews (see table 1).
Table 1 Jaffa’s population during the late Ottoman period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3,850</td>
<td>1,00</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>1,745</td>
<td>400–600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>16,570</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>33,465</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>3,465</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>30,700</td>
<td>9,300</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kark 1990, pages 148-49

After World War I and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire Jaffa came under British Mandate like all Palestine.

However, since the Zionist movement entered Palestine and built the first pure Jewish and modern city Tel Aviv as arrival point for Jewish migrants and centre of the colonisation, beautiful Jaffa and its fertile surrounding was a temptation and a thorn in the eye. Consequently the Zionist movement started purchasing land in and around the 24 Jaffa’s villages which was part of preparing the future hegemony over Jaffa (HRA 2005: 6). In 1921 Tel Aviv got its own city council thus becoming independent from Jaffa. From that time on Jaffa was limited in its extension to the north (see map 1) and mutual planning was difficult.

As a matter of fact by demography both cities competed unequally. Between first and second world war Jaffa’s population grew from around 32,000 (1922) to 94,000 (1944), while the Jewish population of Tel Aviv through enforced immigration grew from around 5,000 to 166,000. Tel Aviv at that time was the biggest and most dense Jewish City in Palestine; over one third of all Palestinian Jews lived there.

The economic situation was different. Both cities expanded during that time. However in 1939 e.g. the export of Jaffa amounted more than 1.2 million pound sterling in comparison to around 700,000 pounds of Tel Aviv, while import of Jaffa amounted 1.3 million and Tel Aviv’s over 4 million pounds. In a way Tel Aviv depended on Jaffa’s harbour. (LeVine 2005: 84-88)

In general both municipalities co-operated in different matters like street paving, transportation facilities, opening of factories and shops etc. Disputes were about taxes. However, the more on the Palestinian side got fears about the Zionist colonisation and British protection of it, irritation arose, conflicts appeared compromising the relation. In the forties the ‘land question’ became a hot matter, Jaffa Municipality complained intensively about ‘border infringements’, asked for British protection and aimed defending the city’s borders. Moreover, Jaffa municipality wanted to extend its city borders while the Zionist Municipality demanded to include Jaffa neighbourhoods into Tel Aviv. Manshiye became like a frontier line of the increasing conflicts (see map 1). Finally the conflict was reflected in the UN division plan for Palestine by UN resolution proposing also a separate spatial solution for Jaffa/Tel Aviv. (LeVine: 107ff)
4.1.1 Jaffa’s forced displacement under British Mandate until UN division plan

During the first uprising in 1936 Jaffa was a centre of protest and demonstration against the British because fostering Zionist immigration and usurping Palestinian land. British authorities answered with military attacks on the citizens and ‘cleansing’ the cities vernacular shape through breaking a new road through the old fabric for better entering with jeeps and military à la ‘Hausman’. (see images 2-4)

Image 2 British police searching Jaffa-citizens

Image 3 British exploding a house

Image 4 The new road à la Hausman

Sources 2-4: palestineremembered
At the end of the British mandate and according to the partition plan of the UN in 1947 Jaffa was supposed to be included in the future Palestinian State, an island surrounded by Zionist Jewish territory and separated from Tel Aviv (HRA 2008: 7; (see map 2a,b,c)

Map 2 a,b,c  UN partition plan for Palestine Mandate area including Jaffa (blue Jewish, brown Arab)

Source: Resolution 181 (II).  

However, the Zionist plan was to conquer the full land with all its resources and this is what happened the moment Britain left Palestine – also in Jaffa.

4.2 Displacement and expropriation after 1948

Jaffa was military occupied by Israel in 1948. During the ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Pappe 2006) Jaffa’s suburbs in the south (the New city) and the surrounding many villages in east and north of the city were erased from the map. Out of 70.000 inhabitants 60.000 were forced to leave and about 70% of the city was bulldozed. (HRA 2008: 16)

Only 4.000 Palestinians remained, gathered in the most run-down suburbs along the coast like Ajami in the southern and Jabalyah in the northern part of Jaffa. Manshiye was totally emptied. (HRA 2008:9; see images 5-8)

14 "The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Miqve Israel lands, to the north-west of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the north-east corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State."

Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine 29.11.1947 section A

(http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253)
After that eviction fundamental expropriation and a slowly ongoing judaising process started. The remained inhabitants were subjected to a strict martial law: surrounded with a barbed wire fence and checkpoints inspecting those entering or leaving the area, people in the Ajami neighbourhood, the biggest remaining Palestinian space in Jaffa, were only allowed to leave or enter after receiving a permit from the military governor (HRA 2008: 9).

This situation continued until 1950 (the military regime lasted until 1966 like in other Palestinian areas of Israel e.g. the Galilee (see section III). After lifting the siege Jaffa was administratively engulfed by the Tel Aviv municipality and became Tel Aviv-Yafo. The Old City of Jaffa became ‘showcase’ for Israeli artist life - the New City is still under transformation (see images 9/10).
Images 9/10  Jaffa Old City today: ‘show case’ of Tel Aviv

Source: palestineremembered

4.2.1 Fill in policy with Jewish refugees – building stop for Palestinians

The Judaising of Old Jaffa and the adjacent Palestinian – now abandoned – quarters began under pressure of thousands of Jewish immigrating from European/German persecution and new immigrants according to huge campaigns of the Jewish Agency (JA) (see images 11/12). JA became the main actor for ‘immigration and land absorption’ for the new Israeli government. It brought 700,000 Jews to Israel within three years: 239,000 survivors from holocaust, collected from different refugee camps in Europe and Cyprus, 3,800 Yemenite in an operation called ‘Magic Carpet’, 343,000 Jews from East Europe and North Africa, 110,000 Iraqi Jews in an operation called ‘Ezra and Nehemiah’, nearly all Jews from Bulgaria, half of the Yugoslavian Jews, 40,000 Jews from Turkey and 18,000 Jews from Iran. (Jewish Agency 2005).

Mainly European Jews came to Jaffa (see images 9/10). In less than one year, as the Israeli parliament reported, 45,000 new Jewish immigrants were settled in the city’s so called ‘abandoned’ homes. (Washington Report 2008)

Image 11/12 European immigrants 1949 in the looted area close to the mosque

Source: palestineremembered

In addition to being ghettoized the Palestinians who remained had lost everything, their city, their families, their properties and their historical environment. Buildings in the suburbs of the city and the surrounding villages were destroyed; a new map was grounded on their ruins. 14.397 dunam (10 dunam=1ha) were confiscated according
to the new Absentee Property Law, that law, which defined an absentee a person who during the period between 29. November of 1947 and 19. May of 1948 was a citizen of the neighbouring Arab countries or just present in these countries or out from his place in any part of the “Land of Israel” outside the territory of the State of Israel. Hence all those who under the bullets of Zionist guns fled to Gaza, Jerusalem or what became West Bank and even families who came back to their houses in 1950 were declared absentees under different pretexts and their property transferred to the Custodian of Absentee Properties (see section III) and later to Amidar. Amidar, an arm of the ILO Israel Land Organisation, was the quasi governmental Zionist Institution to provide Jews with land and housing, their major stockholder are the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund. (Shehade/ Shbaita 2008/2009: 10; HRA 2008: 12ff)

Along with this expropriation process owners of their own properties became tenants of Amidar, depending on Israeli conditions and became so called ‘protected tenants’ according to the law. The same happened to most villagers who left their land by force during the ethnic cleansing period and came to the city entering abandoned Palestinian houses or houses of their relatives who left. Most of the remained Jaffa Palestinians were from those days on refugees in their own country and tenants in their own properties. They were depending on a hostile government that did not respect their needs and rights for the next couples of years and did not allow them to build, renew, and reconstruct the neglected areas or to move to new areas. In addition land prices were beyond the range that Ajami residents could pay. Demolition and evicting went on; the vacated areas were used for new developments. In 1973 there were still 3.176 housing units in Ajami and Jabaliya neighbourhood, by 1990 just 1.608 remained, Palestinian residents estimate that some 3.200 houses were demolished during these last 30 years (HRA 2008: 16)

**Image 13 Manshija area today – a park**

Anwar Sacca in: palestineremembered.com

The Manshija area, completely destroyed, turned into a park, the Old City was completely under Jewish control and vision. New expensive restaurants, artist workshops, galleries and gift shops for foreign and Israeli tourists made it one of the most attractive and expensive places in Israel. (see image 13)

**4.3 The New Development Plan for Jaffa and the rights of Palestinian tenants**

More than 30 years the Palestinian neighborhoods along the Old City of Jaffa were neglected and looted or destroyed. In the midst of the 1980ies the Tel Aviv municipality started a next phase of cleansing of Jaffa. The view to the seaside, the beauty of the Old City and the ongoing urbanization of Tel Aviv-Jaffa area made...
places like Ajami and Jabaliya attractive for expansion and investment of wealthy Israeli. A so called ‘Jaffa Renewal Plan’ was presented - purposing of its ‘physical and socioeconomic rehabilitation’. But even though Palestinian benefitted too, it was a twisted program. The privatization of land was one of the main items within this plan. (HRA 2008:18) In this the tackled Palestinian neighborhoods were described as ‘slum neighborhoods’. (see image 14)

**Image 14  Neglected Palestinian Ajami quarter**

Source: palestineremembered HRA 2008: 17

Key actions proposed were:
- statutory building plans;
- including Jaffa into the national project of renewal, providing financial support;
- a contract with ILA (The Israel Land Authority – the governmental owner of land and buildings) requiring to channel part of the profits from sale of plots into rehabilitation and development of the public infrastructure; and
- fundraising among the international Jewish Community. (Montrescue 2007: 10 in HRA 2008: 18)

Under the first phase of this plan, demolition stopped and renovation of some mosques, churches and public buildings became real, also some of the Bauhaus styled buildings like the Alhambra cinema of the forties. (see Image 22, 23)

**Image 15  Mina Mosque renovated  Image 16  Alhambra cinema, still waiting**

Sources: palestineremembered
Standard of living increased somehow also for the Palestinian community. An increase of post-secondary graduates was possible, slow economic growth, and the Palestinian community became more self confident and active. Many of the new generations invested into new Palestinian owned enterprises – but simultaneously were involved in the upgrading project that eventually would also lead to ‘neutralizing’ its Arab Palestinian character and let Jews enter the areas.

Along with these opportunities the 90th witnessed a growing rediscovery of Palestinian identity between the Jaffa inhabitants especially among the youth and also awareness of the still existing discrimination and the loss of land and history. The beginning second intifada in the West Bank and Gaza supported even more awareness of that, campaigns to stress the unity of the Palestinian people and protests against Israeli policy in the 67 occupied territories led to demonstrations, protests and clashes with the police. (Shehade/ Shbaita 2008/2009: 12 ff) It only caused more and special attention of the Israeli government to the ‘mixed cities’, searching for more control and definitive solutions.

In April 1999 a ‘Supplementary Authority’ for Jaffa was established creating a special and powerful arm of the Tel Aviv Jaffa municipality to keep control and to organize the framework fostering the plan to develop Jaffa eventually at the expense of the origin Palestinian inhabitants

- tourism and business,
- infrastructure,
- an academic campus and Jaffa as a higher education centre,
- urban face-lifting (boulevards and parks),
- developing education, culture and community building,
- culture and art.

The anchor feature of the renewal plan for Jaffa accordingly was the ‘Jaffa Slope’ project, an area that was drained over years, used as a garbage disposal. No complains of the Palestinian inhabitants of that neighborhood against the increasing dirt, smell, noise and the closed view had ever reached a change. However now ‘Jaffa Slope’ project was to ‘remove the eyesore’ and to transform the area in a green park, linked to the Tel Aviv promenade, enlarging the sea front line including a beach section at the coast line. One of these projects is ‘Andromeda Hill’, a private initiative, planned for 270 houses with superior conditions for foreign residents and wealthy Israeli (HRA 2008: 19-22, see images 17/18).

Image 17 Andromeda Project

Image 18 Advertising Ajami

Source HRA 2008: 21,22
Within these activities ILA began to market plots to the highest bidders. In many cases ILA tendered not only empty plots but also inhabited houses so that the tenants became now object to private owners (Kaldor 2007).

Amidar, the manager of most of the houses presented in March 2007 a report on these areas entitled ‘A Review of the Stock of Squatted Property in Jaffa, Interior Committee, Israel Knesset’, in which a total of 497 houses were indicated as ‘squatters’, all of them ‘government property’, managed by Amidar, and furthermore noted, that a total of 497 received already orders to vacate their homes during last eighteen months. (HRA 2008: 3).

- However, as all the inhabitants were Amidar tenants, the tenant protection law should come to action, but the opposite happened. The Tenant Protection Law of 1972 (before Key Money Law of 1958), of which the noted Palestinians were objects, was declared for saving poorer people and mainly the thousands refugees from Europe, from eviction and unlawful treatment by land lords. However, tenants were and are protected as long as there is no demand from the owner for personal need or tenants breaking the law. This condition today is the cause for eviction of hundreds of Palestinians in the Ajami neighbourhood. Reasons for eviction were given such as: squatting or ‘building addition’ without approval from Amidar and

- no permit from building and planning authorities.

By law, eviction is permitted in such circumstances. (HRA 2008)

In fact actual 497 Palestinian families are threatened to eviction in Jaffa-Tel Aviv by means of planning programmes, building regulations and tenant protection law. (see map 3)

Map 3 Ajami neighborhood designated houses for eviction Image 19 Neglected Ajami and new Jewish inhabited houses

Gentrification often goes with upgrading policies also in European urbanized areas, and it needs action and a kind of advocacy planning to hinder authorities to succeed with such policy for the aim of social cohesion. But facts in Israel and the example of Jaffa show clearly: gentrification is aimed to ethnic cleansing in Jaffa’s Palestinian neighborhoods. The judaizing of Palestinian Jaffa has meanwhile come to a peak stage: the remained Palestinian neighborhoods are threatened to be uprooted totally.
Planning is managed to create ‘racification’ of residential areas, which are Palestinian. Accordingly protests have come and fights against these plans, demonstrations were organized, and clashes followed. (see image 20)

Image 20 Demonstration on 29.2.2008

Source: palestineremembered.com

Jamal Zahalka, a Palestinian-Israeli member of Israel's parliament, and from Jaffa, a member of the Palestinian-rights party Balad, which advocates for a secular democratic state and currently holds three seats in the Knesset, in a lecture titled “Debunking the myth of Israeli democracy” in Montreal and Toronto 2008, stated: "Our situation is deteriorating towards apartheid…,” Highlighting the situation in the occupied territories, he added, "Apartheid in South Africa separated whites and blacks, while in Israel, it not only separates Jews and Palestinians, but also separates Palestinians from each other."

Conclusion

The myth of a ‘mixed city’ of Tel Aviv-Yafo, has come to an end. Jaffa existed before 1909 as a mainly Palestinian city, and in fact a mixed city, hosting many Jews in suburbs established in the end of the 19th century. The new Jewish city of Tel Aviv was established by ‘white’ European Jews, as starting point of the colonization of Palestine. Today 4,2% of Tel Aviv – Yafo (not even the original name Jaffa is more used) population is Palestinian what is hardly an indication of a ‘mixed’ or a city of diversity or multiculturalism – as the city is often vaunted in tourist promotion.

Yonathan Mendel describes the real situation in his article “Fantasising Israel” (Mendel 2009) as follows: “The city was subject to intensive shelling in 1948, when more than 60,000 of its residents were forced to leave – mostly fleeing to Gaza. Seventy-five per cent of the city was bulldozed, leaving only 4,000 Palestinians in the now run-down Ajame and Jabaliah neighborhoods, which in fact today are the subject of intended clearance by the Amidar Corporation, who have imposed fines on the residents for “illegally” improving their houses when they had refused to allow them to upgrade. What will be built in their place is luxurious real estate at fantastic prices beyond the reach of the existing inhabitants.”

Jaffa today has been turned into a picturesque artists’ colony, in houses expropriated from their Palestinian owners. Tools were from evicting by force and
different terms of planning: developing programs, site plans, building laws and even tenant protection laws were used – as in all Israel (see section III).

In contradiction to that, 2009 Zionist enterprises celebrated the ‘centenary of Tel Aviv’ all over the western world, focusing on its cosmopolitan flavor and modernity, materialised in cement and stone in the ‘White City’. This Bauhaus City Israel achieved to be UN protected human heritage recently. Tel Aviv festivities were organised in New York, Vienna, Copenhagen and Paris, with the creation of Tel Aviv beaches in Central Park and along the banks of the Seine, the Danube and Copenhagen’s canals. While Gaza was slaughtered, Jaffa inhabitants evicted from their homes and/or forced to demolish them. The Israeli embassy in London promoted 24 hour trips to Tel Aviv to “celebration of Israeli culture, which includes the valuable contribution from many minorities in Israel, such as Christians, Muslims and Druze.” But this is not true. All the facts indicate a planned further ethnic cleaning. However, “It [Tel Aviv] didn’t just emerge from the sand in 1909, as the Zionist myth tells us. Al-Sumayil, Salame, Sheikh Munis, Abu Kabir, Al-Manshiyeh: these are the names of some of the villages that made room for it and the names are still used today. Tel Avivians still talk about the Abu Kabir neighborhood; they still meet on Salame Street. Tel Aviv University Faculty Club used to be the house of the sheikh of Sheikh Munis.” (Abe Hayeem, The Guardian – 13 Oct 2009)

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V Final Comment

The occupation and infiltration of main cities of religious and historical importance for Jews, Christians and Moslems, is a clear indication of the malicious character of Judaisation by means of planning. Since the 1967 occupation, two cities in particular, Hebron and Jerusalem, like Jaffa after the 1948 war, have faced an intensive program of destruction, aimed at eventually eliminating their Palestinian character and replacing it with a fabricated layer of Jewish 'cornerstones.' Constructing new realities in stone plays a dramatic role in reshaping the image of these cities into a Jewish one. In addition, the people, the original inhabitants are under threat due to the use of military force and the illegal use of power. Furthermore, creating Jewish majorities by inserting colonies into these cities is accompanied by a harsh policy of depriving the Palestinian inhabitants of their rights to their homes, properties and even citizenship, especially in Jerusalem.

The Judaisation of East Jerusalem is an illegal act whereby the whole city was incorporated into the Israeli system and proclaimed the capital of Israel by Knesset legislation. This allows the Israeli government to justify the planning that is actually aimed at Judaisation as official and legal development.

Hebron is an even more difficult case. After the agreements with the Palestinian Authority, the city was divided into different areas, like two countries with different legislation, culture and ways of life. Very racist, mostly American, settler groups did the dirty work of this usurpation process, breaking into the a densely populated Palestinian city before official activities and the state of Israel itself became involved as the military power over the city; later, the state concurred officially. These aggressive Israeli Jewish groups still play a vanguard role in Judaising the city. Beyond legal constraints, rules and controls, they do their job more roughly and hence more efficiently than any government would be allowed to do. In cooperation with the WZO planners, these settler groups fulfil tasks that a government would have difficulty justifying. However, the moment these aggressive groups find themselves in a problematic situation, the role of the state is asserted on the pretext of having to guarantee the security of the usurpers. It is a malicious game.

This is what happened in Hebron and, in another way, in Jerusalem. In neither city has the process come to an end, however plans and actions to assert more control and reshape the map are ongoing. Will these cities suffer the same fate as Jaffa and other Palestinian cities in Israel, where Palestinian existence nearly disappeared?

After 1948, the Old City of Jaffa lost all its Palestinian inhabitants. Israel actually calls Jaffa the 'Old City of Tel Aviv,' a total negation of historical facts which shows clearly the intention to fabricate, even in words, what does not exist. Haifa has almost lost its Palestinian character; many quarters nowadays show more Russian influence than Palestinian presence. Palestinians in Acca are still fighting for the survival of the city's Palestinian character and to remain the majority. Other cities, like Ashdod or Ramle, were emptied of Palestinians in the 1947-49 ethnic cleansing, and those who returned after the census live a shadow life, unrecognized and socially and culturally deprived. According to WZO visions, this state of affairs is intended to be the future reality for Hebron, Jerusalem and other West Bank cities in the long run. Already the ground is being prepared by brash Jewish settler groups from all over the world, in order to join with Israeli planners to create a new reality under Israeli governance.
The story of the fabrication of Israel revealed in the previous sections has more facets than we have discussed so far. Certainly, main factors in the realisation of this construction were carefully chosen planning instruments and measures with long term perspectives.

However, the aims go beyond territorial claims. The whole idea belongs to an overall vision, an image of what Israel was and how it can be re-invented. (Abu-Lughod, Heacock, Nashef, 1999) New names are replacing the Palestinian names of cities and locations in order to re-establish locations mentioned in the bible or torah and thus reinvent a historic Israel in alliance with Christian symbols, while denying and disfiguring what is Palestine and Palestinian history and identity. As explained by Edward Said, "how the history of ancient Palestine was gradually replaced by a largely fabricated image of ancient Israel, a political entity that in reality played only a small role in the area of geographical Palestine." (Said 2000: 175)

The Christian world knows Hebron, but not the Arab name of Al Khalil, which reflects the religious significance of the city of Abraham/Ibrahim from a Muslim perspective. Sarah's tomb? A mysterious Jewish tunnel under the Muslim quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem? David’s city in Jerusalem’s Silwan? Even Israeli archaeologists have questions about it. The terms Samaria and Judaea replaced the West Bank, which is also not an original Palestinian name, but part of the British Mandate's division of the Jordan Rift Valley. Israeli settlements in the West Bank, such as Ofra, Bet El, Beit Horon and Shilo are not only reinvented names taken from ancient names mentioned in the Bible; they are also reinvented locations prepared by Zionist planners in the first Zionist visions and plans. There are no remaining traces of any ancient Jewish village from Biblical times, but it becomes reality and fact by renaming and rebuilding these places.

As a result, the invented Zionist narrative dominates and gains credibility in the western world. This is the power behind Israeli/Zionist planning policies. For example, what the WZO claimed in their 1984 propaganda booklet--that Gaza 'was never heavily populated' (WZO, 1984:19) re-imagines the prevalent European Christian view of the Holy Land long before the advent of Zionism. (See the description of the Holy Land in Selma Lagerloef’s novel Jerusalem). In an essay on 'Renaissance Cartography and the Question of Palestine' (1999), Matar revealed how this question was posed cartographically with Palestine portrayed as a land 'without a people'. Focusing on holy locations only and the route of the biblical exodus, the European/Christian maps of last centuries seem justifying the Crusades conquer of the Holy Land. Matar points out that "This conflation of faith and cartography ... led to the emergence of one of the strongest heresies in the sixteenth century, that the exodus was a prophetic anticipation of the 'Restoration' of the Jews to the Promised Land in preparation for the Second Coming." (p. 149) (Matar 1999: 149)

Moreover, the struggle to judaize Palestine doesn't stop at locations. Landscape as well is under threat. Oleibo has outlined a dismal picture of Palestine in the future,
without its beautiful hilly silhouette since the Jewish colonies posted on hills are reshaping the skyline completely (Qleibo 1992). Har Homa, the recently established colony on Abu Ghneim hill, between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, is constructed on an artificially constructed hill to give the impression of an ancient housing cluster that actually never existed, in the process destroying an ancient site accessed by the people of Bethlehem for leisure and enjoyment.

The Palestinians' fight for identity in harmony with their own history has become like the task of Sisyphus. Especially in Israel, the reshaping of landscapes and locations has almost eliminated a Palestinian spatial existence, also recognised as ‘urbizid’ (analogically used with genozid/genocide: „systematische Zerstörung oder Vernichtung von Städten”/”systematic destruction or elimination of cities”, Funk 2005) and ‘ecozid’ (analogically used in environment context: destruction or elimination of ecosystems like rainforest). Parallel to Zionist destruction, modern life styles and techniques have replaced traditional Palestinian structures, while lack of space, money and resources allowed only small Palestinian spatial interventions to preserve or influence Palestinian localities. Hence, Palestinian presence in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Region nowadays is materialised in European building style and adapting to international standards. Therefore, the naturally built-up history of rural and urban life is increasingly under threat from inside and external destruction. Moreover, the remaining signs of an indigenous history are being neglected. Further complicating the situation is the fact that Palestinians and their institutions still have no power or sovereignty over their own land, and continue to rely on foreign support, which entails foreign influence and intervention, whether European, Israeli or American. It is a colonial war and usurpation by all means - cultural, social, economic and spatial - imposed on a weak occupied society with no real sovereignty. In addition, international funding and international compliance with Israeli projects are also threats to Palestinian existence and identity.

**International Projects for Palestine without Palestinians**

At the beginning of the ‘peace process,’ many expectations and development scenarios came to the fore. The World Bank immediately provided international donors and supporters with statistics and material to assist in their planning. Future perspectives, like an international free trade zone for Gaza, were proposed, despite the fact that such plans were unrealistic in view of the fact that Palestinians had no independence or sovereignty over their land. The first ‘Master Plan’ for Palestine devised by Palestinians was drawn up by Mahdi Abdel Hadi's Center for Engineering and Planning in Ramallah, outlining the future sustainable development of what should become the Palestinian State (CEP 1992). The first official Palestinian Master Plan, entitled Palestine 2015, was created between 1994 and 1998 by the newly established Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC). Palestine 2015 is comprised of the Regional Plan for the West Bank Governorates, the Regional Plan for Gaza Governorates, the Emergency Natural Resources Protection Plan (e.g. water and wastewater, landscape, cultural heritage, ecology, agricultural land) and the Palestinian Development Plan (MOPIC 1998). These plans were supported by the Europeans. Starting from the assumption of two territorially separate parts of a Palestinian state, the approach adopted in these plans was to follow international standards of sustainability, democracy, participatory and balanced development between rural and urban areas, and agricultural and industrial sectors. Planning institutions like the Ministry of Local Government and city planners still try to
follow these guidelines in part. However, the continued existence of the occupation, the post-Oslo zoning of the West Bank into different areas of mainly Israeli control and the completely separate Israeli planning on Palestinian land, mainly in Areas B and C precludes coherent development policy. People build according to their needs, the rest is developing haphazardly, if not forced into a special direction by international investments like the creation of a program called 'Metropolitan Ramallah' or 'Ramallah-al-Bireh-Beituniya Metropolitan Area Project' (RABMAP) (Khamaisi 2006, Musleh 2006). The latter sounds like a futile countermove to the Israeli Metropolitan Plan for Jerusalem which intends to include Ramallah and Bethlehem in the usurped Jerusalem area (see section V).

In conclusion, it is not the Palestinians but others who are the main planners, and whether the planner is Israel, donor countries or institutions of diffuse nature, they are not necessarily working in the Palestinians’ interest.

**The Jordan Rift Valley Project (1997)**

Everybody will agree that the Jordan Rift Valley is an important human heritage location, with great historic and religious significance for the formation of civilisations and cultures of the region. It has served as a retreat for many saints and prophets who chose this lowest place on earth and a unique surrounding of mountains to meditate and come close to God. Hence, the Jordan Rift Valley hosts many monasteries, convents and religious sites. At the city of Jericho are the main remains of what is known to be the oldest human settlement on earth going back to 9000 B.C. Moreover, the Jordan Rift Valley with its bio-diversity and sub-tropical climate attracts people from all over. The valley contains several medical resources such as mineral springs and the Dead Sea which provides clay and water with special medical and cosmetic qualities. Furthermore, the Jordan Rift Valley is a very valuable area in terms of agriculture and the most important water basin in the region. (PACE 1999: 108pp, see figure 1)

**Figure 1 The Jordan Valley Basin and planned links**

![Figure 1 The Jordan Valley Basin and planned links](image)

Source: Israel 2020 - Palestine 2015

In 1997, in accordance with the international peace efforts a 'Jordan Rift Valley Project' was initiated, the product of several economic conferences aiming at regional
economic development and partnership as part of peace achievement. HARZA, one of the world's top experts on power, water and wastewater issues, presented a preliminary study that eventually led to a master plan for the regional development of the Jordan Rift Valley (HARZA 1997). The follow-up process was undertaken by a steering committee composed of representatives for Jordan, the US and Israel, financed initially by the Italian Government. The Palestinian Authority was not included, but was promised to be a participant in a later stage. The change of the Valley's image and structure will be radical according to the master plan published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA 1997). Main projects, besides an environment survey and nature reserves, include:

- Joint cross border tourism from North to the South and connected to tourism areas in Israel, Jordan and Egypt
- Cross-border transportation, highways connecting Haifa with Irbid, the establishment of several new bridges over the Jordan River and the construction of a railway between Haifa and Mafraq (Jordan)
- Industrial parks and high tech incubators at Sheikh Hussein and King Hussein border crossings
- Joint agriculture and aquaculture for export, promoting agricultural production and fish farming
- Establishment of a joint East-West, Amman-Tel Aviv international telecommunication cable
- Energy plants in connection with the planned Red-Dead Sea Canal. (MFA 1997, HARZA 1997)

It is important to note that on the Jordan side the above-mentioned 'joint' activities appear in a special World Bank-financed program as East Bank projects under the title 'Integrated Ecosystem Management in the Jordan Rift Valley' which is already underway with the contract signed 12.7.2007. (wewewe.wd.worldbank.org 2007)

This Jordan Rift Valley Project is another instrument to determine territorial definitions and eventually redraw borders, creating conflicts instead of carrying new potentials and contributing to the political and economic stability of the region. This can be seen by the fact that the Palestinian Authority has been excluded from essential plans and decisions, in addition to Israel's expropriation, demolition and restriction policy in the West Bank which makes about 28% of the planned area. In truth, this project is a big and most profitable part of Israeli national development schemes to promote its regional aspirations, tackling water, transportation, environment, energy, tourism and communications and Israel's role in the region (IMFA 1997). Moreover, the Jordan Rift Valley Project must be understood as a chief factor in Israel's land grab and usurping policy aimed at creating a greater Israel and cementing imperial control over the region.

Coordinated Long-Term Planning between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean

In 2000 a preliminary workshop was held as a trilateral activity between Palestinian, Israeli and German (as coordinators) planners to coordinate what wasn't coordinated yet: the Palestinian 'Regional Development Plan for the Gaza and the West Bank Governorates,' Palestine 2015, and the Israeli 'Master Plan for Israel in the 21st Century,' Israel 2020. The problem was defined that the two sides were planning their
future without any connection between them. Europe and especially Germany wanted to give professional help to facilitate coordination between the two sides. At first, the meetings were funded by the Netherlands, but the purpose was unclear. Was it to support peace and find solutions? Or to keep Palestinians busy? There are more questions than answers.

The issues discussed in several workshops in Berlin between 2000 and 2005 were 'Urban and Rural,' 'Infrastructure and Systems' and 'Geography.' Subgroups were formed to discuss 'spatial and physical planning,' 'economy' and 'social infrastructure.' Seventeen Israeli experts and twelve Palestinian experts were discussing, clarifying facts and developing scenarios with the help of international experts. Eventually, the main outcome was the proposal of some 'cross-border-metropolitan areas' (see figure 2)

**Figure 2 Cross border metropolitan areas**

![Cross Border Metropolitan Areas](image1)

**Figure 3 Cross Border Area**

Ramallah/Tel Aviv

Source: Israel 2020 - Palestine 2015

**Figure 4 Cross Border Area**

Haifa/Nablus/Irbid

Source: Israel 2010 - Palestine 2015
Under fantastic names like ‘the secularity link’ (Tel Aviv/Ramallah), ‘the green heart’ (Netanya, Wadi Arad, Tulkarem) and ‘Individualism on the lowest point on earth’ (the Dead Sea), a cross-border and cross-cultural vision was outlined (see figure 3, 4). The most cross-cultural region of all, Jerusalem, was excluded. Perhaps it was excluded to avoid touching on Israel's crimes and land grab in this area, or to avoid reality altogether. This speaks for itself. Furthermore, the link between this game and the above-mentioned Israel/Jordan Planning under World Bank funding is obvious. Is this intended to involve Palestinian experts in their own destruction? Is it to keep them busy with visions which do not correspond at all to the new reality that Israel is creating day by day? Is it to keep Palestinians dreaming?

**The Arc - a vision from RAND (2005)**

The US-based RAND Corporation, which describes itself as a non-profit institution that contributes to improving policy and decision-making through research and analysis, interferes in another way with a ‘gift’ to the Palestinians. In 2005 RAND arrived at a revolutionary formula for the success of an independent Palestinian state (see figures 5-7). Given the future state within the 1967 borders, RAND proposes an ‘infrastructure corridor’ between the Gaza Region and the West Bank, an Arc, with a linear arrangement of connected cities, a ‘Ladder,’ comparable to the development of ‘Cairo along the Nile’ as an extended urban region. This Arc ‘A Ladder of Linear Cities’ would support a high speed interurban rail ... an energy network... boulevards connecting the train stations to the towns would create new areas for housing and commercial activities.’ Thus Palestine would be provided with ‘sustainable development and preserve open land for agriculture, parks and nature reserves.’ The Arc, linked not only to Gaza but also to Haifa in the future, would help ‘... to foster a coherent, unitary, and, it is hoped, a cohesive economic, political, and social Palestinian entity.’ It would, moreover, ‘open its markets to the world’. Costs are estimated at 6 billion US$$, completion time at five years and the number of employees at 100,000 to 160,000 Palestinians. The idea is that the refugee problem could also be dealt with in this way.

**Figure 5-7 The ARC**

Source: RAND Corporation 2005

The group proposes to start the project even before a state formally exists in order to ‘enhance prospects for stability and security’ (RAND 2005). Fantasy? A comment about this project is in order. Once again, it is a project proposed from outside without Palestinians or Palestinian input. It also completely ignores reality. As might be expected, the question of Jerusalem is not included. The realities created by Israel are assumed to be irrevocable facts. This Western dream is put forward at a time
when nothing seems to be moving; it is just another lie and tantalising Palestinian leaders to cope with and to keep them cooperative. Looking at their website, one finds RAND praising itself to the skies for such an extraordinary idea. Yet, when you look at the proposed links between Tel Aviv and Amman, and keep in mind what we know about the deepest Israeli aims, doesn't it look like part of another Israeli plan?

Outlook

There are many efforts from many sides to give advice to the Palestinians and the Israelis to finally make peace with each other. A ‘fight over contested land’ is one of the usual explanations for the conflict. Nobody wants to understand who has a right to the land and how and why the conflict started. Our aim is to shed light on the essence of this conflict and to create a deeper understanding of why the Palestinians’ struggle for their land on the one hand, and why Israel follows an occupation policy with all means of planning to achieve a greater realm on the other.

This will not lead to peace solutions. We also want to state clearly that there are many distractions and no simple solutions, whether with one state or two states; nor is there hope for a quick solution. Furthermore, solutions are not possible in the absence of one of the partners, especially not by eliminating the voice of the weaker side, the oppressed Palestinians, no matter how well the intentions. Deceptions and false hope lead nowhere. A solution cannot be built on the total degradation and humiliation of a people; there is a limit.

Which solution is the best? One bi-national state? Two states? Associated? Confederation? Which borders should be used? Those of the British Mandate? Those specified by the UN? The 1967 borders? This can only be decided by the indigenous people themselves. The international forces, which originally fragmented Palestine, have a special responsibility to listen to the voices of the native people, those who lived for centuries in Palestine until being forced to flee the country in 1947-48, those who were born and are living in Palestine now. Their voice is the most important; they must be heard and involved in any discussion on an equal level and based on international law, which has repeatedly asserted their right to their land and condemned Israel. In addition, the Israeli society has to give up the vision of a ‘Greater Israel’ and finally and officially admit that what they are today was and is at the expense of the Palestinians. Only then might talk and negotiations lead to a solution.

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The Authors

Amro, Jamal. Born 1956, PhD 1991, Faculty of Architecture, University of Stuttgart, Germany. MSc 1985 in Architecture, University of Stuttgart. Since 2001 Head of Master Program Urban Planning and Design UPLD, Faculty of Engineering, Birzeit University.
Recent Publications/Papers:
  Amro, J. (2006) Jerusalem, History and Future, Staedtebau und Bauleitplanung, Faculty of Spatial Planning, Dortmund University (german)

Awadallah, Faisal. Born 1955. PhD 1987 University of Maryland, USA. MSc in Civil Engineering University of Maryland, USA. Since 2004 Dean of the Faculty of Engineering, Birzeit University Palestine.
Recent Publications/Papers:

Egbaria, Kassem. Born 1970. PhD 2003 School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape, Newcastle University, UK. MA1995 in Architecture, University of Arizona-Tuscon, USA. Planner and architect, head of office, lecturer at Birzeit University, UPLD program, Faculty of Engineering, Palestine
Recent Publications/Papers:

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El-Atrash, Ahmad, Born 1986. 2010 MSc in urban Planning and Landscape Architecture, Birzeit University, Palestine, 2004 BSc in Civil Engineering, Al Najah University, Nablus, Palestine. Since 2005 Research Associate at ARIJ, Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, Currently, coordinator of “Strategy Development of Palestinian Joint Councils” and “Planning the Geo-political Fate of Jerusalem” projects.
Recent Publications/Papers

Hilal, Jane Sami, Born 1975, 2003 MSc in Environmental Management, 2002 Diploma of Specialized Postgraduate Studies (D.S.P.U.) of Environmental Management, both Department of Environmental Management-Mediterranean Agronomic Institute of Chania (MAICH) Chania, Greece; 1997 B.Sc. of Science / Major in Chemistry Bethlehem University, Palestine
Since 1998 research associate in ARIJ, Currently Head of of the Water and Environment Research Department at the Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (ARIJ)
Recent Publications/Papers: